FSRC LIBRARY

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 39, Number 3, Summer 1995

Marc Trachtenberg on Melvyn Leffler's Cold War

MYSTERIES, RIDDLES, ENIGMAS

How Near Russia Is the "Near Abroad"?
Martha Brill Olcott

How Near to Collapse Is Russia Itself?
Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham

Will Moscow Use High-Tech to Remilitarize?
Sumner Benson

The Real Stakes in the Caucasus
Stephen Blank

The Real Stakes on the Baltic
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius

The World's First Space War
Steven Lambakis

Foreign Policy Research Institute / JAI Press Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) is an independent, publicly supported, nonprofit organization devoted to the dissemination of scholarly research affecting the national interests of the United States. Through research, publications, seminars, and appearances by its staff in the news media, FPRI seeks to shape the climate in which American foreign policy is made. Research is conducted by the FPRI staff, supplemented by the work of Fellows and Associate Scholars.

Major programs of the Institute include the Asia Program, the Middle East Council, the Center for Emerging Democracies, and the Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education. Wachman Fund activities include the *Inter-University Seminar on Foreign Affairs,* for scholars and the interested public; *Global Classroom* and *Weekend Academy,* for secondary school teachers; *Where Business and Politics Meet,* for business leaders; and the *Internship Program,* for students contemplating a career in international affairs.

The Institute also publishes the *FPRI Wire,* a two-page commentary on world affairs; through its Middle East Council, it publishes the *MEC Wire* and *Peacefacts,* a bulletin on the Middle East peace process. The Wachman Fund publishes *Footnotes,* a newsletter for secondary school teachers.

To inquire about membership, write or call the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684, Tel: (215) 732-FPRI (-3774), Fax: (215) 732-4401. All contributions to FPRI are tax-deductible.

President
Harvey Sicherman
Vice President
Alan H. Luxenberg

Board of Trustees
John Gilray Christy
Chairman
Bruce H. Hooper
Marvin Wachman
Vice Chairmen
Charles B. Grace
Treasurer
W.W. Keen Butcher
Robert A. Fox
Susan H. Goldberg
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Kenneth D. Hill
Bobbie Hillman
Tatnall Lea Hillman
John F. Lehman
David Lucterhand
Martin Meyerson
Stephen S. Moody
Ronald J. Naples
Irene E. Nunn
Frank N. Piasecki
Charles P. Pizzi
Harvey Sicherman
Edward M. Snider
Robert Strausz-Hupé
David V. Wachs
William H. Wurster
Dov S. Zakheim

Board of Advisors
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower
Samuel P. Huntington
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz
James R. Thompson
Richard Thornburgh
Murray Weidenbaum

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 39, Number 3, Summer 1995



President Abraham Lincoln hoisting the American flag with thirty-four stars upon Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 22, 1861. Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia.

Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute

by JAI PRESS INC.

Greenwich, Connecticut • London, England

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis
A Journal of World Affairs

Editor
WALTER A. McDOUGALL

Managing Editor
ROGER DONWAY
Manuscript Editor
THOMAS ECKMIER
Book Review Editor
ADAM GARFINKLE
Membership Coordinator
THELMA PROSSER

Contributing Editors
BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ
PAUL BRACKEN
PATRICK CLAWSON
MARK FALCOFF
L.H. GANN
ROSS H. MUNRO
MICHAEL RADU
HARVEY SICHERMAN
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU

BOARD OF EDITORS

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
University of New Orleans

PAUL BALARAN
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
National Defense University

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

HENRY S. BIENEN
Northwestern University

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

ELIOT A. COHEN
The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

STEPHEN P. COHEN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

L. GORDON CROVITZ
Hong Kong

ARTHUR CYR
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
National Institute for Public Policy

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Rutgers University

CHALMERS JOHNSON
University of California, San Diego

ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD
RAND Corporation

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

ROBERT S. LEIKEN
International Forum for Democratic Studies

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
Center for Strategic & International Studies

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

KENNETH MAXWELL
Council on Foreign Relations

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Hudson Institute

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

BARRY R. POSEN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
University of California at Berkeley

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI
Princeton University

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHEN VAN EVERA
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

GEORGE WEIGEL
Ethics and Public Policy Center

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Editorial Assistants: Job Campbell, Jason Ladavac, Troy Prinkey, Kathelene Sicalides, Annette Reeves

Articles appearing in *Orbis* are indexed and/or abstracted in *ABC Political Science; Academic Index; America: History and Life; Articles 1st; CARL UnCover; Contents 1st; Current Contents: Social and Behavioral Sciences; Historical Abstracts; International Political Science Abstracts; (Newspaper and) Periodical Abstracts; Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS); Social Science Citation Index (SSCI); Social Science Index; U.S. Political Science Documents.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 39, Number 3, Summer 1995

Editor's Column Walter A. McDougall 315
Poor Richard's Almanack R. Saunders 321

Russia's World Turned Upside Down 327
The Russian Federation's Fight for Survival Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham 329
Sovereignty and the "Near Abroad" Martha Brill Olcott 353
Russia's Real Drive to the South Stephen Blank 369
As Go the Baltics, So Goes Europe Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius 387
Will Modern Technology Remilitarize Russia? Sumner Benson 403

Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond Steven Lambakis 417

Correspondence 435

Review Essays
Melvyn Leffler and the Origins of the Cold War Marc Trachtenberg 439
The Promising Land? Outlines of a New Israel Mark A. Heller 456

La Longue Durée 463

Auguries 465

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991

Diplomacy and War in the New World Order

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh

The Gulf Conflict provides the most authoritative and comprehensive account to date of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, its expulsion, and the aftermath of the war. Blending compelling narrative history with objective analysis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh inquire into the fundamental issues underlying the dispute and probe the strategic calculations of all the participants.

"The marshaling of so disparate a coalition, the assembling of so large an army half a world away, and the winning of a stunning if inconclusive victory are parts of a tale that until [now] has not been told in all its complexity. . . . It is unlikely that there will be a better balanced or more comprehensive chronicle of that seminal event."—*The New York Times Book Review*

Now in paper: $18.95 ISBN 0-691-03772-8

Available from Princeton in the U.S., Canada, and U.S. dependencies



With a new postscript by the author

The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire

John B. Dunlop

This is the first work to set one of the great bloodless revolutions of the twentieth century in its proper historical context. John Dunlop pays particular attention to Boris Yeltsin's role in opposing the covert resurgence of Communist interests in post-coup Russia, and faces the possibility that new institutions may not survive long enough to sink roots in a traditionally undemocratic culture.

"Through a judicious mix of well-chosen detail and a good feel for the peculiarities of the Russian scene, Dunlop has produced a book equally valuable to someone trying to understand how Gorbachev's perestroika came a cropper and to someone who needs to know the immediate background of the Russia we now have."
— *Foreign Affairs*

Now in paper: $16.95 ISBN 0-691-00173-1

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

AVAILABLE AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR DIRECTLY FROM THE PUBLISHER: 800-777-4726

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor's Column

The Foreign Policy Research Institute is on the move . . . again. It began life at the corner of 36th and Walnut, in the Girard (now Mellon) Bank building owned by the University of Pennsylvania. When the FPRI and Penn finalized their divorce in 1971, the Institute went into windowless exile in the Science Center on Market Street, then escaped in 1988 to the venerable wood-panelled and iron-stained Ralston House on Chestnut Street. But given that the official mandate of Ralston House is geriatrics (something the FPRI is not yet ready for), and that elegant offices can now be had in Center City for lower rents than in West Philly, we pulled up stakes at the end of March. The editorial offices of *Orbis* are now located in Suite 610, 1528 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684. Still a ten-minute drive from campus and 30th Street station, we are now within walking distance of the Financial District and Rittenhouse Square. Our new telephone number is (215) 732-FPRI (-3774), and fax (215) 732-4401.

In These Pages

For six or seven years the call has been out for a new Mr. "X" to draft a blueprint for American strategy. But let us recall that containment, to Kennan, was derivative. The central purpose of his Long Telegram and X-Article was to explain "the sources of Soviet conduct." Inasmuch as a nuclear-armed Russia teetering between reform and reaction still poses the greatest potential threat to our security, should we not begin our strategic search by asking after the sources of Russian conduct today?

I know the perils of the undertaking. In 1990 I was asked to gather my thoughts on the future of Gorbachev's foreign policy.[1] Rereading that article I am pleased with its *historical* insights but appalled at how quickly its prophecies aged. I do not envy political scientists and columnists, whose earnest works may not survive the morrow. Worse still is the burden of statesmen, whose mistakes cannot be shrugged off.

When we planned this issue I expected that most of the articles would deal precisely with Russia. One of them does. Sumner Benson, a veteran of Richard Perle's Pentagon office on technology transfer, asks whether the high-tech infusions sought by Russia in the interest of the civilian economy may perversely nurture the ex-Soviet military-industrial complex. Otherwise, our contributors' gazes are fixed on the edge of old empire, where Russian conduct,

[1] Walter A. McDougall, "Speculations on the Geopolitics of the Gorbachev Era," in *Perestroika at the Crossroads*, ed. Alfred J. Rieber and Alvin Z. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe and Co., 1991), pp. 326–62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whatever its sources, has been revealed since the time of Ivan the Terrible, or Catherine the Great, whose minister warned: "That which ceases to grow begins to rot."[2] An excuse for imperialism, that is still a statement of fact for a great Eurasian people bereft of natural boundaries. And that is why Russia's choice may be more subtle than one between democracy and empire.

In these pages, we learn how to think about the question "what's to become of Russia?" Martha Brill Olcott, a leading expert on Central Asia, performs a triage on the Commonwealth of Independent States, describing which members are willing and/or able to aspire to full sovereignty. Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham do the same for the congeries of political entities within the Russian Federation, and assess the chances of Russia's falling apart. Stephen Blank tells us what is really at stake in Chechnya, and why Russia's thrusts to the south threaten the security edifice of all Europe. Vejas Liulevicius ponders possible Baltic futures (including that of my favorite ort—Kaliningrad) and tells why Europe and the United States should do more than promise to "act appropriately when Russian actions run counter to our interests," as Warren Christopher recently did in defiance of my ban on the weasel word "appropriate."[3]

Finally, Marc Trachtenberg (an assiduous footnote- and logic-policeman) takes us back to the start of the cold war in a critical review of Melvyn Leffler's *A Preponderance of Power.*

If any subject is as fetching as the future of Russia, it is military power in outer space. How many readers know of the decisive role played by orbital assets in the Persian Gulf war, and how easily our monopoly of space power might be broken by a rogue regime possessing only a bit more technology and wit than Saddam Hussein? Steven Lambakis answers these questions in an overdue wake-up call.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

Who wanted the Soviet bloc to collapse? Almost everyone, save Marxists and fellow travellers.

Who wanted the Soviet *Union* to collapse? Not so many, East or West. George Bush and James Baker evidently did not, to judge by their bitter-end support of Gorbachev, delay in blessing Baltic independence, and warning against Ukrainian nationalism. A Soviet crack-up, it was feared, would breed instability and nuclear anarchy. Most liberals agreed.

Now, who wants *Russia* to collapse? Almost no one. But the Russian Federation is still a polyethnic empire with disaffected regions, an economy in tatters, and a clumsy central government. Moreover, Russia is still an agency of terror against dissidents like the Chechens (however disreputable they may be). Yet no one says, "Jettison Russia—let it go down." Perhaps that's prudent; I don't suggest otherwise. But no irreducible Russian "nation" exists. Russia is a state or, as Pobedenostsev put it,

[2] Cited by Adam Ulam in *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1967* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 5.

[3] Warren Christopher, "Remarks at the University of Indiana," March 29, 1995, p. 3 (mimeograph).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a world. So the questions to ask are not "should we support Russia?" but rather "how much Russia is enough, or too much?" and how might Caucasians and Kazakhs answer that question differently than Lithuanians or Poles, Romanians or Turks, Frenchmen, Germans, or Americans?

If self-determination and consent of the governed are the yardsticks, then Russia has never enjoyed legitimate government. Tsars and commissars ruled by *force majeure* in the name of ideologies they revised at their convenience. As a result, outsiders have usually thought of Russia only as a *force* to be exploited, avoided, or destroyed according to their own whims and means.

How much Russia is enough? In the seventeenth century, the Ch'ing Dynasty thought a Russia reaching into the Amur Valley "too much," and effaced her foothold. In the eighteenth, Sweden and Turkey considered a Russia reaching the Baltic and Black Seas "too much," but after disastrous wars reconciled themselves to a greater Russia by redefining themselves. When Tsarina Elizabeth threatened to move against Poland, Prussia's King Frederick the Great said such a Russia would be "too much." So he looked to England for help, which shocked the French into an alliance with Austria, which precipitated the Seven Years' War (1756–63).

Napoleon tried twice to make Russia *bigger*, by offering the mad Tsar Paul and somewhat less mad Alexander I a partition of Eurasia. But Alexander demanded the Turkish Straits as part of his share and bolted the French Continental System, whereupon Napoleon decided that any Russia with a will of its own was "too much."

The first European to see Russia as useful was Metternich. To be sure, he contrived to contain Russia in Europe and the Near East, lest it become "too much," but willingly granted the tsars a leadership role so long as they blessed the status quo. But a Russia able to freeze the status quo was "too much" for fiery Liberals like Palmerston. So Britain and France went to war in the Crimea to trim Russia down to a size they deemed *juste*.

How much Russia is enough, or too much? In World War I the British and French quickly agreed to what they'd resisted for a century—Russian control of Constantinople—in order to cement the coalition against Germany. But after the armistice the Allies enjoyed the rare luxury of being able to deliberate, without immediate fear or ambition, on the bigness of Russia. The land was rent by revolution and civil war, while Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Poles, Ukrainians, Moldovans, Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijani seized the moment to declare independence. To be sure, the Allies' options were limited, but they had it in their power to influence the future of Russia.

France wanted a strong, unified, nationalist Russia as a counterweight to Germany, hence showed little sympathy for Caucasian nationalisms and embraced those of Eastern Europe only *faute de mieux*. Woodrow Wilson endorsed Russia's "territorial integrity" against Japanese pretensions in Siberia, but otherwise upheld self-determination.

The British alone debated the question—at length. Lord Curzon, his eye as always on Britain's Lifelines of Empire, cheered every independence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movement and longed to send troops, ships, guns, and money to Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Persia. Churchill was hot to help the Russian "Whites" crush the "Reds," even if it meant honoring their loud claims to the former imperial borders. He feared that a weak Russia would succumb to "that very Russo-German alliance which, whether on a Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik basis, constitutes the greatest danger that threatens us in the future."[4] But Prime Minister Lloyd George clung to the muddled middle, approving half-measures only when procrastination became untenable.

So Britain encouraged post-tsarist independence movements, but never warned the Bolsheviks to keep "hands off" the Ukraine or Caucasus, nor intervened enough to secure the new nations. By 1920 Churchill was crying:

> "These consequences are terrible . . . to allow Poland, the Baltic States and Finland to remain inert and uncombined until their turn comes; to abandon to their fate all our present friends in Russia who have been fighting the Bolsheviks; to adopt two new protégés in the feeble and divided States of Georgia and Azerbaijan; to make new doles of arms, munitions, and supplies to them; to tie up small bodies of British troops in most perilous positions along the Batoum-Baku railway line. . . . In other words, having refused to combine any of the large factors in the struggle against the enemy, having allowed them to be smashed up one by one on the grounds that we could not face the expense or run the risk, we are now to try to make a new front out of the little weak pawns that are left to us. . . ."[5]

So the British and French played Keystone Kops while the Red Army occupied Azerbaijan in April 1920, then moved on to Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Siberia, Central Asia, and Mongolia. The Allies got the worst of all worlds: a strong, dictatorial Russia hostile to the West and accommodating to Germany.

Perhaps today we should heed Lloyd George. Perhaps NATO has no business, or interest, in propping up the successor states. Perhaps we should heed Churchill and seek above all a tolerable *Russia,* compared to which the fate of small states is of little importance. Or perhaps we should echo Curzon, damn Russia as incorrigible and beyond our control, and look to our own interests and the rights of small nations.

It's not just a matter of balance of power, but of what *role* we want Russia to play in the world. As Paul Schroeder recently argued, every state, big and small, has a function to fulfill defined by its geography and characteristics. When a state ceases to play its role, or oversteps its bounds, the system goes out of whack.[6] But what is Russia's proper role? To stay out of the Caucasus,

[4] Cabinet paper, Sept. 16, 1919. Cited by Winston S. Churchill in *The World Crisis: The Aftermath* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1929), pp. 251–53.

[5] Cabinet paper, Jan. 17, 1920. Cited by Richard H. Ullman in *Britain and the Russian Civil War,* vol. 2 of *Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968) pp. 332–33.

[6] Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security,* Summer 1994, pp. 108–148.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Balkans, and Central Asia—or to police them? What constructive role should Russia play on the Pacific, or the Islamic frontier? And come to think of it, why have no high-minded Russians come along to answer such questions? Is it because they love their dialectical chains so much that they insist on being Slavophils or Westernizers, democrats or imperialists, Orthodox or secular materialists—always passionate about abstractions and oblivious to reality?

If you believe Tolstoy, the purpose of Russia is a riddle no one can read:

> A bee settling on a flower has stung a child. And the child is afraid of bees and declares that bees exist to sting people. A poet admires the bee sucking from the chalice of a flower and says it exists to suck the fragrance of flowers. A beekeeper, seeing the bee collect pollen from flowers and carry it to the hive, says that it exists to gather honey. Another beekeeper . . . says the bee gathers pollen dust to feed the young bees and rear a queen, and that it exists to perpetuate its race. A botanist notices that the bee flying with the pollen of a male flower to a pistil fertilizes the latter, and sees in this the purpose of the bee's existence. . . . The higher the human intellect rises in the discovery of these purposes, the more obvious it becomes that the ultimate purpose is beyond our comprehension. All that is accessible to man is the relation of the life of the bee to other manifestations of life. *And so it is with the purpose of historic characters and nations.*[7]

[7] Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 1264.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Publications from RAND



$35.00 cloth, $20.00 paper
769 pages • 0-8330-1527-3

NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEFENSE PLANNING

RETHINKING HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH

Edited by Paul K. Davis

"Represents a broad treatment of a tough problem facing the defense community—how to plan military forces in the context of an uncertain future."

Dr. Stuart Johnson, Director of Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies

TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD

U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence

Richard L. Kugler

This book explores a single dominant hypothesis: that a dangerous world may lie ahead. To deal with interacting trends in the current global situation, the author suggests a new U.S. policy of "systemic containment" or "peace through global stability."

$15.00 paper • 304 pages • 0-8330-1592-3

SNAKES IN THE EAGLE'S NEST

A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases

Alan Vick

A historical look at air base attacks over the past 50 years, with in-depth focus on three case-study regions. Alan Vick explores the objectives, tactics, and outcomes of ground attacks and why they will continue to be a threat in future conflicts.

$15.00 paper • 165 pages • 0-8330-1629-6

U.S. REGIONAL DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening

Few states or leaders appear to be truly "crazy" or undeterrable. Watman and Wilkening assert that a critical distinction must be made between adversaries motivated to gain and those motivated to avert loss. Understanding this dichotomy has important implications for developing a credible deterrence strategy.

$15.00 paper • 106 pages • 0-8330-1595-8

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT

Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman

Regional nuclear confrontation will involve brinkmanship, or a competition in risk-taking. In this companion report to *U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, the authors use a dynamic framework to analyze why regional nuclear deterrence may be difficult for the United States.

$15.00 paper • 75 pages • 0-8330-1596-6

Available as a set for $20.00
0-8330-1658-X

At bookstores or National Book Network, Inc.
(301)459-3366 • (800) 462-6420

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poor Richard's Almanack

by R. Saunders

"Twiddle, Twaddle," or The Great Foreign Policy Debate

> Ye Party Zealots, thus it fares with you,
> When Party Rage too warmly you pursue;
> Both Sides club Nonsense and impetuous Pride,
> And *Folly* joins whom *Sentiments* divide.[1]

Thus did I arrive (following a suitable discourse on the mysteries of astrology) at the sublime truth that in foreign policy, party rage joins both sides in Folly.

It was August 1751, when Whigs and Tories entered the lists, jousting madly to discover which could do most damage to the realm—the pointing out of which would soon lose the excellent Mr. Pitt his portfolio.

We Americans later dared to imagine that under our own Constitution, after suitable debate, the play of faction might cease at waters' edge. Alas! We learned instead that debate on foreign policy, in Washington as in London before, is subject to an intellectual Gresham's law: bad ideas invariably drive out good ones.

So it is today. For just when we anticipated a genuine clash of philosophy between a Democratic president and a Republican Congress, we find ourselves mired again in an ancient feud between so-called internationalists and so-called isolationists.

Mr. Clinton employed a conference at the Richard Nixon Institute to assault Republicans for inciting the hounds of isolationism. This from a president whose political body language conveyed for two years the sense that foreign policy does not matter . . . except when it does, whereupon America's pocketbook and human rights agenda come first . . . except when we are beguiled into some folly by the United Nations.

The Republicans rose, or fell, to this challenge. Some denied they were isolationist (i.e., stupid). Others criticized the Russians. Henry Kissinger noticed that this administration lacks a "conceptual approach," a failing he would be happy to remedy. As usual, it was Speaker Newt who caught the real temper of his flock. "I'm a hawk," he said, "a cheap hawk."

So here is reality. The president and his party stand for a failed multilateralism associated with the United Nations and characterized by the absence of American leadership. Republicans stand for a robust Ameri-

[1] Benjamin Franklin, *Poor Richard: The Almanacks for the Years 1733–1758* (Garden City, N.Y.: International Collectors Library), p. 188.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can role, but "on the cheap"—a role that risks rhetorical excess backed by underwhelming force. We have seen enough of that already in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the American people tell the pollsters that they like the Republican rhetoric, but shun the price of leadership, at least until they hear better justification for it. The people make more sense than the politicians. But common sense is not yet a policy.

No wonder that the president, Congress, and people, duly perplexed by this dubious beginning, turn instead to such delightful diversions as budget cutting, school lunches, and welfare reform. Surely we can, we must do better—for the world shall not leave us alone. So once again it is left up to me to suggest some modest foundations upon which to erect the scaffolding of a bipartisan foreign policy, lest party rage join both sides in folly.

First, let us confess: the rest of the world craves our system in order to make money, not make democracy. So put aside the dizzy notion that the burial of Marx means the resurrection of Jefferson. The newly freed soon forget their old chains. What they espy at present, rubbing their eyes uncertainly in the harsh light of truth, is their physical and intellectual poverty.

Predictably, the idea of getting rich quick has submerged all other ideas except a new nonsense to the effect that all that prevents one from getting rich quick is some devil, be it one's neighbors, organized crime, Western financiers, or some stranded minority within. Money-grubbing nationalism is the *real* theme of the hour. It follows then that it is a dangerous conceit for the United States to pursue a foreign policy that presumes democracy to be in the ascendancy. The "restoration" of democracy in places where it never existed is fool's beer at best.

Secondly, the sinews of peace are to be found not in the United Nations—which is neither "united" nor composed mainly of "nations"—but in coalitions of the like-minded, such as NATO. We would revisit at our peril the old debate between Wilson and his League and Teddy Roosevelt and his carefully entangled alliances; or that between Franklin Roosevelt's Four Policemen and Churchill's alliance of free peoples.

Evidence should be self-evident: the United States and its democratic allies possess a preponderance of political, economic, and military power. If they cannot fix a given problem, who else can do it? I do not suggest that the United Nations is bereft of utility! As every president and secretary of state soon learns, the United Nations is a convenient place to discharge failed policies—an echo chamber of banging shoes, embarrassed demagogy, and the ironic applause of paid diplomats. For the United Nations to be of use, your coalition must be in place before you mount the U.N. podium; your votes must be in hand before the voting begins.

Thirdly, this republic's military must have a broader choice than that between fighting another Desert Storm and polishing brass in the bar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

racks. As everyone in Washington knows, the Pentagon really did not want to fight the Persian Gulf war. But having fought and won it, the generals want nothing but more Desert Storms. And so they inquire: Do trees grow on the battlefield this time? Not good. Is our adversary not dumb enough to give us six months to get ready? Not good. Do we not have the whole world behind us this time, and do we lack whole countries in which to stage our forces? Not good *at all.*

Such is the thinking behind our deployment of two aircraft carriers and two ground divisions to subdue the Haitians—an operation that might have proved within the ability of the police force of one large American city. The Pentagon's interpretation of Colin Powell's doctrine (better to use twenty guns instead of ten) now demands, by a process of bureaucratic elephantiasis, a hundred guns instead of twenty. Such hyperbole exhausts the troops, depletes the budget, and leaves presidents with less and less choice.

The world knows we can win a Desert Storm. Unless we so denude ourselves of army divisions that this too becomes impossible, no adversary will test us in that way again. We need a doctrine that tells us how to engage the Somalias, Haitis, and Bosnias of the world if we are *not* to go "isolationist" by default.

Crucial to such a doctrine will be a sense of limit. We can save select portions of humanity only on a schedule: a beginning, an end, and a not very lengthy engagement in between. Otherwise only a well-conceived and well-explained national interest justifies the risk to our troops.

Lastly, let us confess that economic bashmanship gets us nowhere. For two years these Clintonites have bashed; the trade deficit has gone up. Even Mr. Gephardt admits now that most of our deficit is due to factors other than Japan's unfair trade practices. Meanwhile, the world's bean counters ignore our tough talk, read the numbers, and dump dollars accordingly. The endless reports we read on the American economy may be tiresome, but that does not mean they are false. A low savings rate, poor education, taxes on capital, and budget deficits damage American competitiveness far more than Japanese bureaucratic impediments.

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration's real economic disaster turns out to be good neighbor Mexico. In defiance of economic logic Mexico borrowed short-term in ever larger amounts until devaluation was the only alternative to collapse. The mystery is not Mexico—but why our self-satisfied pundits, politicians, and even investors pronounce themselves astonished. At least investors can leave Mexico. Most Mexicans cannot.

Preach less abroad until one's own house is in order. I think *I* said that.

These four propositions—that democracy is not what the world necessarily wants; that coalition, not U.N., diplomacy works; that our military craves flexibility; that economic strategy begins at home—require little of Democrats and Republicans be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yond a humble bow to reality. They are the basis for the exercise of leadership rather than the rhetoric of leadership. But 'tis a hard thing to ask our leaders to listen to facts instead of each other . . . and leave off their clubbing with Nonsense and impetuous Pride.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Washington Quarterly

Brad Roberts, Editor

"With the passing of the Cold War, the intellectual challenge [of] U.S. foreign policy could hardly be greater. ***The Washington Quarterly*** has been consistently creative in meeting this challenge." **Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies**

"***The Washington Quarterly*** [is] a leading source of analysis and forum for debate about the role of the United States in the post-Cold War era. Its articles are consistently fresh, yet authoritative, reflecting a wide-ranging, forward-looking, and policy-relevant agenda." **Edward N. Luttwak, Strategist**

A premier international affairs journal, ***The Washington Quarterly*** is a valuable source of incisive, independent thinking about our changing world and the foreign, defense, and economic policies suited to the times. Renowned intellectuals and policymakers from the United States and overseas contribute diverse political and professional perspectives to each issue.

Select Recent and Forthcoming Articles: 1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era, *Brad Roberts;* Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances, *Phil Williams;* Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Pete V. Domenici;* The Once and Future Security Council, *Jose E. Alvarez;* Democratic Opposition in Russia: An Alternative to Yeltsin?, *Julia Wishnevsky;* Prospects for an EU-NAFTA Free Trade Agreement, *Thomas J. Duesterberg.*

Browse through select ***Washington Quarterly*** article excerpts and ordering information on THE ELECTRONIC NEWSSTAND: gopher enews.com.

Published quarterly by THE MIT PRESS for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ISSN 0613-660X

1995 RATES: Individual $32.00, Institution $82.00, Student (copy of current ID required)/Retired $20.00. *Prices subject to change without notice. Prepayment required.* Outside U.S.A., add $16.00 postage and handling. Canadians add additional 7% GST. Send check—drawn against a U.S. bank in U.S. funds, payable to *The Washington Quarterly*—AMEX, MC, or VISA number to: Circulation Department, MIT PRESS JOURNALS, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA, 02142-1399, USA, TEL: (617) 253-2889, FAX: (617) 258-6779, journals-orders@mit.edu.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RUSSIA'S WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Russia's Administrative Divisions
(detail from previous map)

Map Key: 1 Krasnodar kray, 2 Stavropol' kray, 3 Adygea, 4 Karachay-Cherkessia, 5 Kabardino-Balkaria, 6 North Ossetia, 7 Ingushetia, 8 Chechenia, 9 Nizhegorod oblast, 10 Mordvinia, 11 Chuvashia, 12 Mari El, 13 Udmurtia. Map Source: U.S. government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Russian Federation's Fight for Survival

by Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham

The greatest question facing today's huge Russian Federation is whether its eighty-nine components—republics, oblasts, and krais—will find enough common ground to remain one country, or will follow the Soviet Union's course and fracture into several smaller countries. If the Federation does hold together, will it be because Moscow reasserts authoritarian, centralized control? Or because Moscow continues to make bilateral arrangements with the various components of the Federation as necessary? At present, the most likely prospect is that Russia will remain intact, progressing—often sporadically and unevenly, but generally peacefully—toward a stable federation or confederation.

But the odds on these three alternative futures have fluctuated greatly over the past four years, underscoring how quickly prospects can change. As long ago as 1991, much evidence pointed to a splintering within the Russian Federation. Some segments of the country (such as Tatarstan, Chechnya, and Bashkortostan) were seeking autonomy; some (most notably, important parts of resource-rich Siberia and the Far East) believed that their interests were not well-represented in Moscow; others (for example, Nizhny Novgorod) saw brighter economic prospects in closer, direct contacts with the international community.

Today, while regionalization within Russia is still occurring, several developments have made the possibility of new states emerging on Russian territory more remote. These include: the breathing room Russian president Boris Yeltsin obtained for his leadership with the 1992 Federation Treaty; Yeltsin's victory over the old parliament in October 1993; the adoption of the new constitution, which created a strong presidency and helped stabilize relations between Moscow and the rest of Russia; and fear of the instability such fracturing would cause. In the wake of events in Chechnya, the impetus behind greater regional autonomy may well reignite, but with less emphasis on outright independence and more on extracting concessions from a weakened center.

As for the idea of an authoritarian regime assuming control: the December 1993 elections and ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's strong showing in them lent credence to this prospect for a while. Since then, Zhirinovsky has

Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham work at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia. Clark focuses on security and political developments in the former Soviet Union. Graham, an economist, analyzes government regulation of industries, economic conversion, and technology and acquisition policy. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the IDA.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discredited himself through a host of inflammatory and ridiculous statements. Yet support remains strong for many of the ideas he embodies: including firmer centralized control, continued subsidies to factories and agriculture, social protection measures, and reasserting Russian pride. This support is strongest in Russia's rusting industrial centers, but the ideas have adherents among Russia's political elite, some of whom embrace the idea of reclaiming parts of the Soviet empire. Calls to protect the millions of Russians living outside the Russian Federation have frequently served as a rallying point for those wanting to interfere in the other states of the former Soviet Union. At the time of the USSR's disintegration, there were approximately 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation; as of early 1995, this number is said to have declined to about 22 million. Still, the probability of the authoritarian alternative is not high at present, in part because it would require the cohesive participation of the Russian military. For reasons discussed below, that is currently unlikely.

In early 1995, therefore, the near-term outlook for Russia is neither fractionation nor centralization, but greater federation: "The likely prospect for 1994 and 1995 is of increasing powerlessness and instability of the center, with Russians struggling to survive in an increasingly regional framework."[1] Indeed, the Yeltsin leadership appears to have accepted (for now) that it must allow a greater devolution of power to local authorities if the Russian Federation is to remain in one piece.

In some respects, the Russian Federation is structured like the former Soviet Union (FSU). That is, just as many boundaries between Soviet republics were drawn purposely to divide ethnic groups, so too were many of the borders within the Russian Federation. For instance, in Siberia the Buryats were divided among Buryatia, Chita Krai, and Irkutsk Krai in order to reduce their cohesiveness.[2]

On the other hand, Russia has the advantage of being more ethnically homogeneous than the FSU. Ethnic Russians are the majority in a significant number of the Russian Federation's components and altogether make up 80 percent of the Federation's population.[3] In contrast, Russians were only half of

[1] Peter Reddaway, "Visits to a Maelstrom," *The New York Times,* Jan. 10, 1994. Reddaway reaffirmed this thesis in "Desperation Time for Yeltsin's Clique," *The New York Times,* Jan. 13, 1995.

[2] See M. Appelgate, *Siberia and the Russian Far East* (Camberley, U.K.: Conflict Studies Research Center, 1994), p. 5.

[3] Those areas of the Russian Federation in which Russians represent 50% or less of the local population are: Aginsky-Buryat (41%), Bashkortostan (39%), Chechen-Ingushetia (23%), Chuvashia (27%), Dagestan (9%), Kabardino-Balkaria (32%), Kalmykia-Halmg Tangtch (38%), Karachai-Cherkessia (42%), Komi-Permian (36%), Mari El (47%), North Ossetia (30%), Sakha/Yakutia (50%), Tatarstan (43%), Tyva/Tuva (32%).

Those areas of the Russian Federation in which Russians represent 51–75% of the local population are: Adygea, Astrakhan, Buryatia and Ust Ordynian Buryat, Chutkotsky, Evenk, Gorno-Altay, Karelia, Khanty-Mansi, Komi, Koria, Magadan, Mordovia, Nenets, Orenburg, Taimyr, Tyumen, Udmurtia, Ulyanovsk, Yamalo-Nenets.

In all other areas of the Russian Federation, Russians represent 76% or more of the local population. USSR State Committee on Statistics, *The National Composition of the USSR's Population* (Moscow: Finance and Statistics, 1991) pp. 34–77. While there are questions about its accuracy, this 1989 census remains the most comprehensive and authoritive to date. Note that Chechen-Ingushetia separated into the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the USSR's population. This homogeneity does not, however, ensure Russia's territorial integrity.

In fact, the principal divisions that have emerged within the Russian Federation over the last four years have been geographic and economic, not ethnic. Thus, the main challenge facing Russian leaders today is to find a proper balance of power and authority between Moscow and the other components of the country. If Moscow retreats from its current position of devolving some of its power, and ultimately proves unwilling or unable to compromise on regional rights (either by retracting existing agreements or refusing to enter into additional ones), the economic pressures for separatism will grow.

But, the possibility of some fracturing along ethnic lines cannot be ruled out. For example, the current leaders of the Republics of Tatarstan and Tyva (formerly Tuva) have supported the Russian Federation and have emphasized economic rather than ethnic priorities. But separatist tendencies could well come to the fore should nationalism flare in these or other regions (such as the volatile North Caucasus). In that case, Moscow's accommodation with the regions might prove inadequate, despite their poor prospects for survival as independent states. As Mark Galeotti has argued, "Surrounded by Russia, few of these ethnic concentrations can be seen as viable nations but . . . as Yugoslavia shows, rational calculations rarely play a part when nationalism is awoken."[4]

Three key variables will shape the Russian Federation's cohesion or disunity: political, economic, and security issues. These variables in turn give rise to three alternative scenarios for Russia's evolution, whose implications the West should assess. But the changes occurring in Russia today are being propelled by internal, not external, factors, so the ability of Western states to help shape the evolution of Russia is quite limited. What the West can do is be prepared for a range of possible outcomes, not just those it would prefer.

Political Factors Affecting Russia's Future

The fundamental political issue tearing at the heart of the Russian Federation today is the struggle by local authorities in the republics, oblasts, and krais for greater autonomy and a more equitable (as they see it) sharing of power with Moscow. Within the context of this struggle for power, the most contentious issues are economic: controlling natural resources and land, setting economic priorities and policies, and paying taxes. But the ebb and flow of the struggle has depended to a great extent on politics. Not surprisingly, the push for greater regional sovereignty has been strongest and most successful when the center has been weak, often riven by its own internal rivalries between the executive office and parliament.

This shifting balance of power between the center and the regions has been a constant in Russian politics since the demise of the Soviet Union (and,

[4] Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall—Russia's Long Arm," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Nov. 1992, p. 482.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indeed, even prior to December 1991). To note just the most perceptible of these shifts: In early 1992, with the culminating attempts to develop and sign a new Federation Treaty, Moscow appeared to have reasserted control over most of the country's constituent parts. Even in this case, however, divisions at the federal level between the president and parliament allowed the republic and regional leaders some leverage in their negotiations. Chechnya, having declared its independence from the Russian Federation in 1991, and Tatarstan both refused to sign the Federation Treaty. By the summer of 1993, with the drafting of the new Russian constitution, the balance seemed to shift toward the localities. They obtained Moscow's recognition of their sovereignty, while Yeltsin and the parliament continued their own struggle for power. Then, following the Moscow crisis of September–October 1993, Moscow again appeared to regain the upper hand, as the sovereignty clause was deleted from the final version of the constitution, which was officially approved in December 1993.

A shifting balance of power between Moscow and the regions has become a constant in Russian politics.

Nevertheless, future obedience to the federal constitution should not be assumed to be automatic throughout Russia. Given that the referendum on it was not passed in all of the Federation's components, a future crisis could call into question the constitution's applicability to those areas that did not approve it in December. Moreover, localities have the right to their own constitutions, and, in fact, three-quarters of the republics have written their own constitutions, nearly all containing declarations of some sort of sovereignty. Except in the case of Komi and Karelia, the republics' constitutions directly contradict the federal constitution by declaring that the land and resources belong to the peoples in those republics. The constitutions of Tyva and Yakutia are said to violate federal rights on matters of war and peace.[5] In short, although Moscow has begun to establish a more coherent federal structure—through the 1992 Federation Treaty and the 1993 constitution—the Federation continues to be held together by a series of bilateral treaties and agreements between Moscow and the constituent republics, oblasts, and krais. And, recently, both Moscow and regional leaders have raised the issue of Chechnya's possible effects on center-regional relations.[6] Yeltsin's chief of staff, Sergei Filatov, has stated: "'Manipulating the situation in Chechnya, reactionary forces in individual regions are trying to tear pieces of power away from the federal authorities.'"[7]

Yeltsin's expediency has created frictions among the constituent parts of Russia that may, in time, prove divisive. In particular, concessions extracted from Moscow have not been applied universally throughout Russia. For example, Russia's republics have been given greater control over their natural resources

[5] "Regional Constitutions Compared, Contrasted," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), Oct. 21, 1994, pp. 36–37, from *Segodnya*, Oct. 21, 1994.

[6] "Center-regional relations" mean "relations between Moscow and all the other components of the Russian Federation," that is, the republics, oblasts (regions), and krais (districts).

[7] "Center to Hold Forum on Regional, Federal Government," FBIS, *CEur*, Jan. 25, 1995, p. 15, from Interfax, Jan. 24, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and been allowed to pay less tax to Moscow than have the oblasts and krais. As a result, several of the latter have tried to upgrade themselves unilaterally to the status of republics in order to obtain these rights; Sverdlovsk oblast, for example, proclaimed itself the Urals Republic. Also, some public figures (such as Zhirinovsky) have talked about abolishing ethnically based republics, a possibility that portends increased domestic conflict in Russia. The popularity of this idea has, admittedly, declined over the last year or two, particularly because of its propensity to generate conflict, but it is still part of the ultranationalist program. In short, various local authorities will continue to maneuver to obtain their own best deal, which will result in continuing power struggles as long as rights are not equal throughout the Russian Federation.

Within each local administration differences of opinion and emphasis will emerge over whether to pursue a more centrist or regionalist policy, and those differences can vary depending on the specific issue. The majority of governors, who are the most powerful actors at the local level of oblasts and krais, have been appointed by Yeltsin and thus generally feel an obligation to show loyalty to him, whereas the local parliaments do not have the same debt (but neither do they yet wield much power). The republics are headed by presidents who, having been elected (rather than appointed by Yeltsin), have frequently demonstrated the greatest willingness to speak out against Moscow's authority. In terms of specific personalities, among the most noted regionalists are: Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shamiev, Nizhny Novgorod's Governor Boris Nemtsov, Yakutia's President Mikhail Nikolaev, Chuvashia's President Nikolai Fedorov, Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev, and Primorsky krai's Governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko. On the other hand, Amur's former governor Vladimir Polevanov (briefly privatization chief for Yeltsin) and Kalmykia's President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov represent a more centrist viewpoint. In any case, lack of central leadership from Moscow has effectively forced local leaders, whether they have wanted to or not, to take more control over the destinies of their areas.

Through individual "deals" with Moscow, some parts of Russia have achieved special treatment—for example, on paying taxes to the federal government and controlling their resources—while others have signed bilateral treaties with Moscow (again, with a primary focus on economic issues). Thus far, the republics of Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, and North Ossetia have actually signed such treaties, while negotiations are also under way with the republics of Buryatia and Udmurtia, Krasnodar krai, Orenburg oblast, and the exclave of Kaliningrad oblast. Moscow officials expect that eventually they will conclude such agreements with all the components of Russia, and in September 1994 they established a commission (at that time under Vice Premier Sergei Shakhrai) to prepare such treaties. However, Shakhrai has explicitly noted that treaties cannot be concluded with those components whose constitutions or charters contravene the Russian Federation constitution.[8]

[8] For an outline of the Commission's focus, see "Shakhray Cited on Treaties with Regions," FBIS, *CEur,* Sept. 7, 1994, p. 16, from *Rossiskaya gazeta,* Sept. 6, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The relatively limited experience to date indicates that a certain model has now been created, but that the specific contents of each agreement are likely to vary. Tatarstan, the first to undergo this process, negotiated three years before signing a treaty in February 1994 that describes Tatarstan as a state united with the Russian Federation on the basis of their two constitutions and the treaty. But the agreement curbs much of the sovereignty Tatarstan previously claimed and even restricts how much oil the republic is allowed to produce each year. Following the February 1994 signing, negotiations still had to continue for five intergovernmental agreements on taxation, budget, foreign economic activity, and coordination of defense and law enforcement agencies. But given that Tatarstan was the first to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Moscow, it can be assumed that the process for signing treaties with the other components of Russia will be significantly faster (with the probable exception of Chechnya).

Moscow's threat to shut off the pipeline to and from Tatarstan seemed to be the greatest single motivator for Tatarstan's willingness to agree to the terms of this treaty, and Moscow can be expected to use such forms of leverage in future negotiations with other republics, oblasts, and krais. For these purposes, the centralized infrastructure system inherited from Soviet times will be critical. (In all components of the transportation system—railroads, air travel, and roads—Moscow is the central hub. In other aspects of infrastructure, such as telecommunications, some areas of Russia have—with foreign investment—been able to upgrade their systems and reduce their dependency on Moscow's role as a hub.)

A power-sharing treaty was signed by Boris Yeltsin and Bashkortostan's President Murtaza Rakhimov in early August 1994. Unlike Tatarstan, however, Bashkortostan is acknowledged as a constituent part of and a sovereign state within the Russian Federation, and it is given wide-ranging authority—authority to establish its budget; determine the laws of land and natural resource ownership; handle foreign economic trade; conclude international treaties; draft its tax policy; and create its own legislative system. The treaty stipulates three types of powers:

> Those that are exclusively Bashkortostan's (noted above);
>
> Those that belong to the center, such as conducting foreign policy; setting federal policies and programs; deciding defense and security matters; and defending state borders; and,
>
> Those that are shared and coordinated jointly between Moscow and Bashkortostan, such as defending Bashkortostan's sovereignty and territorial integrity; granting citizenship; deciding budgetary, tax, and other financial issues; and observing ethnic-minority and other human rights.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Relating to the issue of defending Bashkortostan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, it was agreed that its territory and status cannot be altered without Russia's consent.[9]

With the increased importance of local officials and concomitant diminution of power in Moscow, one wonders whether cooperative efforts among some of Russia's republics, oblasts, and krais (probably ones united by geography) will become viable. And, if so, will they become a threat to Moscow? The most obvious example of such regional cooperation to date is Siberian Accord, an association established in November 1990 to focus primarily on economic issues (although it has since emerged as a sort of political force as well), comprising nineteen components of the Federation and covering one-third of its territory. In this and the seven other cooperative efforts, the pursuit of common interests may prevail, or participants may find themselves in competition with one another.[10] As Elizabeth Teague has observed: "At present every territorial unit is out for itself only, each competing with all the others in what is perceived as a zero-sum game. Tension between the republics and regions is fanned by the fact that the present federal system is not perceived as equitable by the majority of Russia's regions—the krais and oblasts."[11] Furthermore, even assuming adequate interest and support for regional cooperation, there are physical constraints, such as the inadequacies of the transportation network and other elements of the infrastructure, that may prove extremely difficult to surmount. Also, as economic disparities between various republics, oblasts, and krais grow, the tensions among the localities are likely to flare.

On the other hand, if some regional cooperative groups succeed, they may find themselves in a stronger position to bargain with Moscow for greater local authority and autonomy. At present, the existing eight interregional associations are in fact seeking to play a brokering role between the federal government and local authorities; in July 1994, the Federation Council signed a protocol effectively granting them this role. Indeed, Sergei Shapovalov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy, raised the possibility of the eight interregional associations becoming a prototype for a new system in Russia, perhaps expanding to between twelve and fifteen such associations, but certainly far fewer than the country's eighty-nine current components.[12]

Tied in with the idea of pressuring or gaining leverage on Moscow is the necessity of forming political parties at the local level. Because virtually all the nationally known politicians are based in Moscow, the general public believes everything is run from there and consequently feels alienated from the

[9] See "Treaty with Bashkortostan Ready for Signing," FBIS, *CEur,* July 20, 1994, p. 32, from Interfax, July 19, 1994; "Russia, Bashkortostan Sign Treaty," FBIS, *CEur,* p. 26, from ITAR-TASS, Aug. 3, 1994.

[10] These associations are: Siberian Accord; Central Russia; North-West; Black Earth Zone; Socio-Economic Cooperation Association of North Caucasian Republics, Krais and Oblasts; Greater Volga; Urals Regional Association; and, Far East Association.

[11] "Russia: A Troubled Future," RFE/RL Research Report, June 17, 1994, p. 8.

[12] "Shapovalov Views Regional Policy, Politics," FBIS, *CEur,* pp. 45–46, from *Rossiya,* Dec. 21–27, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political process. Many people distrust the current national political leaders as deeply as (and perhaps even more deeply than) they distrusted the Communist Party hierarchy. In short, popular apathy and cynicism are arguably the strongest forces in Russian politics today. From the reverse perspective, politicians in both the executive and legislative branches commonly lack a sense of identification with the general public and consequently do not consider their role to be one of representing their constituents' interests. This missing link of representation has made many political elites fearful of new elections, for they realize voters will not feel loyalty to them. The most effective solution for sinking deeper democratic roots would be to create national parties with local representation throughout the country, but to date this approach has been only marginally successful. Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party has arguably been the most successful, but the more general tendency has been for differing (albeit not necessarily opposing) interests to pull apart parties or coalitions of parties. Unfortunately, many of the groups supporting Russia's reform efforts (commonly labeled the "democratic forces") have focused on their differences rather than on common interests that might appeal to a wide range of voters.

Many Russians distrust their current national politicians at least as deeply as they distrusted the Communist Party hierarchy.

In the final analysis, the evolution of center-regional relations in the Russian Federation depends on the answers to several important political questions. First and foremost, will the power-sharing arrangements Moscow has now begun to sign with local authorities in republics, oblasts, and krais prove enforceable and workable? Will differences among the individual agreements preclude any cohesive opposition to Moscow, or will local officials (and publics) jointly rebel against perceived "unfair treatment"? The answers to these questions depend, in turn, on such considerations as: Will the relationship between the executive and the legislature provide an environment in which laws can be established and actually implemented? For example, will changes be made to taxation and subsidy policies, and will collection and distribution of revenue take place?

While the constitution adopted in December 1993 does provide a general legal framework for the state, cooperation between the executive and legislature will be necessary to implement it. The center and Russia's constituent components must also cooperate, and that will result largely from common economic interests, since Moscow cannot rely on any central coercive power to enforce its demands. Working in favor of such cooperation is the willingness of local leaders to support some limited role for Moscow. Even outspoken critics of Moscow's regional policy, such as the presidents of Chuvashia and Tatarstan, support a role for Moscow in the "big picture" areas (such as security policy and foreign affairs). Many regional leaders also hope Moscow will have the foresight to create free economic zones, thereby improving their economic prospects.

The fact remains that even those regions most insistent on local autonomy and even "independence" from Moscow have loudly denied any intention to smash the Russian Federation's territorial integrity. They simply seek greater

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control over their own destinies. Similar to the young American colonies, Russia's republics, oblasts, and krais are debating the costs and benefits of autonomy, testing their limits within the Federation, and trying to determine how much freedom they are willing to sacrifice in order to participate in a larger, probably stronger union. Complete separation from Moscow is not feasible for most areas and is likely only in the extreme case of a political or economic catastrophe. Despite the flaws in the current federation system, Moscow will be able to hold the country together as long as it continues its present course. What has been changing, and will continue to change, is the balance of power between Moscow and the rest of the Russian Federation.

Economic Challenges

The Russian Federation faces formidable challenges in creating a viable economic system, and a small but serious risk of failure both in the near term and in the longer term. This risk of economic failure poses the greatest threat to the future of the Russian Federation. But even if economic catastrophe is avoided and the Federation holds together, economic forces will almost surely lead to an increasingly decentralized economic and political system in Russia, as is already becoming evident today. The Russian leadership must accomplish three economic tasks in particular: avoid the continuing risk of systemic economic failure, create a viable system of public finance, and establish a functioning system for international trade and investment.

Avoiding systemic economic failure. The most pressing challenge facing the Federation is to avoid the continuing danger of systemic economic failure, which could plunge the Russian economy even deeper into depression. As bad as was the Soviet economic system in its prime—with a moribund industrial system that comprised outmoded physical plant and equipment, abused and depleted natural resources, malstructured industries organized into giant state monopolies, and no conceptual or practical basis for instituting modern management, financial, and accounting practices—that system and its successor have received a series of additional blows since the late 1980s that have triggered a deep economic depression. For example, the decline in world oil prices (coupled with the continued decline in Russia's own oil production) reduced the country's hard currency earnings. But, more important, the state enterprise system started to implode once Mikhail Gorbachev began his program of glasnost and perestroika. His program undermined the traditional state mechanisms for coordinating and controlling industry, without providing effective replacement mechanisms.[13]

An additional blow to the economy came from the breakdown of inter-republic trade that occurred when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Not

[13] Marshall I. Goldman, *What Went Wrong with Perestroika* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1992), pp. 142–46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unlike the breakdown in international trade that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the breakup of the Soviet Union destroyed the highly integrated and specialized trading system that had grown up over the years.[14] These factors led, according to Russian statistics, to a 60 percent drop in industrial production between 1990 and the summer of 1994, a far greater fall than the United States experienced in the early years of the Great Depression. With the very notable exception of the service sector (which has seen significant expansion), no region or industry has escaped this overall trend. Moreover, internal investment has plummeted, while foreign investment has remained at much lower levels than Russian officials had hoped and expected.

Today, there is considerable debate whether the worst may now be behind for the Russian economy.[15] During the summer of 1994, the economy appeared to be stabilizing, but events quickly turned again when inflation reignited in October. The conflict in Chechnya further complicates Moscow's economic problems by placing additional demands on the already overdrawn federal budget and discouraging foreign financial assistance and investment. Even under the most optimistic view, there remains considerable risk that one or more factors could trigger another round of economic contraction. Among the most dangerous pitfalls the Russian leadership must sidestep are: a runaway budget deficit, resulting from Moscow's inability to collect taxes and its continued subsidies to bankrupt industrial enterprises; the associated risk of hyperinflation and an international debt crisis; and, the threat of large-scale unemployment, which First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais has identified as the greatest problem the Russian economy will next have to face.

One accomplishment of vast significance is the widespread privatization that has been accomplished in the last year. Privatization is a key prerequisite for modernizing the Russian economy. But it is not a panacea, as some Western economists seem to believe. It will not in itself solve Russia's task of coordinating and restraining its monopoly production system, and it does not in itself create the basic institutions needed to establish property rights, enforce contract law, and intermediate financial transactions that are needed to modernize Russian industry. Furthermore, "privatization" has largely translated into the current work force buying their enterprise, keeping the old directors in control, and continuing inefficient management procedures.[16] The Russians will still need to pursue fundamental economic reforms in order to modernize their industries and make their economy a competitor on world markets. At the enterprise level, Agan-

[14] A macroeconomic analysis is provided in Axel Leijonhufvud, "The Nature of the Depression in the Former Soviet Union," *New Left Review,* May–June 1993, pp. 120–26.

[15] For an optimistic view, see Abel Aganbegyan, "Academician Aganbegyan on Strategy to Overcome Economic Crisis," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Central Europe: Economic Review,* Jan. 4, 1995, p. 20, from *Delovoy mir,* Dec. 19–25, 1994; and, Anders Aslund, "Russia's Success Story," *Foreign Affairs,* Sept./Oct. 1994, pp. 58–71. For pessimistic views, see A. Kennaway, *An Economy of Russia in June 1994* (Camberley, U.K.: Conflict Studies Research Center, 1994); and, Leonid Lopatnikov, "The Year 1995—Where Will the Economy Go?" FBIS, *CEur,* Jan. 11, 1995, pp. 18–28, from *Delovoy mir,* Dec. 19–25, 1994.

[16] See Kennaway, *An Economy of Russia,* pp. 10–12; and, Lynn Nelson and Irina Kuzes, "Coordinating the Russian Privatization Program," *RFE/RL Research Report,* May 20, 1994, pp. 15–27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

begyan notes that Russia's enterprises need to be transformed to succeed in a market economy: "A serious company is not an industrial enterprise, but a trade-financial-industrial formation that encompasses all links of activity that are necessary for successful functioning in the market. . . . The more quickly our industrial enterprises are transformed into market structures, the easier the process for their adaptation to the market will be and the more effectively they will operate in the market."[17] In addition to this transition in management structures, improving productivity will depend on the investments made in physical plant and equipment, the education and training of the work force, natural resources, the quality of management, and a number of intangible factors, such as the work ethic and culture. Privatization is only a first, albeit important, step in the right direction.

Indeed, the dramatic changes associated with privatization pose some risks to the Federation. First, many of the privatized firms and their workers have been surviving on federal subsidies, which have often been forthcoming even after production has ceased. Aganbegyan estimates that 20 percent of former state-owned enterprises are bankrupt, and would collapse without continued government subsidies. If privatization is accompanied by sharp reductions in these subsidies, that could bankrupt many enterprises, triggering another round of industrial collapse. In the longer term, surviving firms will create another kind of risk. As enterprises begin to modernize and improve productivity, they will inevitably need to redefine the social contract that has long existed between Russian workers and enterprises. This redefinition will result in unaccustomed layoffs, unemployment, and income inequality. These changes will bring political tensions that will create stress in Russian society, and because the effects of these changes will differ across the Russian landscape, they will create stresses among Federation localities as well. Income inequality is emerging as a source of tension, as only a small proportion of the population is prospering while the majority suffer stagnating or declining standards of living. This could prove a threat to social stability. The wealthiest 10 percent of households control 26 percent of the total income, and the 10 percent who are the poorest, only 2.3 percent. About 50–60 percent of the population are estimated to be worse off than in 1990; 20–30 percent are at approximately the same level, and 20 percent are better off as a result of the market reforms.[18]

The Russian economy may evolve into scores of fiefdoms run by local elites.

Continued impediments to creating a fundamental economic framework within the Russian Federation government—no one knows who is responsible for anything or what is controlled at the center versus the local level—raise the possibility of further erosion of central economic control. As noted above, Russia must undergo many fundamental changes, including industrial modernization and privatization (into the hands of the general public rather than the old

[17] Aganbegyan, "Academician Aganbegyan on Strategy," p. 23.
[18] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomenklatura). The risk to the Federation as it is currently functioning is that, at some point, local regional leaders will step in and set their own houses in order. For instance, if Moscow refuses to establish more economic free zones in Russia, places such as Primorsky krai, Amur and Chita oblasts, Kaliningrad, and St. Petersburg might take matters into their own hands. The key question is whether the Federation government will allow such local initiative, or whether it will repress it, as it has in the past. If the latter is the case, the Russian economy may continue to stagnate. As long as outdated monopolies survive and can succeed in suppressing competition, the likelihood of significant economic advance is quite small. Another possibility is that the Russian economy could evolve into scores of fiefdoms run by local political and business elites, assisted by local strongmen (organized crime). Given the extent of organized crime involvement throughout the Russian economy today, these "fiefdoms" have already emerged in some respects. Marshall Goldman cites a 1994 study prepared for Yeltsin, which estimated that organized crime controlled 70 to 80 percent of all private business and banking activity.[19]

The economic forecasts for the Russian Federation in recent years have reflected the shifting hopes and prospects for economic reform. Last summer the optimists reigned; with the resurgence of inflation and the war in Chechnya, pessimism dominates. Perhaps the next wave of reforms will turn the tide once again in 1995. But the fundamental trends argue against this: avoiding the risks posed today by huge budget deficits, resurgent inflation, massive foreign debt, hidden unemployment, and business insolvency will require economic savvy and political will (not to mention timing and good luck) that may be beyond the reach of the Russian leadership.

Creating a viable system of public finance. The Russian Federation must create a stable, trustworthy system of public finance, while at the same time heading off a tax revolt triggered by an unwillingness of people in certain areas of Russia and certain individual enterprises to subsidize the federal government. This unwillingness arose largely because of the historical pattern of exploitation of Russia's natural resources to encourage the development of heavy industry. As a result of this pattern, the resource-rich areas have been forced to subsidize the industrial areas. For example, in 1992, Russia continued to hold domestic prices on natural gas to about one-sixth the world level. In effect, gas-producing regions faced a tax rate of 83 percent. As Russian resource prices rise to world levels, "the division of resource rents among the many claimants, both governmental and nongovernmental, will pose a stringent test of the viability of democratic government in Russia and of the nature of Russian Federalism."[20] As Figure 1 illustrates, an analysis of existing minerals and energy resources valued at world prices shows that the Far East and Western Siberia account for

[19] See Marshall Goldman, "Comrade Godfather," *The Washington Post,* Feb. 12, 1995.

[20] See Charles E. McLure, Jr., "The Sharing of Taxes on Natural Resources and the Future of the Russian Federation," in *Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism,* ed. Christine I. Wallich (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994), pp. 181–217.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Figure 1
Natural Resource Distribution in Russia



Urals includes	Western Siberia includes	Eastern Siberia includes	Far East includes
Orenburg Oblast	Kemerovo Oblast	Chita Oblast	Amur Oblast
Chelyabinsk Oblast	Tomsk Oblast	Irkutsk Oblast	Sakhalin Oblast
Perm Oblast	Tyumen Oblast	Krasnoyarsk Krai	Magadan Oblast
Sverdlovsk Oblast	Omsk Oblast	Buryatia	Kamchatka Oblast
Kurgan Oblast	Novosibirsk Oblast	Tyva (Tuva)	Khabarovsk Krai
Udmurtia	Altay Krai	Khakassia	Primorsky (Maritime) Krai
Bashkortostan	Altai Republic (Gorno-Altai)		Yakutia (Sakha)

Sources: United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook, 1989* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991); United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Commodities Summaries 1993* (Washington D.C., 1993); *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 December 1993; Telephone Conversations with analysts at the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines; Energy Information Administration, *Monthly Energy Review*, April 1994.

Figure prepared by authors.

76 percent of Russia's natural resources; when Eastern Siberia is included, the total reaches 93 percent.

Clearly, in light of the poor state and quality of Russian industry, Asian Russia possesses much of the Russian Federation's wealth and potential export earnings; its desire to have greater control over this wealth is understandable and a significant factor in center-regional relations today. Another cause of imbalance in the Russian Federation is the disparate treatment of oblasts and krais versus republics, relative to their tax burden and autonomy. The former localities are responsible for paying the bulk of taxes to the central government, yet it is the republics that have greater powers, even under the new constitution—hence, the desire by some oblasts to declare themselves republics.

Under Communist rule the extent of cross-regional subsidization was never explicitly stated, and a single enterprise could do little about such subsidies in any event. That is changing, however, as the financial relationships among the Federation government, the governmental units at the local level, and economic enterprises are evolving away from the command-and-control framework toward a public finance system based on explicit taxes and a Federation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

budget. Consequently, the extent of cross-regional subsidies is becoming more apparent. At the same time, local governments and enterprises are sometimes gaining greater latitude in avoiding taxation, either unilaterally by refusing to pay taxes (e.g., Chechnya) or through a specific agreement with Moscow (e.g., Yakutia [Sakha] and Bashkortostan). The result is a bankrupt Federation system of public finance.

Overall, this imbalance in tax burdens (between resource-rich and industrial areas, and between oblasts and republics) represents an important, long-term problem for the Russian government. Moreover, it is likely to get worse when and if local economies begin to improve. Even before such improvement, in 1993, only five of the eighty-nine components of the Russian Federation paid more taxes to Moscow than they would ordinarily get back from Moscow. Additionally, federal budget nonpayments constituted 64.7 percent of total budget nonpayments in the first quarter of 1994, highlighting the increased priority given to territorial budgets. This suggests a scenario in which some of the more prosperous parts of Russia attempt to opt out of the Federation system in order to avoid the heavy tax burden. Reforms of the tax system may in time succeed in establishing a sound base of Federation income. But it seems certain that, in any event, the federal budget will need to be reduced. The central government will need to determine what are the *nation's* highest priorities (such as infrastructure, defense) that must be addressed at the *national* level, and what should be left to *local* governments to address. This is precisely one of the issues Moscow has focused on in its bilateral agreements with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, for example.

It appears that the Russian government is destined to play a declining role in the Federation's economics and politics; the question is how quickly and to what extent will it decline. It could decline gradually, as the government accommodates to the new fiscal realities, or there could be a cataclysmic failure of the Federation system of public finance or an outright tax revolt in which a veritable fault line would likely separate the resource-rich areas from the Russian industrial heartland. The key indicators to watch in this realm are the bilateral agreements negotiated with the center, the pace of tax collections, and trends in the federal budget and budget deficit. In order to retain some role for itself in the face of such changes, the Russian government would have two main forms of pressure: economic and military. Economic pressure, including boycotts and embargoes, can still be highly effective since the inherited Russian economy is highly integrated and often still monopolistic. How the military might play in a tax revolt remains a wild card. But given the increasing dependence of the Russian military on local authorities (discussed below) and a general reluctance to become embroiled in "political" issues, Russian troops would almost certainly resist raising arms against a regional revolt, particularly of this nature.

Creating a viable foreign trade system. Another set of economic challenges revolves around the need to foster international commerce and investment. The old Soviet state-planning system built an economy to suit ideological and military dictates, not economic markets. As a result, the system was nearly autarkic, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrial structure based on gigantomania and state monopoly. The continuing weakness of property rights, contract law, and trading institutions has sharply restricted the foreign trade and investment that is sorely needed to modernize Russian industry. But as trade does begin to grow, it will also create new tensions in the Federation. Given the regions' freedom to realign trading patterns, localities in the East (notably the Far East and parts of Siberia) or on the Western periphery (such as St. Petersburg and Karelia) may in time discover greater economic affinity with, and better economic prospects in, neighboring states than with their partners within Russia. Indeed, already the Far East's top three trading partners since 1992 have been China, Japan, and South Korea. Combined imports and exports for 1992 were: China, $975 million; Japan, $885 million; and South Korea, $236 million.[21]

How the Federation elects to manage these relationships will go far to shape the evolution of the Russian economy. Clearly, the resource-rich areas have a distinct advantage in attracting foreign investment, but even in such cases, foreign investors face uncertainties about who actually controls what (and who has the authority to approve deals), what goods and services actually cost (and will cost six months from now), and how efficiently they will be able to extract the resources. Many potential investors conclude that the current economic climate is simply too unsettled to warrant the risk. One expert on Russian-Japanese trade relations, a coauthor of a Japanese sponsored "Pre-Investment Study for the Establishment of a Free Economic Zone in Primorsky Region," told the authors that foreign investment in the Russian east is focused mainly on quickly exploitable resources and tourism (primarily restaurants and hotels) and that most projects are under $25 million. He believes that dramatic improvements in the investment climate will be needed before the Japanese begin to make sizable investments.[22]

From the standpoint of cold economic logic, it would make good sense for several segments of Russia to break away from the Federation economy and instead participate in a regional trading area, either amongst themselves or in conjunction with other countries as well. Such trade partnerships already exist both in formal terms, as with the cooperation agreement between Kaliningrad oblast and Poland, and on a more ad hoc basis, as with the heavy border trade between Primorsky krai and China.[23] The long-run potential to trade with the Pacific rim countries, such as Japan and Korea, is clearly high, especially for resource-rich areas east of the Ural mountains. However, this will require overcoming long-standing political and cultural differences among the states involved. Currently, the international sector of the Russian economy is languishing, and until such time as at least some of the fundamental concerns of potential

[21] Japan-Russia Economic Committee, *Economic Relations with the Russian Far East* (Tokyo: Keidanren, 1993), p. 51.

[22] Seth Sulkin, interview by authors, Alexandria, Va., Jan. 13, 1994.

[23] "Kaliningrad, Polish Officials Discuss Cooperation," FBIS, *CEur,* July 14, 1994, pp. 18–19, from *Kaliningradskaya pravda,* July 7, 1994. See also, *The Washington Post,* May 26, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign investors can be addressed, the reluctance to invest in sizable amounts will continue.

Military and Security Factors

In contrast to the disintegration of Russia's political and economic centralized structures, the Russian armed forces have maintained at least some semblance of unity. Many analysts accordingly wonder whether the Russian military will be the force that holds the Russian Federation together. The short answer is: probably not. While some considerations favor this argument, increasingly more tell against it. Certainly, Moscow's leadership should not count on the Russian military to enforce order in breakaway areas.

The case of Chechnya in 1994–95 reaffirms this thesis: while the military did intervene, significant elements of it (including several general officers) either refused to participate or did so very reluctantly. For example, then Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov noted his opposition to the operation in Chechnya, and asserted that the main area of disagreement between Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and several deputy defense ministers is over the use of troops domestically.[24] In addition, the forces sent in had to be cobbled together from disparate regions of Russia, and certain regional leaders protested sending troops stationed in their territory to Chechnya. Indeed, Chuvash president Nikolai Fedorov absolved troops in his republic from going to Chechnya. And the abysmal overall performance of Russia's poorly trained, equipped, and staffed forces—coupled with the widespread opposition to this intervention throughout the Russian populace—will certainly reinforce military opposition to any similar future operation. The military's reluctance to carry out operations in Chechnya is all the more notable in light of long-standing and deep-seated Russian animosity toward Chechens.

Essentially, the argument that the military will act as a unifying force arises from a belief that its officers see their duty as involving loyalty to the nation. Certainly, a greater sense of national pride exists among military officers than among the population at large, and so does a deep-seated frustration with the decline in Russia's international prestige. Quite likely, too, as separatist tendencies grow in Russia, nationalists determined to hold the country together may opt for service in the military. (The role of illegal military formations also cannot be ignored in such a case.) And even the more independence-minded Far East is likely to want to retain some form of unified military force, because its own population is so sparse that it could never provide effectively for its own defense without some additional security guarantees, including a nuclear umbrella. But while these points suggest a widespread interest in common

[24] See "General Gromov Cites 'Differences' with Grachev," FBIS, *CEur,* Jan. 11, 1995, p. 21–22, from *Komsomolskaya pravda,* Jan. 11, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security, they do not mean that the military will necessarily act as a unifying force to keep the Federation intact.

Much like Russian society in general, the Russian military is experiencing numerous difficulties, many of which could contribute to its own disintegration. Budgetary constraints are impeding the military's ability to maintain necessary levels of training and combat readiness, a problem lamented by troops sent in to Chechnya. Morale in the service continues to plummet. The combination of draft dodging and legal exemptions means that only 16 percent of the conscriptable pool is currently drafted. Many officers remain without housing (a problem likely to worsen in the face of continued troop withdrawals and declining foreign assistance to help build apartments). Pay has sometimes been delayed for months, especially in the more remote areas. Given an officer-to-conscript ratio of roughly one-to-one, officers are increasingly performing duties normally assigned to conscripts, such as guard duty, cleaning, and basic maintenance tasks. As a result, many of the brightest young officers see better opportunities in the emerging business world and are leaving military service; between 1990 and 1993, 95,000 officers aged thirty or younger left the military.[25]

The West must create lasting ties with Russia on many levels and across the political spectrum.

The Russian military's ability to act as a cohesive force is inhibited not only by declining readiness and demoralization but by its changing relationship with local authorities in the republics, oblasts, and krais where forces are stationed. Just as the breakdown in the centralized system has fundamentally altered economic relations between Moscow and the rest of Russia, so too has this breakdown affected the armed forces. Military units are increasingly dependent on local authorities for housing, food, and other daily necessities; vouchers for paying salaries, issued by Moscow, must be translated into cash at local banks. Beyond this support, local authorities also sometimes provide equipment for the troops' functioning: in October 1994, Khabarovsk krai earmarked money to purchase a control-and-communications system for the Far East Military District's command.[26] These diverse dependencies will increase in the future, especially if one assumes a continued decline in military budgets.

Structural changes being implemented in the military districts are also affecting the military's relations with local authorities. The new regional command structure aims to unify air, naval, and ground forces, as well as border troops and some paramilitary security forces in order to enhance cost effectiveness and operational capability. According to Defense Minister Grachev, one command in the Far East would be based in Komsomolsk-na-Amur, another (to include forces in the Transbaikal and Siberian Military Districts) would be located

[25] Col. Anatoly Belousov, "Junior Officers Need the Help of Seniors More Than Ever," *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 10, 1994.

[26] "Kray Helps Far East Military District Buy Equipment," FBIS, *CEur*, Nov. 15, 1994, p. 43, from Radio Khabarovsk, Nov. 11, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Ulan Ade, and another in the North Caucasus.[27] As Mark Galeotti points out, the military's new command structure is designed to work more closely with local officials, thereby increasing the former's dependency on the latter.[28]

The willingness of such a locally based military unit to put down separatist movements, should it be so directed from Moscow, is doubtful—and not only because local commanders might find it personally difficult to take action against authorities who had fed and housed their troops. Under current Russian conscription patterns, and in light of rising transportation costs, draftees are allowed to serve much closer to home than they did under the Soviet system. That raises additional uncertainties about a soldier's willingness to use force, possibly against friends or even family. The experience in Chechnya further illustrates the willingness of local politicians to (try to) overrule Moscow's orders, even when the troops are sent to a different part of the Russian Federation. In addition to Chuvashia, mentioned earlier, other republics that took action against sending troops to Chechnya include Karelia, Tyva, and Yakutia.

Russian officers have a deep-seated fear of civil war and an aversion to police activities.

Lastly, Russian officers have a deep-seated fear of civil war and an aversion to police activities. The military's unpopular involvement in quelling unrest in various "hot spots" of the Soviet Union over the last decade reinforces this reluctance to operate domestically and the desire to stay out of politics. Military officers recognize only too well that blurring the line between police and military operations runs the risk of further eroding morale and of politicizing their institution, developments most of them strongly wish to avoid.

Should Moscow feel compelled again to use military force within the country, it will have to rely on select, elite units to carry out its bidding. Yet there are only pockets of such loyal forces from which to draw; for Chechnya, forces had to be pulled together from many locations and, even so, not all of them proved loyal in executing Moscow's orders. The backbone of the center's forces will be the mobile forces now being created, and these are in turn drawing heavily on the airborne troops for personnel and training methods. The most mobile forces are to be stationed in the North Caucasus Military District, the area of the greatest instability in Russia, while a larger group of reinforcements will be deployed in the heart of Russia: the Ural and Volga Military Districts. Eventually, all these mobile forces combined may total 150,000 or 200,000 troops, but such plans and capabilities lie in the future; for now, the number of reliable forces is extremely small. The creation of these new forces, combined with the military doctrine espousing the use of military force to quell domestic unrest should police or internal troops fail to do so alone, provides evidence that the Federation leadership has been expecting and

[27] As described in William Odom and Robert Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hudson Institute, 1995), p. 155.

[28] Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall—A Vote of No Consequence?" *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1993, p. 242.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

planning to resort to force in a Chechen-type contingency. Apparently, Moscow will rely on elite units assembled around Moscow and on a new, small National Guard that will be directly subordinate to the president to ensure that some small group of forces is loyal enough and reliable enough to carry out its orders.[29] The uncertainties are: how large a force might be needed for one such police action (Chechnya certainly required a larger force than originally expected); what will be done if more than one contingency arises simultaneously; and how well-prepared will the force be for its mission. In terms of preparation, Chechnya also illustrated that—at least to date—most troops have not received proper training for a domestic intervention role.

Thus the Russian military as a whole is not likely to act assertively to hold Russia's republics, oblasts, and krais in line. But larger security concerns (i.e., external threats) do offer a reason for the Federation's cohesion. And to the extent Russia's constituent components share concerns about external threats, there will be interest in maintaining some form of unified military force to counter these threats. As already noted, sparsely populated areas such as Siberia and the Far East do not have the manpower to create a viable, independent military force. To counter potential threats from China, Japan, or Korea, for example, the obvious security guarantee is a nuclear umbrella. In fact, the military districts in this area do have silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and they will probably also continue to have some of the mobile single-warhead ICBMs deployed there.

Similarly, the various components of the North Caucasus, plagued by instability and confrontations among themselves, also feel threatened by neighboring countries that are likewise unstable. The North Caucasus region is also home to some of the more active paramilitary formations and to some of the emerging Cossack forces. Given the internal and external threats here, Moscow logically decided to base its most mobile, combat-ready forces in this region, for the region is likely to continue to be embroiled in some form of military combat.

Prospects for the Russian Federation

The future of the Russian Federation will likely follow one of three scenarios.

> Under a continuation of current policies, the Federation maintains its territorial integrity, as the center works out ad hoc arrangements with its various constituent components.
>
> A nationalistic, authoritarian regime emerges that seeks to recentralize virtually all power back into the

[29] On the former, see "Elite Units Moved to Moscow to Support Yeltsin," FBIS, *CEur*, Sept. 15, 1994, pp. 20–22, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, Sept. 14, 1994. On the latter, see Robert Orttung, "Yeltsin May Create National Guard," *OMRI Daily Digest*, Jan. 25, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hands of Moscow, as well as reassert Russian domination over some portions of the former Soviet Union that are now independent states.

Moscow fails to establish an effective balance of power with the rest of Russia, and a much looser, confederal relationship emerges, perhaps leading to the disintegration of the state into several new ones.

The trend toward decentralization is already evident: overall, despite occasional reassertions of power, Moscow's control and authority over the country's eighty-nine component parts is decreasing, while local demands for more control over their own resources and finances are rising. Also, while an authoritarian option is possible, such a regime might compound Russia's economic problems, resulting in systemic economic failure. In the wake of such failure, the Russian Federation's disintegration would become probable.

The most desirable outcome—from the standpoint of stability and general Western interests—is a looser confederation on the territory of what is currently the Russian Federation. Under this scenario, Moscow would give more and more effective power to local government, which would in turn still welcome links to Moscow. In light of Russian domestic developments since early 1994, this scenario is also the most likely for the foreseeable future.

Should Russia disintegrate, the cause would probably be a failure of the Federation to cope with one or more of its economic challenges, although ethnic tensions could add fuel to the fire. Assuming such a cause, one can already identify potential fragmentation lines: the North Caucasus (where economic difficulties, coupled with ethnic tensions, can lead to increased instability and armed conflicts); a vertical divide, perhaps as far west as the Urals, that would separate off the Far East and Siberia, where the availability of natural resources and the sense of alienation from Moscow could combine to forge a stronger desire for outright independence than currently exists; and a horizontal divide, along the 55th parallel (at least in European Russia), effectively splitting Northern European Russia (including Moscow and St. Petersburg) from Southern European Russia, whose economy relies on rusting industry and inefficient agriculture. In this case, the Far East and Siberia may opt to form a separate state, or seek some type of arrangement with the Northern European section. These are not, of course, the only possible forms of fragmentation; there are eighty-nine components of the Russian Federation, and any one could theoretically choose to divorce itself from all or most of the rest of the country, as Chechnya has sought to do since 1991. But speculation on fault lines merely illustrates some of the trends already in evidence.

Implications for the West

What are the implications of Russia's future for the Western community? The economic and political difficulties of dealing with several new states, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implications of such disintegration for military structures (including nuclear arsenals), and the probability of some form(s) of military conflict suggest that such a scenario would not be in Western interests. Thus, the consensus among Western observers is that the survival of the Russian Federation in its present configuration is in the best interests of the West. What limited influence Washington has over events in Russia should be exerted in that direction, supporting the evolution of effective working relations among all the country's components. If Russia disintegrates, the implications for the West would be both military and economic.

Military-Security implications. The preeminent worries are about the control of nuclear weapons and materiel, and about the possible proliferation of nuclear and other arms. Should Russia undergo some degree of disintegration, certain land-based nuclear forces may not remain under Moscow's control, effectively creating a new nuclear state. Such proliferation concerns pertain not only to Russia, but also to Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the other three states that currently possess nuclear weapons. While these governments are making efforts to put control regimes into place, individuals are apparently able to smuggle technology, nuclear materiel, and weaponry abroad, as several incidents in 1994 suggest. Research centers are especially likely to lack adequate control over their nuclear materiel. This already dangerous situation may grow worse if Russia experiences substantial decentralization.

Other military concerns pale in comparison to the nuclear threat, but still affect Western security interests. For example, the regional conflicts in various states of the former Soviet Union, including within Russia itself, generally create only minimal Western interest so long as they remain within the borders of the FSU. An exception, however, might be an escalation of tensions between Ukraine and Russia, arising out of the ongoing disputes over the future of the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea. If, indeed, these two countries reached the point of armed conflict, the pressure for some form of international action would be greater than for any other imaginable scenario within the FSU. Furthermore, if any conflict were to expand to external players (i.e., non-FSU countries), the United States and international community would certainly be under pressure to become involved.

The sale of conventional weapons by individual components of Russia—or even individual enterprises—is another possibility that increases significantly in the event of a further breakdown in Moscow's central authority. Already, local authorities have proposed the sale of military equipment produced on their territory to a third party. Sverdlovsk officials made such suggestions to China, for instance, but apparently with the knowledge and approval of Moscow. Should Moscow's control diminish and Russia's defense enterprises or local officials decide to act independently, export controls would be severely hampered and indiscriminate arms sales could easily heighten regional instabilities in any of a number of areas of the world.

Lastly, one must allow for the possibility that renegade militaries will emerge in Russia (and elsewhere in the FSU). While the Russian military will certainly continue to exist, other paramilitary organizations, many of which are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

connected with organized crime activities, have already begun to emerge in the North Caucasus. The lessons of history are important in this context. In Weimar Germany, disaffected World War I veterans believed the nation had let them down; they were humiliated by Germany's military defeat and were angry about the country's reduced power status and the decline in the military's prestige; they subsequently formed the root of a significant paramilitary movement out of which German fascism sprang. Parallels to the current Russian military—demoralized and disillusioned, forced to withdraw from Central Europe and parts of the FSU—are striking. Should such groups (either outside the official military structure or within it) grow even stronger, their ability to foster unrest could pose a serious threat to Russian stability, which could in time spill over into the FSU and Central European states.

Economic implications. Changes internal to Russia also raise economic concerns in the West, but these are far less important than military concerns. One possible result of changes within Russia could be disruption of supplies of natural resources such as oil, gas, timber, diamonds, and gold. While such disruptions might affect Western European and Asian countries more than the United States (especially in oil and gas supplies), U.S. firms involved in business ventures in Russia might be hurt. Undoubtedly, the Russians are themselves the main losers in economic terms from the risks of political instability. Investors will continue to stand on the sidelines until the Russian investment environment improves, limiting the inflow of capital and technology needed to modernize the Russian economy.

More directly relevant to U.S. economic interests in the long run is the possible emergence of an Asian trading center involving China, Korea, and perhaps even Japan in Russia's Far Eastern and Siberian regions. These countries might join to form their own trading area and seek to exclude the participation of others. Alternatively, if Moscow's presence in the region diminishes further, these countries may become competitors for commerce and political influence in the region, making it a new source of friction in the Pacific.

Lastly, the questionable safety of Russian civilian nuclear-power plants poses both economic and security concerns for the international community. The threat of another Chernobyl becomes all the greater as Russia's economic constraints impede its ability to maintain safety levels. Moreover, given the problems in exploiting oil and natural gas resources (both because of geographical conditions and because of the inefficient ways these fields have been developed to date), and given that the regions in Russia without such resources will find it difficult to pay world prices for them, the Russian government already recognizes that its dependency on nuclear power will increase in the coming years.

Conclusions

Political, economic, and military indicators suggest continued instability for the Russian Federation, with give and take between the executive and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legislature and between Moscow and the rest of the country, as they try to find more equitable center-regional balances of power. Current trends point to a peaceful evolution in these relationships. Nevertheless, Russia has demonstrated in the last several years how quickly its political situation can change. The United States has important concerns about developments within the Russian Federation, from control over nuclear materiel and nuclear power plants to potential chaos in some segment of the country. But Washington has only limited potential to influence events there.

What the West can do is prepare for more radical alternative futures. Regardless of how the Russian Federation evolves, we cannot afford to focus all of our attention on Moscow and President Yeltsin. A policy of close association with only Yeltsin and his closest associates is detrimental to both sides: he has to counter the image of being a supplicant to the Western community, while the West restricts its room for maneuver by investing so heavily in only one man. What is needed is a policy of "flexible engagement" that promotes ties with other power centers across the Russian Federation. The goal of such a policy should be to create long-term links at many levels throughout Russian society, and to try whenever possible to foster institutions supporting democracy and a market economy. Rather than large-scale, government-directed development activities, the United States should seek to build a network of local programs. Experience to date suggests that such grass roots activities have been most effective.[30] While the U.S. and other Western governments must understandably be cautious in pursuing such a policy, for it cannot be done at the expense of undermining Moscow's federal authority, these governments can encourage nongovernmental agencies and businesses to foster regional development on the political and economic level. An important element of this policy would be to begin observing events in Russia from the perspective of the Pacific nations in order to understand better how the Russian Far East and Siberia may develop. Various Western countries have made significant progress in expanding their contacts, but their efforts must be broadened throughout the country and across the political spectrum, lest the West find itself as unprepared as it was when Gorbachev and the Soviet Union disappeared.

[30] See Fred Hiatt and Daniel Southerland, "Grass-Roots Aid Works Best in Russia," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 12, 1995; and, Ariel Cohen, "Aid to Russia: Yes, but Needs Reform," *Heritage Foundation Committee Brief*, Feb. 6, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"... easily the most important and consistently interesting journal in the field..."
John Lewis Gaddis, Ohio University

International Security

Steven E. Miller, Editor in Chief
Michael E. Brown,
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editors

A major journal in today's international arena, *International Security* provides lucid, well-documented essays on all aspects of the control and use of force, from all political viewpoints. Its articles cover contemporary policy issues, and probe historical and theoretical questions behind them. Whether a topic is emerging, maturing or taking an interesting twist, each issue of *IS* provides important information, penetrating analysis, or new interpretation.

recent and forthcoming articles include:

Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Reiveson, and Marvin Miller A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material

V.P Gagnon, Jr. Ethnic Nationalism and The Case of Serbia

Charles L. Glaser Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict

Christopher Layne Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace

John J. Mearsheimer The False Promise of International Institutions

John Simpson and Darryl Howlett The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling Toward 1995

■ **1995 Rates** Individual $34; Institution $92; Student/Retired $20. Outside U.S.A. add $16 postage and handling. Canadians add additional 7% GST. Prepayment is required. Prices are subject to change without notice. Send check, payable to *IS*, drawn against a U.S. bank in U.S. funds—MasterCard, VISA, or AMEX number to: **MIT Press Journals** 55 Hayward Street Cambridge, MA 02142 Tel: 617 253-2889 Fax: 617 258-6779 journals-orders@mit.edu

Browse through select *International Security* article excerpts and ordering information online on the *Electronic Newsstand:* gopher enews.com

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University ISSN 0162-2889

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sovereignty and the "Near Abroad"

by Martha Brill Olcott

During the three-plus years since the collapse of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), "the competition to see which [of the ex-Soviet states] could become the most independent of all"[1] has noticeably slowed. Centripetal forces have begun to assert themselves, and a general sentiment prevails in the post-Soviet expanse that some sort of reintegration, especially in the economies of the various new republics, is not only necessary but desirable. (The Baltic states are the exception; no one in the CIS expects they will voluntarily rejoin any sort of post-Soviet configuration.)

How such a reintegration might be achieved remains a question, for integrative efforts to date have been ineffective. The CIS has never been granted the powers necessary to enforce the many decisions and policies that various committees of the Commonwealth have adopted. As Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev noted in March 1994, the CIS had by that date adopted 270 documents, of which one member had ratified only 40, another 140, and yet another 150.[2] By early 1995 the number of unratified documents had come to about four hundred. Efforts to overhaul or replace the CIS, such as the proposal by Nazarbaev to create a Euro-Asian Union, have found little support, especially among the larger countries, which would bear the cost of assisting the smaller and more enthusiastic states. Even the one supranational body that Russia has supported with some energy, the Interstate Economic Committee (IEC), has been slow to gel since the announcement of its inception.

The failure of a supranational integrative body to form has not, however, meant that relations among the new republics have gone unregulated. There has been an accelerating tendency toward the establishment of bilateral agreements and treaties, both between Russia and the other new states, and between

[1] Russian President Boris Yeltsin, speech to the Duma, *Rossiiskaia gazeta,* Feb. 25, 1994.

[2] "Views Russian-Kazakhstan Relations," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), Mar. 31, 1994, p. 43, from *Rossiiskaia gazeta,* Mar. 31, 1994.

Martha Brill Olcott is a professor of political science at Colgate University and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She is the author of *The Kazakhs* (Hoover Institution, second edition, 1995) and *Confronting Independence: Foreign Policy and Political Stability in Central Asia* (U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the new republics, one to another. Some of these treaties and agreements have been uniform, but many have not, so that differentiations of status and national interests have begun to emerge among the various states, further complicating the prospect for future reintegration within the CIS or some comparable structure.

One major reason for the persistent failure to reintegrate is that the Soviet successor states have very different understandings of independent statehood. While each recognizes that no state is able to function independently of all the others, these states also have differing conceptions of how much sovereignty they need to preserve, disagreeing widely in their answers to the question of whether they are willing to trade autonomy for security guarantees and for decreased responsibility in the management of their economies.

Sovereignty is of course a relative concept, particularly in the context of the post-Soviet states. For purposes of the present argument, a "sovereign state" is one that has sufficient capacity to meet its economic and security needs, so as to allow it to pursue its own interests even at the occasional displeasure or outright veto of the regional hegemon.

Polar opposite answers to the sovereignty question came from Tajikistan and Ukraine. Tajikistan, the weakest of the post-Soviet entities, scarcely meets Robert H. Jackson's criteria for a "quasi-sovereign" state, a term Jackson uses to describe a state that has received sovereignty despite its government's inability to provide for the security or social-welfare needs of the population.[3] The existing government in Tajikistan is not recognized as legitimate in large parts of the country, foreign aid supplies more than two-thirds of the national budget, and the regime cannot ensure either the international or the internal security of its population.

By contrast, Ukraine hopes, with considerable justification, to become a major Central European state within the space of a generation. However, since the election of Leonid Kuchma as president, even Ukraine accepts that short-term cooperation with Russia is a prerequisite of state survival and recognizes that long-term cooperation would maximize the scope of Ukraine's economic development.

The rest of the (non-Baltic) post-Soviet states fall somewhere between these two extremes in their desire for sovereignty, forming three general groups. The first consists of states that view themselves as potentially fully sovereign; the second, of those that hope to attain some form of "quasi-sovereignty"; and the third, of those that are still undecided about how best to define their national interests.

Differing Aspirations

In addition to Ukraine, the non-Baltic FSU states that have full sovereignty as their goal include Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. The leaders of

[3] Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these states believe that, however suddenly independence may have been thrust upon them, the country has the capacity to consolidate its statehood. This they seek to do both by strengthening a latent sense of nationhood in the overwhelming majority of the country's people, and, functionally, by transforming Soviet-era institutions that were at best administrative, and at worst almost wholly fictive, into fully functional executive, legislative, and judicial organs. Each of these states also has the economic resources necessary to ensure survival and such access—actual or potential—to the global transportation system as obviates its need to rely on Russia. Most of these states also have some hope of meeting their own security needs. Under these circumstances, the governments of these states hope to restrict participation in international organizations to those in which all members are granted equal or near-equal status.

Turkmenistan's deeply rooted traditional society may provide a basis for nationhood.

One cannot now say unequivocally that all these states will eventually achieve full sovereignty, much less that they will make the transition to full sovereignty with equal ease. While Azerbaijan has substantial oil wealth, and international outlets through (and close ties with) Iran and Turkey, the war with Armenia has made the country politically unstable and has left a quarter of the country's territory under Armenian occupation. Still, although the Azerbaijanis have elected three presidents in three years and endured considerable civil turmoil in addition to the war with Armenia, these "birth pangs" seem only to have stimulated Azerbaijani desires to recapture the statehood they lost during the Russian Civil War (1918–1920). As early as 1989 or 1990 the memory of that "lost" statehood was sufficiently strong that the Azerbaijani Popular Front became one of the largest and politically most powerful groups in the USSR, posing a sufficient threat to local Communist rule that the city of Baku was placed under martial law.

Turkmenistan is also rich in fossil fuels, and although at present the country is dependent upon Russia's highly erratic goodwill to transport these fuels to market, transit through Iran should become a viable option within a decade. The people of Turkmenistan lack a sense of modern nationhood, but the country's deeply rooted traditional society, which was strong enough to survive seventy years of Soviet social engineering, might well provide a basis for nationhood comparable to those of the small, oil-rich Gulf states.

Uzbekistan is not nearly as richly endowed as are the two states considered above, but has enormous gold deposits (one quarter of the USSR's reserves), is one of the world's leading cotton growers, and is only a year or two away from being able to meet all its own needs for electricity, oil, and natural gas (with plenty of the latter left over for export). Uzbekistan's land-locked position, and the fact that its only pre-Soviet international border was with Afghanistan, make transportation potentially more of a problem than it is for Ukraine and Turkmenistan. On the other hand, internal communications within the republic are among the best in the former USSR, an advantage certain to help Uzbekistan overcome lingering problems of regionalism when the nation's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders try to stimulate the development of modern Uzbek nationalism. No less important to the development of nationalism will be the major role that Uzbekistan's territory has always played in Central Asian history. Uzbekistan will also be aided in the consolidation of its political identity, and the building of economic and state institutions, by the presence of a relatively large and occupationally diverse native intelligentsia, which is generally fluent in Russian as well as Uzbek. In addition, Uzbekistan has committed itself to the development of a military force capable of meeting the republic's own defensive needs and strong enough to make the state a regional military force. Although the process of building military capability is certain to be slow, already Uzbekistan has succeeded far enough to have offered Tajikistan its services should Moscow decide to withdraw its forces.

Ukraine, in addition to having begun its statehood as a nuclear power, also has (after Russia) the largest and best-equipped military of any of the post-Soviet successor states. To be sure, the forces "stranded" in Ukraine when the USSR dissolved were never intended to function as an independent military and so will require substantial overhaul and restructuring, but the number and quality of these forces are such that they will be able to offer some defense against Russia should the need arise, and may even be seen by Moscow as posing some risk of a challenge. Possession of the largest army in Central Europe, a diverse agricultural and industrial economy, international ports, and an extensive border with Europe all make Ukraine a potentially viable country, even if it is wholly reliant on imported energy. The key to Ukraine's survival is rapid economic recovery, since that is the one asset that will help to reconcile the republic's twelve million ethnic Russians to independence. Except in Crimea, the Russians of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for independence in 1991, but that vote is widely understood to have been a mirror of economic rather than political aspirations. The ethnic Russians lack the emotional commitment to Ukrainian statehood that is characteristic of the country's ethnic Ukrainians, particularly those who live in the western part of the country.

All of these states recognize that their transition to independent statehood will be shaped—and perhaps even changed beyond recognition—by a Russian state intent on playing the role of regional hegemon. But each hopes to limit its involvement with Russia, in order to minimize the impact of that entanglement upon its sovereignty and so reduce as much as possible Russia's long-term ability to dominate the new state's economic and political life.

Significantly, none of these states has tried to divorce itself from Russia. To be sure, Azerbaijan made a concerted effort to do so under President Abulfaz Elchibey, when the legislature, which was dominated by the Popular Front, refused to ratify even the CIS founding documents that Elchibey's predecessor, Aziz Mutalipov, had signed in the republic's name in 1991.

However, that attempt to stay out of the CIS cost the Azerbaijanis dearly during the fourteen months (spring 1992 through summer 1993) when the Popular Front controlled the country, helping as it did to give a strategic advantage to Armenia (which had joined the CIS) in the war between the two states. Azerbaijan's current government, which was brought to power in 1993

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with a Russian "helping hand," ratified the CIS accords and has generally followed a pro-Russian policy, although one which is far less "Russo-centric" than Moscow would like.

Alliances of Expedience

All the leaders of the more independence-minded states are sensitive to the need to remain on good terms with Russia. Azerbaijan's President Gaidar Aliyev, who was a Soviet-era Party boss, is particularly aware of the length and tenacity of Moscow's reach. At the same time, though, in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, both of which are evolving toward democracy, public suspicion of Russia requires that leaders maintain more distance from Moscow than their personal inclinations might dictate.

Both the more pluralistic states and the single-leader states, however, have found it prudent to enter into a large number of bilateral treaties, particularly with Russia. A sample includes: a treaty between Russia and Turkmenistan that permits Russian citizens to serve in Turkmenistan's army; a treaty between Russia and Uzbekistan permitting military cooperation between the two states, including joint provisioning and equipping;[4] and a treaty between Russia and Ukraine on borders and border guards.[5] Ukraine and Uzbekistan have also concluded bilateral treaties of cooperation with Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (the foreign intelligence successor to the KGB).[6] As noted, Azerbaijan has been the most reluctant of these states to deal with Moscow, but even it has entered into negotiations on questions regarding the Caspian Sea, including questions about navigation, ownership and exploitation of oil resources, and responsibility for patrolling the borders with Iran and Turkey.

Yet, significantly, each of these states has also been reluctant to enter fully into the CIS or into other multilateral institutions that build upon or seek to reconstitute parts of the old USSR, because the former Soviet republics do not wish to make permanent their ceding of sovereignty. This reluctance is especially evident in the area of economic relations. In September 1994, Russia attempted to introduce an Interstate Economic Committee that would create a tariff-free common trade zone within the CIS; member states of the IEC would coordinate their foreign trade and economic development policies. The committee, which would be the first functioning sitting body of the CIS, would be charged with a number of executive and managerial tasks, in exchange for which member states would give up certain national prerogatives. The CIS Coordinating Consultative Committee, which formulated the proposal, set as one of the IEC's first tasks the creation of an intra-Commonwealth payments union, to serve as a clearing house for inter-republic debts. Over time this

[4] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* Nov. 30, 1994.
[5] "CIS Border Troops Agreement Signed," FBIS, *CEur,* Aug. 2, 1994, p. 1, from *Interfax,* July 29, 1994.
[6] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* Oct. 22, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clearing house would evolve into a monetary union. Voting in the IEC is to be weighted in accordance with the amount of financing contributed by each state, with Russia putting in (and hence voting) 50 percent; major decisions, however, will require 75 percent of member votes.

When the heads of the CIS states met the following month to ratify Russia's proposal, however, the IEC idea faced considerable opposition. Belarus's President Aleksandr Lukashenka objected to having the IEC in Moscow rather than Minsk, where the CIS is meant to be headquartered. All of the states except Uzbekistan put forward amendments or appended reservations that significantly diluted the powers that the body might have, Ukraine and some other states stipulating specifically that IEC decisions could not override national legislation. But the conditions posed by three of the states made their participation in the IEC almost meaningless. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan refused to participate in the payments union, while Ukraine said it would participate only after the introduction of its national currency, an event not expected for some time. Ukraine also indicated that it intended to retain full national control over its monetary policy.[7]

Since the meeting also rejected President Yeltsin's proposal to use Russia's Ministry for CIS Economic Relations as temporary staff while the IEC was forming, the IEC has had difficulty developing a structure through which to work. Although the first meeting of representatives was held in mid-November to consider such important issues as the creation of a CIS customs union, a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor, and an interstate refugee fund, only Russia and Uzbekistan sent fully accredited plenipotentiary representatives, and Turkmenistan sent no one at all.[8]

The IEC has subsequently acquired somewhat more authority, but the body remains far from operational. No chairman has yet been chosen. (Boris Yeltsin's proposal, to name former Belarusian premier Vyacheslau Kebich as chairman was defeated by the current president.) And, even more important, no formula has been agreed upon to permit the convertibility of currency within the CIS.[9]

Similar difficulties have also arisen in the area of security relations. In 1993, the CIS Defense Ministers' Council created a CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters, again in Moscow, with 50 percent Russian funding.[10] But Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have had mixed feelings about military cooperation with Russia. By November 1994, Russia had managed to secure what it viewed as satisfactory border patrol arrangements with Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and had proposed arrangements with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. Plans for Russian or joint control of the Belarus and Kazakhstan borders appear to be moving forward relatively smoothly,

[7] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* Oct. 21, 1994.
[8] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* Nov. 21, 1994.
[9] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* Oct. 21, 1994.
[10] "Defense Agreements Signed," FBIS, *CEur,* Dec. 23, 1993, p. 16, from *Interfax,* Dec. 23, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Turkmenistan has "contracted" with Russia for the introduction of Russian officers in Turkmen patrols, although Turkmenistan has refused to join more general CIS military operations.[11] The Ukrainians by contrast, as late as February 1995, were still expressing a strong preference to protect their own borders, and Azerbaijan was still resisting the introduction of Russian border troops. In the case of Azerbaijan, this refusal to yield may have helped harden Russia's objections to an agreement with a consortium led by British Petroleum to develop Azerbaijan's Caspian oil. Concerns about Azerbaijan's porous southern border also led Russia to warn that it might close its own border with the republic (as indeed it attempted to do, in part, during the battle for Chechnya).[12]

The reluctance of the leaders of these states to be herded into multilateral institutions is based on the belief that supranational organizations like the CIS should evolve, rather than be imposed. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan has been particularly insistent that integration of the Soviet successor states should not occur "prematurely,"[13] and that inter-state institutions should first address economic development and coordination, ideally on a corporate, rather than governmental, basis. Economic integration, if achieved, would then dictate political structures, in Karimov's estimation.[14] Turkmenistan's President Saparmurad Niyazov has made similar objections to the idea of closer political union.[15]

Obviously, what the leaders of these states fear are collective economic and security institutions based on multilateral guarantees of Russian hegemony. The example of the Warsaw Pact, which Russian commentators frequently put forward as a model for the CIS, makes the leaders of the sovereignty-minded states decidedly uncomfortable, remembering as they do that Pact's "multi-national" response to attempts at political self-direction in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

A New "Warsaw Pact"

By contrast, the dependency of a Warsaw Pact–style arrangement appeals to the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Tajikistan. To varying degrees, the leaders of these states seem as nervous about the burdens of their independence as they are about the possibility of losing it. They appear to be seeking ways to use sovereignty as a bargaining chip to gain international guarantees for securities they cannot otherwise provide. In ways familiar from post-colonial Africa, these states seem prepared to become "quasi-sovereign."

The state that best exemplifies the aggressive pursuit of quasi-sovereignty is Kazakhstan, which characteristically was the last Soviet republic to declare

[11] *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* Jan. 13, 1995.

[12] *Krasnaia zvezda,* Mar. 2, 1994.

[13] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* May 20, 1994.

[14] "Karimov Calls for Economic Integration First," FBIS, *CEur,* July 5, 1994, pp. 57–58, from Mayak Radio Network, July 4, 1994.

[15] *Komsomol'skaia pravda,* Apr. 26, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its independence and the only one to do so after the formal dissolution of the USSR. Potentially one of the richest of the Soviet successor states, Kazakhstan is the only former Soviet republic in which the eponymous people are a minority. Kazakhstan has nearly as many Russians as Kazakhs, and most of the Russians live less than a day's drive from the three-thousand-mile border separating the republic from Russia.

Thus, demographics as much as anything have made the republic's leadership nervous about independence. As nationalism has increased among the republic's two leading nationalities, so has President Nazarbaev's determination to find a formula to prevent the breakup of the republic and to secure its formal independence.

Many Russian commentators propose a CIS modelled on the Warsaw Pact.

As one of the FSU's four industrial republics (the others being Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia), Kazakhstan has an economy that was inextricably intertwined with Russia's at the time of the breakup. Not only has the rupture of those ties put Kazakhstan's economy into a sharp decline, but the Russians who worked in those now-idle factories have suffered disproportionately from that decline, making President Nazarbaev particularly eager to see the old inter-republic connections restored.

Nazarbaev's clear and often-repeated preference for such reintegration envisions a successor to the USSR, which he has called a Euro-Asian Union (EAU). If adopted, Nazarbaev's proposal would transform the CIS from its present commonwealth structure into a confederation of states. The states, though independent, would surrender large parts of their sovereignty to a supranational parliament charged with the development of a common economic policy, as well as common defense.[16]

It is highly unlikely that Nazarbaev's plan will ever be implemented, at least in the form he proposed it, because Nazarbaev envisions the constituent units of such a union functioning as equals. Not surprisingly, Moscow rejects any proposal that would permit the other post-Soviet governments to set the course of the Russian economy or defense; as noted, both the IEC and the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters are located in Moscow rather than in Minsk, the putative capital of the CIS. However, it is not just Moscow that objects to Nazarbaev's proposal; the leaders of Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have all declared the EAU unacceptable, on one ground or another. In fact, the only support for the EAU has come from President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan and President Eduard Shevarnadze of Georgia, each of whom has more to gain than lose from the arrangement. But even they have cooled somewhat, over time.

The appeal of the EAU for Nazarbaev, besides the presumption that such a body would give Kazakhstan's president a prominent role, is that such an arrangement would allow Kazakhstan to devolve or retain the same amount

[16] See Nursultan Nazarbaev, "Plan for the Formation of a Euro-Asian Union of States," *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* June 8, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of autonomy in concert with all the other post-Soviet republics. The failure of Nazarbaev's initiative has pushed Kazakhstan to make greater direct accommodation of Russia's interests in the republic on a bilateral basis. In late 1994 and early 1995, Kazakhstan relinquished partial ownership of the enormous Karachaganskaya natural gas field to Russia and also opened the door to Russian domination of all Caspian Sea oil and gas development. The two republics have recently signed seventeen accords, providing for joint Kazakhstan-Russian ownership of selected defense-related industries, banks, and communications facilities, and for increasing links between the Kazakh and Russian military forces, which were already closely allied.

Whether the integration that these agreements mandate will ever occur is another question. An agreement for a customs union among Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, signed in January 1995, appears to have encountered problems almost immediately, in large part because of Belarus's second thoughts about how much independence it ought to cede to Russia. The history and culture of the Belarusians and Russians are more closely intertwined than are those of any two other ex-Soviet peoples, and the economic interconnections are exceedingly tight as well, to such a degree that when the ruble zone collapsed, in late 1993, Belarus briefly considered exchanging its economic sovereignty outright in return for being able to stay in Russia's ruble zone.

The election of Aleksandr Lukashenka in July 1994 has made official policies somewhat more confused, but the new Belarusian president appears to prefer establishing bilateral ties to Russia, or establishing multilateral ones in concert with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, to strengthening the CIS or creating some successor.

The two other states in this dependence-minded group seem even more willing, almost anxious, to become "quasi-sovereign," if the surrendering of sovereignty will bring them security. As noted, Tajikistan has never really functioned as an independent state. Within days of the attempted Soviet coup, in August 1991, Tajikistan had a coup of its own, which forced Gorbachev-era party boss Khakar Makhkamov from office, after which Tajikistan tumbled into political turmoil. Power was held first by Brezhnev-era leader Rahmon Nabiev (whom Gorbachev had dismissed), then by Nabiev and an Islamic-Democratic coalition, then solely by the Islamic-Democratic coalition. There was open civil war in the fall of 1992, after which Emomali Rahmonov took power, and secured it with Russian and other CIS troops.

One of the poorest republics in Soviet times, Tajikistan is now supported almost entirely by outside assistance, most of it Russian. Indeed, Tajikistan is the only post-Soviet republic to have remained in the ruble zone (although the rubles shipped there are specially marked). For Rahmonov and the current Tajik government, close ties with Russia are a requirement for remaining in power. The Tajik leaders favor a strong CIS as well, since bilateral ties with Russia may not be enough to forestall Uzbek territorial ambitions toward the republic.

The Uzbek government would far prefer to see its neighboring republic ruled by people from Khojent, President Rahmonov's former communist rivals,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than by Rahmonov and the other men from Kuliab who currently dominate in Dushanbe. Khojent, formerly Leninabad, is in Tajikistan's extreme north, physically remote from Dushanbe, and closely integrated economically, politically, and culturally with Uzbekistan. Throughout the Soviet period the leadership of Tajikistan came from Khojent. In contrast, Kuliab is located in southwest Tajikistan. It had long contested Khojent's domination and finally overturned it in the aftermath of the 1992 civil war. Since the replacement of Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullojanov by Abdujalil Samadov in February 1994, the entire senior government is said to be in Kuliab's control. This current Tajik government is well aware that in addition to having a strong military presence just over the Tajik border, whence it provides Tajikistan's air defense, Uzbekistan also has a large contingent of troops among the CIS forces within Tajikistan, second in size only to Russia's contingent.

Kyrgyzstan is another state that fears the idea of a "greater Uzbekistan," since Osh, the republic's border province with Uzbekistan, is more than one-third ethnic Uzbek and very poorly linked with the northern half of the republic and the nation's capital, Bishkek. Inter-ethnic disturbances in this region of southern Kyrgyzstan could destabilize the whole republic, as they did when Uzbeks and Kyrgyz turned on each other in bloody riots there in summer 1990. Kyrgyzstan also shares a long, mountainous border with Tajikistan, over which comes an influx of guns, drugs, and refugees, particularly since the collapse of Tajikistan's coalition government in late 1992.

Kyrgyzstan is also a very poor republic, despite having substantial gold reserves and receiving the highest per capita international financial assistance of all the ex-Soviet republics. The short- and even medium-term economic prospects for the republic are bleak, leading President Akaev to support virtually every plan for increased inter-republic integration that has been proposed. Akaev also seems willing to grant Russia large economic and military concessions in return for promises of cheap fuel and industrial investment designed to create employment.

Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are all reluctant to break ties to their Soviet, and hence Russian-dominated, pasts. For Tajikistan the reason is the pragmatism of a state at war, but for the others the reasons go deeper. Before independence Belarus did not have Ukraine's double tradition: one part of the country wanting close ties with Russia, another aspiring to independence. The pro-independence movement in Belarus was small and had no direct ties to the independence movements of 1918; indeed, it did not emerge until very late in the Soviet period. The situation in Kazakhstan was much the same. The Kazakhs firmly supported the idea that the Kazakh people had to be preserved, and saw their future as threatened by the implied assimilationism of Soviet policies. However, almost everyone in Kazakhstan recognized that there was no clear delineation between Russia's frontier and the Kazakh steppe, which has led to a widely shared belief that any effort to erect firm borders between these two states, even if internationally recognized, could easily end in bloodshed. For their part, the Kyrgyz cannot imagine a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

future in which they and the Kazakhs would go totally separate ways, as would be the case if a Kazakh-Russia union formed and excluded Kyrgyzstan.

All of these states, in sum, have strong historic, geostrategic, and economic reasons for establishing close bonds with Russia. For each of them, save perhaps Belarus, it makes more economic sense, and is more efficient, to establish such bonds through the CIS or some successor institution than through a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties.

The Undecided States

Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova are the third group of ex-Soviet states: they cannot decide which way to turn. Georgia and Moldova appear to have some idea of where they would like to be, but lack a notion of how to get there. In the case of Armenia, even its goals seem contradictory.

Georgia was the last of the present twelve members to join the CIS, which it did only in late 1993, after Russian support of Abkhaz secessionist forces brought the Georgian state to the point of destruction. The danger to Georgia was that, if the Abkhaz secessionists succeeded in "joining up" with Russia, then Osset and Ajar nationalists elsewhere in Georgia might have gone to war to gain the same arrangements. With the Abkhaz question still unresolved, and hundreds of thousands of Georgian refugees trying to return to this former autonomous republic within Georgia, the Shevardnadze government has little choice but to support the strengthening of the CIS and improved bilateral security arrangements with Russia. Indeed, most of those in the government who objected to the signing of the treaty introducing such ties (including the opening of three new Russian military bases on Georgian soil) retired precipitously. Among these early retirees was Defense Minister Georgi Karkarashvili. Another who objected, Deputy Defense Minister Nika Kekelidze, perished in a mysterious explosion in his apartment.[17]

But for all their need to cling to Russia, the Georgians would like to be fully independent. They declared their independence only weeks after the three Baltic republics did, in spring 1990. Their memories of Georgian independence in 1918 remain vivid, but in the current situation a new and real independence seems quite unattainable.

The situation in Moldova is also complicated by a Russian military presence, that of the former Fourteenth Soviet Army, based on the eastern bank of the Dniestr River in the breakaway, pro-Russian "Trans-Dniestr Republic." Moldova joined the CIS at its formation, but, more interested in ties with its ethnic-kin state of Romania than with Russia, republic representatives took no active role in the CIS until late 1993. At that time, the state was pressured, in

[17] "Russian-Georgian Talks Yield Three Bases in Georgia," Joint Publications Research Service, *Central Eurasia,* Mar. 4, 1994, p. 27, from *Krasnaia zvezda,* Feb. 4, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exchange for Russian promises so far unfulfilled, to support reunification of Trans-Dniestria with the rest of the republic.

Armenia's is a more complicated case. Fiercely nationalistic, Armenia believed that it required membership in the CIS, or even a reconstituted and looser USSR, in order to protect itself from annihilation by the "Turks," who nearly encircle it. However, after the victory Armenia achieved at Azerbaijan's expense, with the incidental assistance of U.S. sanctions against Azerbaijan, the Armenians now feel more secure. Armenia continues to feel vulnerable along its borders with Turkey, though, and so has accepted a joint Russian-Armenian border defense, while hoping for membership in a broader collective-security institution, such as the CIS might become. Yet one of the issues confusing Armenia, and all of the other states, is the difficulty of knowing what choices for security protection are really on offer from Russia.

Russia's Undefined Security Interests

One of the largest imponderables facing all of the non-Russian post-Soviet successor states, including the Baltics, is Russia's continued indecision over its security interests: How should these be defined in what Russian policy makers term "the near abroad," and what institutions should be used to pursue them? Although significant differences of opinion exist among factions of the Russian government and society, broad agreement has emerged on a number of issues.

Opinion is unanimous that, as President Yeltsin explained to the Duma, future integration cannot *cost* Russia, and so it cannot proceed at the expense of dissipating Russia's forces or resources.[18] Russia's first priority is to protect its own defenses and pocketbook. Thus some factions, such as that represented by Lieutenant General L. Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, argue that Russia must use CIS structures, under Russian control, to defend the entire ex-USSR (whether or not this includes the Baltics is unspecified) in a new variation of the Warsaw Pact.[19] By contrast, Andranik Migranyan of Yeltsin's presidential council argues that Russia should abandon the "150-year plus attempt of the Russian Empire, and subsequently of the Soviet Union also, to integrate [Central Asia] in a single linguistic and cultural space," and should concentrate instead on making the region a neutral buffer zone, while seeking to bind Ukraine, Belarus, the north Caucasus, and Kazakhstan to itself with a series of regional defense agreements.[20] Another government faction claims that Russia's primary interest lies in control of oil and other resources, for which purpose the state should establish a two-tiered relationship, first among the "oil-four" of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and then secondly, and less importantly, with the consuming states.[21]

[18] *Rossiiskaia gazeta,* Feb. 25, 1994.
[19] *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* May 17, 1994.
[20] *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* Jan. 12, 1994.
[21] *Nezavismaia gazeta,* June 3, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All factions also appear to agree on defense of the borders, which for reasons of practical economy as much as anything else are defined as the fortified borders of the old USSR. (Many Russians have written of the extraordinary sums it would take to establish fortifications along the new Russian border, which is virtually as long as was the Soviet one.) Likewise shared are: a desire to "protect" the approximately 25 million Russians who ended up outside the boundaries of Russia, and whose rights are now viewed as in peril, especially if they live in Central Asia or the Baltics; a fear of contagion by civil conflicts, especially interethnic conflicts, in other parts of the former USSR; and a fear of spreading "Islamic fundamentalism" penetrating into Russia through the Caucasus or Central Asia. Another fear which is mentioned with increasing frequency is the emergence of a "CIS-II," as smaller sub-units of the existing republics, like the Trans-Dniester Republic, the Gagauz Republic, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, and Karabakh, link up to provide a joint bolstering of their claims to independence.[22] Indeed, the announcement from Moldova that Gagauzia has signed treaties of friendship with South Ossetia, Trans-Dniestria, and Abkhazia suggests that such fears are not groundless.[23]

There is more disagreement on the structures that would defend Russia's interests militarily. Official Russian military doctrine, as explained by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, calls for a complete restructuring and downsizing of the army in the period 1996–2000, with a move to increased reliance on volunteers and the withdrawal of all Russian soldiers back to Russian territory.[24] At the same time, however, Grachev also announced plans to open twenty-seven or twenty-eight new Russian bases in the CIS in 1994 alone.[25]

Ultimately, Russia will determine the relations among the various states of the former Soviet Union.

In general, government security thinking is probably close to that set forth in a paper issued by Yevgeny Primakov's Foreign Intelligence Service, which outlines three possible scenarios for future development of the CIS. In the first scenario, centripetal forces intensify, bringing economic integration, increased military cooperation under a unified (Russian) command, and perhaps political integration. In the second scenario, advocates of "separate development" receive direct or indirect outside support, bringing worsening economic problems, increased nationalism and hence authoritarianism, and an increase in Islamic extremism on Russia's southern flanks. In the third scenario, one of the CIS states other than Russia attempts to integrate the CIS members. If successful, this might integrate the entire CIS, but if not, it could create a closed sector, oriented towards "external centers of influence."[26] The way in which these scenarios are sketched suggests what

[22] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty E-Mail Bulletin,* Nov. 21, 1994.

[23] "Gagauzia, South Ossetia Sign Treaty," FBIS, *CEur,* Nov. 1, 1994, p. 40, from *Basapress,* Oct. 28, 1994.

[24] *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* June 9, 1994.

[25] *Slovo Kyrgyzstana,* Feb. 11, 1994.

[26] "Text of FIS Report Presented by Primakov," FBIS, *CEur,* Sept. 23, 1994, pp. 1–6, from *Rossiiskaia gazeta,* Sept. 22, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia's response is likely to be in each case, but Andranik Migranyan removed further ambiguity when he stated that Russia would view any attempt to interfere with integrative processes in any of the ex-USSR states around itself as an unfriendly act.[27]

In addition to the debate over security, which is on-going in the present government, a larger debate is taking place among various groups now out of power, or on the margins of power. It is unclear how these various groups would behave were they to come to power, whether the nationalists would turn their rhetoric about the defense of Russians, and more than Russia, into policy; or whether the Communists would make a serious effort to recreate a looser version of the USSR.

All of the major political constituencies in Russia today defend the idea of closer integration of the post-Soviet states as well as the need to defend the interests of ethnic Russians who live beyond Russia's borders. But it is not clear what price various constituencies would pay to achieve these goals, particularly those democratic groups that have been so critical of the Russian military engagement in Chechnya.

Over time, though, all of Russia's political constituencies will likely feel compelled to distinguish among various states of the "near abroad," setting different priorities for each state or group of states. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are likely to continue to be of special interest to Russia.

However, a cost-conscious Russian state may well decide that the investment necessary to enjoy anything like a hegemonic relationship in Ukraine is too great to pay. For 150 years Russian security demanded domination of eastern Poland, but the price of maintaining it ultimately grew too high. It is not impossible that Russia will make the same cost/benefit choice again, withdrawing further eastward and contenting itself with a totally loyal Belarus and a well-disposed but independent Ukraine that grants port rights.

Similarly, should Kazakhstan develop into a stable and secure state, Russia may feel that its security interests are well enough met by joint patrols of Kazakhstan's southern and eastern boundaries, especially if Russian multinational corporations can ensure the state a controlling presence in development, exploitation, and shipment of fossil fuels from the Caspian states.

Burnt by its costly war in Chechnya, Russia may at some point wish to retreat back north of the Caucasus mountains, especially if it is faced with the risk of indefinite secession struggles and local wars in the North Caucasus and in the states of Transcaucasia.

For the time being, however, and probably for the next decade or two, Russia will continue to want to preserve an "outer security" zone along the borders of the Central Asian and Caucasian states. The question that Russia must answer, however, is what method it will use to preserve that zone, and the price it will pay to keep it up.

[27] "Presidential Council Member Migranyan Assesses Policy Toward FSU," FBIS, *CEur,* Feb. 14, 1994, pp. 13–30, from *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* Jan. 12, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Integration through supranational organizations reduces the financial and political costs to Russia of maintaining control, but brings with it the threat of diluted security. Indeed, one of the persistent fears running through discussions of group security arrangements is that Russia might find itself dragged into conflicts in which it has no interest, whether between two states or, even more likely, between rival pretenders to elite status within a state. However, if Russia were to attempt to impose control more directly, the costs would be enormous, crippling the state financially and isolating it politically. In addition, while Russia ponders this equation, economic and political deterioration in the other states, combined with a growing familiarity of the population with independence, makes ever more complex the political situations in the states over which Russia would seek to extend control.

The reality of the CIS and the post-Soviet expanse is that Russia will ultimately determine the relations among the various states. The danger is that Russian indecision, and the continuing murkiness of politics, both within and without Russia, will create a situation in which events, rather than reasoned consideration of national interests, will thrust upon the CIS states an integration even worse than the present disintegration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY

Editors
Marc F. Plattner
Larry Diamond

Editorial Board
Chinua Achebe
Shaul Bakhash
Nancy Bermeo
Daniel Brumberg
Naomi Chazan
Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.
Francis Fukuyama
Harry Harding
Donald L. Horowitz
Samuel P. Huntington
Atul Kohli
Leszek Kolakowski
Liang Heng
Arend Lijphart
Juan J. Linz
Seymour Martin Lipset
Joshua Muravchik
Ergun Özbudun
Octavio Paz
Susan Kaufman Purcell
Peter Reddaway
Condoleezza Rice
Philippe Schmitter
Alfred Stepan
Vladimir Tismaneanu
Arturo Valenzuela
(on leave)
Ernest J. Wilson III
(on leave)

January 1995 is a Special Fifth Anniversary Issue

Volume 6, Number 1 articles include: Democracy's Future • The Tide Beneath the Third Wave • Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital • Europe After Utopianism • Toleration and the New Arab Politics • Georgia's Identity Crisis • Ukraine at the Crossroads • Malawi's New Dawn • Redemocratization in Chile

Since its inception in 1990, the *Journal of Democracy* has become an influential international forum for scholarly analysis and competing democratic viewpoints. Its articles have been cited in *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal,* and widely reprinted in many languages. Focusing exclusively on democracy, the *Journal* monitors and analyzes democratic regimes and movements in scores of countries around the world. Each issue features a unique blend of scholarly analysis, reports from democratic activists, updates on news and elections, and reviews of important recent books. The *Journal* presents spirited debates on key issues such as alternative electoral systems and the prospects for democracy in Russia and Eastern Europe, as well as clusters of in-depth articles on such timely themes as dealing with ethnic conflict and combating corruption. *Published quarterly in January, April, July, and October for the National Endowment for Democracy.*

Prepayment is required. Annual Subscriptions: $26.00, individuals; $55.00, institutions. Foreign postage: $3.80, Canada & Mexico; $7.70, outside North America. Single-issue prices: $8.00, individuals; $16.00, institutions. Payment must be drawn on a U.S. bank in U.S. dollars or made by international money order. MD residents add 5% sales tax. For orders shipped to Canada add 7% GST (#124004946).

Send orders to: The Johns Hopkins University Press, P.O. Box 19966, Baltimore, MD 21211. To place an order using Visa or MasterCard, call toll-free 1-800-548-1784, FAX us at (410) 516-6968, or send Visa/MasterCard orders to this E-mail address: jlorder@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu

EA5

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia's Real Drive to the South

by Stephen Blank

During 1994, a number of trends and events converged to wrest the Caucasus and Transcaucasia out of obscurity and on to Europe's security agenda.[1] The regional ethnic conflicts, the war in Chechnya, and Russia's broader bid to create new spheres of political and economic influence within and beyond the CIS have come together to present significant continental threats. Unless the Western powers resist this resurgent Russian neo-imperialism, it will increase threats to European security.

Economic Imperialism in Transcaucasia

On September 20, 1994, President Gaidar Aliyev of Azerbaijan signed a contract with SOCAR, a British Petroleum–led international consortium, to develop oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea and Azeri territorial waters. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the deal, even though Russia's state-owned oil company, Lukoil, is a member of SOCAR, sought the contract, and would have received a 10 percent share of profits. The rejection was in accord with the MFA's official position on exploitation of the area's resources, a position outlined in an April 1994 démarche to Great Britain according to which oil deals in the Caspian Sea "cannot be recognized" unless approved by Moscow:

> The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single eco-system and represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or activities including resource development have to be resolved with the participation of all the Caspian countries. . . . Any steps by whichever Caspian state aimed at acquiring any kind of advantages with

[1] "The Caucasus" (or "the North Caucasus") comprises the Russian republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardinia-Balkaria. "Transcaucasia" comprises the states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

Stephen Blank is professor of Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He has published numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies, and is the author of *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities, 1917–1924* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> regard to the areas and resources . . . cannot be recognized . . . [and] any unilateral actions are devoid of a legal basis.[2]

By sending this uncompromising missive to London rather than Baku, Moscow framed the issue of Caspian oil rights in terms of East-West conflict and showed disdain for Azerbaijan's sovereignty. In effect, the MFA has said, "If the West yields, so will Baku." This attitude is in keeping with Russia's doctrine of diminished sovereignty for the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and reflects a basic principle of tsarist and Soviet imperial policies: Azerbaijan and other littoral states must be dominated by Russia or they will revert to an anti-Russian, Western sphere of influence.

However, while the Kremlin's bold assertions and baseless arguments for denying states their territorial waters and sovereignty are reminiscent of Soviet brazenness, they also reflect current Russia's weakness, frustration, and desperation lest its imperial reach continue to shrink. The letter's menacing tone shows Russian awareness that Baku, Paris, Washington, London, and Ankara have been successfully resisting Moscow's pressure. The démarche may be the opening shot in a campaign, but the campaign is not born of strength. This mixture of fear and belligerence is echoed in Russia's media, where the contract has sparked countless farfetched and irrational threat scenarios. These stories are reaching an audience that seems to have little trouble believing them, even though most have been conjured up simply to justify an expansive policy to Russia's south.[3]

Through this policy, Russia is attempting to monopolize more than just oil production. Russian elites routinely link energy control with the use of Russian "peacemaking" troops.[4] Thus it is probably no mere coincidence that the April 1994 démarche arrived in Britain just a day before France and the United States announced their opposition to Russia's proposed unilateral deployment of such troops to Azerbaijan's war-torn Armenian enclave, Nagorno-Karabakh (see map 1). Indeed, right up to the December 1994 meeting of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),[5] Russian negotiators explicitly acknowledged the importance of control over peacemaking and sought to exclude the OSCE from the region. To the Russians' dismay, the organization rejected that proposed ouster.

Nevertheless, where diplomacy has failed, clandestine operations may be succeeding. According to the view that prevails in Baku, whenever Azerbaijan

[2] *Financial Times,* May 31, 1994. In November, Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik reiterated Moscow's claims. *Financial Times,* Nov. 9, 1994.

[3] See, e.g., "Analysis of Russia's Geopolitical Problems in Post-Soviet World," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur Report*), Sept. 26, 1994, pp. 24–27, from *Kommersant Daily,* Sept. 17, 1994.

[4] "Geopolitical Implications of Karabakh Conflict Viewed," FBIS, *CEur Report,* Sept. 8, 1994, pp. 85–87, from *Segodnya,* Aug. 26, 1994.

[5] In December 1994 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—CSCE—changed its name to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The article will use OSCE to refer to the organization both before and after its name change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Map 1
The Caucasus and Transcaucasia



Note: Since the production of this map, Chechen-Ingushetia has split into the separate republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. Source: Diller, Daniel C., *Russia and the Independent States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993), p. 268. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

asserts its independence, the Kremlin tries to instigate a coup in order to ensure continued Russian dominance in the region. President Aliyev himself has made charges to this effect.[6]

The 1993 overthrow of President Abulfaz Elchibey, the breakout of political prisoners, the murder of high officials, and the attempted coup in September 1994 are widely seen as proof of Russian complicity. The 1994 attempt came just after Aliyev signed with SOCAR, while the 1993 coup occurred not long after Elchibey agreed to build a pipeline with his ally, Turkey. In June 1993, Elchibey was to sign contracts for a route that would lead from Baku through Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia to the Mediterranean city of Ceyhan. Preferred by the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey, this route not only

[6] "Aliyev 5 Oct Azadlyg Square Speech," FBIS, *CEur Report*, Oct. 18, 1994, pp. 103–5, from *Bakinskiy rabochiy*, Oct. 7, 1994; "Aliyev Speaks on 'Recent Developments,'" Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), Sept. 27, 1994, p. 77–80, from Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi, Sept. 22, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

avoided Iranian territory, but would have encouraged a territorial settlement to end the Nagorno-Karabakh war. But Yerevan told Elchibey that neither Azerbaijan nor Turkey would be allowed to run a pipeline through Armenian territory. Meanwhile, Nagorno-Karabakh objected to the OSCE's peace conditions and some in Azerbaijan criticized the West's particular version of the route through Armenia. The resulting delay gave Russia and Armenia time to act.

Elchibey's secretary of state, Ali Kerimov, claims that Moscow demanded an exclusive peacemaking presence in Azerbaijan. In return, Azerbaijan would get back all lands captured from it by the Armenians. Elchibey refused the deal and was soon deposed in a coup with Russian fingerprints on it.[7] Armenian troops from Karabakh then attacked Azeri areas intended for the pipeline. (Whether the troops were demonstrating their ability to disrupt any such pipeline or pursuing other strategic objectives cannot be determined.) Soon, Azerbaijan's new president, Aliyev, had joined the CIS, something Elchibey had refused to do. These facts explain the prevalence in Baku of a conspiratorial view.

Even if Moscow is not responsible for the overthrow of Elchibey, its behavior toward Azerbaijan has been harsh. In response to the SOCAR contract, the MFA has advocated blockading the country and is trying to force Baku to ship its oil through Russian ports into the Black Sea, not through Iran or Turkey.[8] Moreover, Moscow has grown angry with Aliyev personally. *Komsomolskaya pravda* even threatened him with expulsion and a coup (after the failed one in October 1994) stating that, "having lost the war for Karabakh and one-third of its territory, the republic is incapable of preserving its integrity without strong military and economic assistance or political support."[9] Lastly, the Kremlin often suggests that rejection of its demands will lead to continued war and further Azeri territorial losses.

Transcaucasia and European Security

Lying behind Moscow's attempts to coerce Azerbaijan over pipelines and oil contracts is a traditional struggle for markets. For Russia, whose energy economy is on the verge of collapse, the advent of new CIS rivals selling to the West would be an economic and strategic catastrophe.[10] Already, Aliyev's resistance to Russia has upset major foreign policy and economic goals.

[7] Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, *"Back in the USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994), pp. 12–13.

[8] "Journalists Comment on Caspian Oil Deal," FBIS, *CEur Report,* Nov. 22, 1994, pp. 85–91, from *Kazakhstanskaya pravda,* Nov. 5, 1994; Henry Huttenbach, "Focus on the Caspian: The Pipeline War," *Analysis of Current Events* (Association for the Study of Nationalities), Dec. 1994.

[9] "Aliyev Courting Confrontation with Russia," FBIS, *CEur,* Oct. 5, 1994, pp. 37–39, from *Komsomolskaya pravda,* Oct. 4, 1994.

[10] See Robert E. Ebel, *Energy Choices in Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meanwhile, Russian energy production is falling, and many customers have reneged on contracts or cannot pay their debts. Provisions for winter have been strained as energy supplies are increasingly exported abroad, making it harder for CIS countries to get their supplies. If Azerbaijan and Central Asia can produce and ship oil without Russia, they will win some of Russia's customers, depriving the country of its major source of hard currency when it can ill afford the loss. In time, Baku may be able to supplant Moscow as primary supplier to the CIS. The consequent injection of foreign capital into Azerbaijan might allow the country to buy more finished goods from the West and further lessen its dependence upon Russia.

Russo-Turkish rivalry. The Kremlin's pressure on Baku is thus hardly surprising. Nevertheless, Moscow's actions in the Transcaucasus cannot be ignored, as they threaten the ambitions and security of other major powers. For example, Russia and Turkey are now involved in a rivalry in which continuous economic competition interacts with regional armed warfare. In a bid for greater control over energy, Ankara is sponsoring a peace plan that would grant Nagorno-Karabakh independence or connection with Armenia in return for a pipeline from Central Asia to Turkey via the Caspian Sea. In response, Russia is trying to outflank Turkey by building, with Greece and Bulgaria, its own line from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and to exclude Ankara (and its pipeline plans) from the peace process. In turn, Turkey recently closed the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to tankers, allegedly for ecological reasons, but probably to obstruct Russian shipping.

Turkey must be integrated into Europe as threats to it grow from the Caucasus, Near East, and Balkans.

Moscow's preferred pipeline route would allow Russia to avoid such Turkish obstructions. In fact, the Russian pipeline would remove Turkey altogether as a player in Transcaucasian energy, striking at Ankara's vital interests there and in the Balkans as well. For Moscow's plan would also serve to consolidate a Greco-Russian, and perhaps Bulgarian, bloc to oppose Turkey in its efforts to dominate Southeast Europe through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ). Turkey's prominence in the BSECZ already gives it a leading role in economic development in the region. The notion of the Black Sea zone as a regional stabilizer is an important counter to Iranian and Russian efforts to dominate the area and helps Turkey assert its status as a major regional power. Therefore the BSECZ obstructs the restoration of a Russian sphere of influence in the Balkans and Black Sea.

But by regaining preponderance in Transcaucasia and its energy economy, Russia could outflank Turkey's international economic and security policy, create a Balkan anti-Turkish bloc, and nullify the BSECZ's promise for Turkey. Even apart from the OSCE's peacekeeping actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, these considerations show how Transcaucasian developments clearly resound across Southeastern Europe. Ankara, however, believes its allies are neglecting this larger context of Russia's Balkan and Transcaucasian policies.[11]

[11] *The New York Times*, June 19, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Balkan developments are closely tied to the wars in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia. By declaring an embargo on trade with Serbia, the U.N. imposed severe economic penalties on Balkan trade in general and trade with Serbia in particular. Bulgaria's Danubian ports have duly ceased handling liquid fuels for export up the Danube to Central Europe, and companies that benefitted from cheap river transport facilities along the Danube for re-exporting oil products to Central Europe are consequently being hurt. Joining the embargo has also cut off Bulgaria from its main overland trade routes through the former Yugoslavia westward. Thus Sofia's agreement to build a pipeline with Russia and Greece must also be seen as an effort to compensate for these economic losses and regain lost markets. Understanding the impact of the Yugoslav wars on the Balkan regional economy, Turkey has promoted rail and road connections tying together Istanbul, Sofia, Skopje, and the Adriatic city of Durres to lessen Bulgaria's and Macedonia's need for links through Serbia or Greece. But Bulgaria's needs for oil and gas proved too large and immediate to delay.

The Russo-Turkish rivalry reflects, among other things, Moscow's perception that Turkey is a major threat to Russian interests and the pivot around which security agendas in the Caucasus and Europe revolve. In line with this view, the Kremlin has pursued a unilateral and exclusionary policy in the Caucasus, and in the Balkans has nurtured traditional ties with Greece and Serbia against the Muslim powers.

Russia's unilateralism. In addition, since 1989, a crucial element in Soviet/Russian policy in Europe has been to gain membership in key European security organizations in order—at the least—to inhibit them from acting in opposition to Moscow's interests, and—at best—to encourage them to give the Kremlin a free hand in the CIS. As Andranik Migranyan, an advisor to President Boris Yeltsin, wrote:

> Russia faces numerous problems, both abroad and with other newly independent former Soviet republics. It cannot afford to be constrained when its own interests do not coincide with NATO's or with those of the Partnership for Peace.[12]

In keeping with its effort to gain a free hand in the CIS, Moscow organized the coups in Baku to gain more leverage over its security and energy policies and made similar efforts in Grozny to unseat the Chechen government.[13] When the latter attempts failed, Russia attacked Chechnya. By massing more than 40,000 troops without giving notice to the OSCE, and by bombing civilians, the Kremlin violated several OSCE agreements, including ones that it had entered just days earlier.[14]

[12] Andranik Migranyan, "Unequal Partnership," *The New York Times,* June 23, 1994.

[13] Thomas Goltz, "The Hidden Russian Hand," *Foreign Policy,* Fall 1993, pp. 92–116; Amur Mursaliyev, "Drugs Fuel Azeri Coups," *Moscow News,* Dec. 9–15, 1994; James Sherr, "The Conflict in Chechniia," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Dec. 1994, pp. 557–58.

[14] See "Politico-Military Code of Conduct," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (hereafter FBIS, *EEur*), Dec. 7, 1994, pp. 10–13, from *MTI,* Dec. 6, 1994; "Ankara to Reject Russian Proposal to Revise CFE Treaty," Joint Publications Research Service, *Arms Control* (hereafter JPRS, *Arms*), Jan. 17, 1995, pp. 55–56, from *Turkish Daily News,* Nov. 25, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Clearly, the future of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia is of great concern to Europe, and Russia's attempt to exclude Turkey, the OSCE, and the West from the area is of more than local significance. Therefore, it is naive and misleading to assert, as some Western observers have, that

> if carefully articulated, Russian interests will find broad support [in the West] because few people have any great interests in generating more "great games" between East and West or between North and South.[15]

Still, despite the West's legitimate interests in the area, Russian diplomats have charged that the OSCE—particularly the Minsk Group (which includes Turkey and the United States and seeks a mediated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh war)—aims simply to sabotage Russian interests and negotiations.[16] The Western powers reply that they do not oppose legitimate efforts at conflict resolution, but only Moscow's attempts to expand its influence under the guise of "peacemaking." Hungary's ambassador to the OSCE spoke for those governments closer to the flashpoints when he told a U.S. audience that Russia's challenge to the OSCE's control of peacemaking in Georgia (and implicitly throughout Transcaucasia) is a test of the organization's viability, and of Russia's willingness to support peace in Europe.[17]

Russian unilateralism in the greater Black Sea region clashes with Moscow's repeated assertion that the OSCE should be Europe's premier security institution. If the Yeltsin regime is able to block the OSCE wherever significant Russian interests are affected, then the organization will surely falter, the Kremlin will get its way, and the current European security structure will be endangered. Europe will again be divided into spheres of influence, and security agendas across Eurasia will be renationalized. Given this bleak scenario, it is easy to see why Moscow's double standard on peacemaking and the OSCE has led to pervasive mistrust of Russia.

The West's response. Fortunately, Russian ambition has not gone unchallenged. In late 1994 the OSCE forced Moscow to accept a neutral, Finnish-led peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh, and President Aliyev (following the failed Russian attempt to overthrow him) cunningly gave Iran a share of the SOCAR project. Western resistance contributed to the regional isolation of Russia and forced it to yield on the energy issue.

[15] Paul A. Goble, "Russia as a Eurasian Power: Moscow and the Post-Soviet States," in *Rethinking Russia's National Interests,* ed. Stephen Sestanovich (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 47.

[16] The Minsk Group, when set up in 1992, comprised nine members—Belarus, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. See Vladimir Baranovsky, "Conflict Developments on the Territory of the Former Soviet Union," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 191–93; "Kazimirov on Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Outlook," FBIS, *CEur,* Oct. 13, 1994, pp. 1–2, from *Rossiya,* Oct. 12–18, 1994; and, Lally Weymouth, "Azerbaijan—Who'll Stop the Russians?" *The Washington Post,* Oct. 11, 1994.

[17] As related by Phillip Petersen to the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, Pa., Nov. 17, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These related actions are important for a number of reasons. To begin with, the challenges to Russia hold out hope for Azerbaijan's continuing economic independence. In addition, they are a crucial first step toward disinterested mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, which has raged since 1988 and damaged U.S.-Russian as well as Russo-Turkish relations. The recent responses to Moscow's bullying also belie the assumption that U.S. policy has merely yielded to Russian pressure and illustrate how local governments working with the West can moderate or even rebuff Russia's neo-imperial pretensions. Moreover, the OSCE decision shows that the organization can play a beneficial role in conflict resolution when it chooses to do so. But above and beyond all this, these recent Western actions reflect the expansion of Europe's security agenda to the whole continent, including its southeastern limit, Transcaucasia.

The progressive "Europeanization" and expansion of the security agenda in the eastern Mediterranean could in time move the entire region to the forefront of Western security concerns. This trend will seriously affect U.S. interests, given America's strong ties to Turkey, Israel, and the Arab kingdoms of the Gulf.

But for the trend to bear fruit, Turkey must be integrated into Europe as threats to it grow from the Caucasus, Near East, and Balkans. Otherwise friction with Greece in Europe and the Balkans and a revived Russo-Turkish rivalry in the Balkans and Caucasus will poison relationships in both regions. Both Washington and Ankara know this. Accordingly, in late 1994, Turkey welcomed not only the OSCE peacekeeping decision but also U.S. naval intervention in the Aegean and assertive U.S. diplomacy to head off conflict between Greece and Turkey over the definition of the Aegean's international waters.[18] In short, despite their many differences, Turkish and American leaders realize that they must act jointly, along with their allies, if the agencies set up for European security are to be successfully extended across the "arc of crisis."

The OSCE's multilateral peacekeeping decision offers a precedent for such an extension, but expanding the organization's activities into the CIS and preventing Moscow from setting up spheres-of-influence peacemaking operations present significant challenges. In September 1994, at the U.N. rostrum, Yeltsin all but demanded a sphere of influence into which other powers could not intrude.[19] Moscow views the Caucasus as a sphere of its exclusive influence where it should have sole proprietary rights to energy, exclude foreign influence, and reorient the new states exclusively to its economy. It certainly pursues that policy toward Central Asian oil and gas.[20] Top officials do not flinch from taking a belligerent, even threatening, stance toward Western interference in this region,

[18] See, for example, the remarks of Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin in "Karayalcin Briefs Assembly on Foreign Policy," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe,* Dec. 22, 1994, p. 27, from *Turkish Daily News,* Dec. 19, 1994.

[19] *The Washington Post,* Sept. 27, 1994.

[20] See Stephen Blank, *Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

even making it a "test" of relations with the West.[21] At the same time, Lukoil, itself an institution of the Russian state, remains intent on retaining its contractual interest in regional energy developments.

Thus, Azerbaijan has become a test both of Russian intentions and of Western capability to resist them through Europe's security structures. So far, the West's resolute pursuit of its oil interests and the OSCE's right to supervise the peace process have enabled Azerbaijan to co-opt Lukoil and sign the contract. Aliyev has sought this result, worked assiduously to foster it, and continues urging President Bill Clinton to help promote an equitable settlement of the pipeline dispute and the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Indeed, as noted above, Aliyev was even able to buy off Iran.[22] Subsequently, in early 1995, the United States formally notified Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Russia that it favors the direct Caspian-Turkey route for a pipeline, apparently through either Georgia or Armenia. Evidently Washington does not to want to reward Russia during the fighting in Chechnya by choosing Moscow's preferred route—which (not coincidentally) runs through Chechnya. In addition, the fighting there has exacerbated an already unstable situation, making the route impractical. In any case, the U.S. decision demonstrates the importance of U.S. and Western resistance to Russia's expansive policy and the consequent extension of the Western security agenda. It also shows that only a comprehensive Western engagement with the CIS can yield a process for conflict resolution in wars like Nagorno-Karabakh's. And it validates Turkey's steadfast resistance to Russia.

The Kremlin does yield on some of its imperial pretensions when the White House confronts it.

Turkey fears the entry of Russian troops into Azerbaijan, ostensibly as peacemakers, but actually as an imperial vanguard. Turkish diplomats do not believe such troops would bring a political resolution because Baku would not accept Moscow's tutelage. A unilateral Russian peacemaking mission would only bring the conflict closer to Turkey. In the fall of 1994 Turkey correctly reported that Moscow was planning to escalate its economic warfare against Azerbaijan because of the SOCAR contract. Russia did in fact threaten to bring the case to the United Nations, and the MFA recommended blockading Azerbaijan. Moscow also approached Iran, and tried to pressure other members of the Caspian littoral to denounce the contract.[23] Turkey therefore urged the Clinton administration to reject unilateral Russian "peacemaking" and support the oil deal with SOCAR.

Obviously, Washington heeded these urgings. According to *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* the United States told Russia at the Washington summit in

[21] *The Washington Post,* Jan. 15, 1995.

[22] "Iran Given 5% Share in Oilfield Development," FBIS, *CEur,* Nov. 16, 1994, p. 41, from ITAR-TASS, Nov. 14, 1994; "State Oil Company President on Caspian Project," FBIS, *CEur,* Dec. 22, 1994, pp. 49–50, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* Dec. 21, 1994.

[23] "Journalists Comment on Caspian Oil Deal," pp. 85–91; "Tougher Stance on Caspian Oil Said Planned," FBIS, *CEur Report,* Nov. 22, 1994, p. 71, from *Kommersant Daily,* Oct. 21, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

September 1994 that it will offer its services in settling the war. U.S. delegates to the OSCE and Minsk Group support multilateral peacemaking and seem to have prevailed. President Clinton also pointedly said Russia would be well advised to settle territorial issues with Japan, suggesting an overall increase of political pressure from Washington upon Russia.[24] Clinton has also met with Aliyev, and stated support for both the SOCAR deal and the pipeline route through Turkey.

The OSCE peacekeeping action, which would implement a U.N. peacekeeping resolution, must still be voted on by the U.N. Security Council and is just a first step in any case. One can expect Russian obstruction or, at best, grudging cooperation. Still, events to date suggest that the Kremlin can and does yield on some of its imperial pretensions when the White House confronts it.

Transcaucasia and Russian Instability

The linkage between energy and security in Transcaucasia highlights Moscow's unstable policy process and the government's internal divisions. Clearly, the military took the lead in the near abroad by promptly recognizing the crises there and undertaking forceful "peacemaking" missions in 1992–94. Having fallen behind, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must now support permanent Russian bases in Transcaucasia and an exclusive sphere of influence. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has tenaciously defended those points, but now both he and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) face the limits of Russian economic power and ability to sustain a neo-imperial position in the borderlands. That many Russian officials want such a position is incontestable. What they call "integration" is the euphemism for an elite consensus on a foreign and security policy that aims at exclusive Russian spheres of influence.[25]

The MFA and MOD rule out any limits on Russia's exclusive rights across the southern frontier of the CIS. Indeed, the navy resists any partition of the Black Sea fleet, insists on a united Commonwealth (i.e. Russian) fleet there, and sees Turkey as trying to "drive a wedge" against Russian interests. In addition, in 1993 the navy demanded a right to station vessels on the Danube and inspect cargos as part of Russia's efforts to gain a place in the diplomacy of the Yugoslav wars.[26]

[24] "U.S. Said to Offer Mediation Services in Karabakh," FBIS, *CEur,* Sept. 27, 1994, pp. 15–16, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* Sept. 27, 1994.

[25] "CIS Republics Seeking Economic Integration," FBIS, *CEur,* Aug. 19, 1994, p. 1, from *Interfax,* Aug. 18, 1994.

[26] "Moscow Warns Against Unilateral Actions in Caspian," FBIS, *CEur,* Oct. 11, 1994, p. 11, from ITAR-TASS, Oct. 8, 1994; "Adm Kalinin: Navy and New Russian Military Doctrine," Joint Publication Research Service, *Russian Military Affairs* (hereafter JPRS, *RMA*), Feb. 23, 1994, pp. 24–26, from *Flag rodiny,* Jan. 12, 1994; *JPRS UMA,* Dec. 14, 1994, p. 14, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* Nov. 17, 1994; *Krasnaia zvezda,* Feb. 24, 1993, as supplied by Mr. Donald Ross, of U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet while these ministries want bases and influence, they can offer nothing positive to the region, neither a viable political solution to local conflicts nor a recipe for stability and growth. While some officials grasp Russia's inability to sustain empire in the CIS, too many are ready to resort too quickly to covert operations or the big stick. Consequently a power struggle among players who have eluded systematic institutional control is developing. One example of what Rowland Evans and Robert Novak rightly called the "deinstitutionalization" of Russian policy making was the demand in 1994 of then Deputy Premier Alexander Shokhin that Lukoil officials be punished for their SOCAR dealings.[27] A still more telling case is the attack on Chechnya. These incidents illustrate the fundamental Russian need to avoid overextension despite the wishes of the partisans of empire. Only if the government changes the way it makes policy can it fashion coherent policies. Meanwhile, in a context of eroding civilian control over the military and the endless waging of peripheral wars, the fragmentation of the policy process stimulates deep concern over the stability of Russia and its neighbors.

Only if Moscow changes the way it makes policy can it fashion coherent policies.

The military dimension is the most troubling and potentially sinister. Even before the Soviet collapse many alarmists warned of looming threats from Iranian or Muslim fundamentalism. With time these scenarios have become increasingly strident. Today a full-blown domino theory has taken hold. Policymakers firmly contend that if Russia does not stop the war in Nagorno-Karabakh or Tajikistan's civil war, it will even face a fundamentalist threat in the largely Muslim republic of Tatarstan.[28] Accordingly, and ostensibly to support Russian peacemaking operations, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and the MOD strongly advocate a large North Caucasian Military District designed to defend against contingencies ranging from small ethnic wars to full-scale theater conventional war. Plans for that district include the establishment of permanent Russian bases across Transcaucasia. Such bases already exist in Georgia and Armenia, but Grachev wants one in Azerbaijan, too. At the same time, the requirements for staffing the new military district have led Russia to ask for a major revision of the CFE Treaty. The revision would allow Russia to deploy many more forces and much more armor in the district and would clearly unsettle European security.[29] Here again the Caucasus impinges on basic European security issues.

The alleged threat perceived by Russia is one or another form of Muslim or Turkic self-assertion that might have reverberations in the Russian Federation itself. But closer scrutiny reveals that local Russian military activity has taken place almost exclusively in former Soviet territories that rejected CIS membership.

[27] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Yeltsin's New Friend," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 5, 1995; "Shokin Wants Lukoil Officials Punished," FBIS, *CEur*, Sept. 26, 1994, p. 26, from Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, Sept. 24, 1994.

[28] "Report Views CIS Defense Issues," FBIS, *CEur*, Sept. 21, 1994, pp. 1–2, from ITAR-TASS, Sept. 21, 1994.

[29] Renee de Nevers, "Russia's Strategic Renovation," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 289, 1994, p. 65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For example, in 1989–1990, the Kremlin incited nationalist uprisings in Azerbaijan and then sent in troops to restore order. In 1991, Moscow again played both arsonist and fireman in Azerbaijan. Russian operations in Georgia in 1993 and General Aleksandr Lebed's campaign in Moldova were also part of Kremlin schemes. Indeed, the deputy chief of the General Staff, General Valery Manilov, admits that Lebed acted in 1992–93 with Moscow's knowledge and consent.[30] Finally, as noted above, officials in Baku and abroad believe that Moscow incited the Azerbaijani coup of 1993 and the coup attempt in 1994. Undoubtedly, the five attempted coups in Chechnya originated in Boris Yeltsin's presidential office and the FSK, inheritor of the KGB's counterintelligence operations.[31]

In short, the military and the intelligence services that have taken charge of policy in the near abroad aim at reunification by armed force and political pressure. The MOD urges such reintegration and has outlined a doctrine justifying military action to defend Russians, Russian speakers, and Russian "interests" in these regions.[32] But if civilian control erodes to the point where Yeltsin can no longer command the armed forces, other political actors may use them for private agendas, triggering grave foreign complications.

Chechnya

In one sense, the Chechen crisis presents a logical progression from failed diplomacy through failed coups to invasion. But the crisis also raises profound concerns about the failure to create viable states in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, the lack of control over Russian armed forces, and the utter disarray in Russian policymaking.

The invasion of Chechnya is just one more page in a never-ending reconfiguration of empires and states in the former Ottoman and Romanov empires. It shows how tenuous is the post-Soviet status quo. In fact, at least since the fall of the shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the real problem in this area has been the absence of viable states. No contender in this part of the world has built viable governing structures that combine legitimacy with clear control over the military. This instability has led to repeated military interventions. Since 1989, Soviet and Russian forces have been used in Georgia, Azerbaijan (twice), the Baltics, Moscow (twice), and throughout the North Caucasus. But none of these interventions significantly advanced Moscow's interests, nor did the covert operations that preceded them. The introduction of troops into Chechnya finally brought political violence on a massive scale

[30] Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad,'" *The Washington Quarterly,* Summer 1994, p. 84.

[31] On Azerbaijan, see Goltz, "The Hidden Russian Hand," pp. 92–116; "Deputy Minister Rejects Aliyev Talks," FBIS, *CEur,* Oct. 5, 1994, pp. 35–36, from *Agence France-Presse,* Oct. 4, 1994. On Chechnya, see James Sherr, "The Conflict in Chechniia," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Dec. 1994, pp. 557–58.

[32] "Osnovnye Polozheniia Voennoi Doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Rossiiskie vesti,* Nov. 19, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Russia itself. The reckless, needless shedding of blood has further undermined the country's standing and power abroad, and threatens the nation's foundations.

Yeltsin and Defense Minister Grachev seem able to exert only tenuous control over the armed forces. While there had been apparent consensus in the Ministry of Defense about using peacemaking operations to restore Russia's hegemonic position across the former Soviet empire, the Chechen crisis, like the Moscow coup of October 1993, shows that substantial elements of the armed forces and their leadership either cannot or will not use troops effectively to quell unrest within the Russian Federation. This lack of integrity in Russia's command structure is evident in the discord at the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense over the invasion, the insubordination of soldiers and generals, their occasional collaboration with hostile civilians, and the demoralizing resort to terror bombing despite orders to the contrary.[33]

The Chechen crisis threatens the security of both the Caucasus and the West.

Nor does the failure to calculate the political and strategic repercussions of Chechnya reflect well upon the government's competence. Indeed, it betrays a yawning gap between Russian interests and resources that pervades military policymaking in general. In addition, because Yeltsin did not declare a state of emergency or consult with parliament beforehand, the Chechen invasion represents a violation by the Russian government of its own laws, not to mention the Federation Treaty of 1992.[34] Apparently, Russia's government can break its own laws and call out the troops without accountability to any institution. Yet where commanders or troops cannot be relied upon either to execute the order to fire on their own people or to conduct successful operations, calling out the troops may lead to a disaster on the scale of the one that toppled the tsar in February 1917.

Furthermore, the pre-invasion resort to failed black operations to unseat the Chechen government shows a reversion to using the FSK as the KGB's heir. If Russia habitually stages coups abroad—and the evidence is incontrovertible—then of what value are Moscow's solemn assurances of adherence to the Helsinki, OSCE, and CFE treaties? Indeed, as noted above, by massing 40,000 troops and equipment for them without notifying the OSCE, then bombing civilians, Russia openly flouted the agreements it signed five days earlier in Budapest and in 1992 in the Vienna round of the OSCE.[35]

[33] This was clear from a collection of papers presented by Pavel Felgengauer, Vitaly Shlykov, Stepan Sulakshin, and Aleksandr Belkin to the Second Annual Conference on Russian Defense Decision-Making, Monterrey, Calif., Nov. 15–16, 1994. See also, Sophie Shihab, "Who's Calling the Shots in Russia?" *The Manchester Guardian Weekly,* Dec. 25, 1994, p. 11, from *Le Monde,* Dec. 16, 1994.

[34] Nicolai N. Petro, "Can Decentralization Solve Russia's Ethnic Problems?" in *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue,* ed. Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1993), pp. 189, 194–99.

[35] See "Politico-Military Code of Conduct," FBIS, *EEur,* Dec. 7, 1994, pp. 10–13, from *MTI,* Dec. 6, 1994; "Ankara to Reject Russian Proposal to Revise CFE Treaty," JPRS, *Arms,* Jan. 17, 1995, pp. 55–56, from *Turkish Daily News,* Nov. 25, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, the crisis in Chechnya threatens the security of both the Caucasus and the West. If the OSCE can intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh, then it can certainly respond vigorously to the invasion of Chechnya, which represents a massive violation of human rights, even by Russia's standards. Indeed, the West can use Foreign Minister Kozyrev's own words as its justification. As Kozyrev told the Vienna OSCE conference in 1993,

> With respect to other countries, we also cannot accept references to the principle of nonintervention when violation of individual rights and freedoms is involved. Especially in view of the fact that international solidarity quite often becomes the sole means of preventing the authorities of a particular country from bloody reprisals. . . . In my opinion, it would be the conference's major achievement if it unanimously accepts that human rights are indivisible. International obligations for their protection must be observed by all countries.[36]

Europe cannot and should not turn a blind eye to violations of human rights, or of the Budapest agreements of December 1994, or the earlier CFE and Vienna accords. As the German Social Democrat Norbert Gansel observes, such Western passivity "creates the impression that Russia has privileged status on violations of human rights and the use of force in internal disputes."[37] Inaction also belies the principle that Russia has no unilateral right to exclude the West from the Caucasus or Transcaucasia. Perhaps European chancelleries are not upbraiding Russia here because they feel that Moscow alone can help persuade the Serbs to make peace in Yugoslavia and because that war has so fractured NATO's cohesion that it cannot act. Or perhaps the chancelleries sense the absence of any palatable alternative to Yeltsin. But if that is true we should understand the consequences of inaction and the impotence of European-wide security regimes.

In any event, we should not accept Kozyrev's false claim that Western pressure strengthens right-wing nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Despite Kozyrev's 1992 Stockholm speech, in which he dramatically outlined what would occur in foreign policy if the fascist and imperialist red-brown coalition came to power, the foreign minister himself has steadily proclaimed and advanced precisely the same goals. Thus, when he argues that the West should not antagonize Russia he is simply trying to blind others to the fact that he, Yeltsin, and much of the military support a neo-imperial agenda. At home that agenda includes tsar-like unaccountability and the absence of true civilian control of the armed forces, which would be subject solely to Yeltsin's personal rule.

Abroad, of course, this agenda means the perpetuation of a closed sphere of influence in the CIS and even in East Central Europe. Moscow has called for the OSCE to be the real coordinator of European security and resists NATO's expansion because Russia would then be isolated. However, in Chechnya

[36] "Kozyrev on International Human Rights Strategy," FBIS, *CEur*, June 17, 1993, p. 12, from *Moskovskie novosti*, June 20 (signed to press June 15), 1993.

[37] Craig R. Whitney, "Why Europe Is Careful Not to Scold the Bear," *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as in Transcaucasia, Moscow wants the OSCE's blessing, but not its presence or supervision. Nor will Moscow be bound by international treaties that might hinder its neo-imperial aims.

According to outside observers, progress was being made toward a peaceful settlement in the North Caucasus and Chechnya before the coups and subsequent invasion.[38] That progress has been shattered by the near certainty of a protracted war. But even if the war is brought to a relatively swift end, Russia has thrown itself into profound insecurity through its reliance on unconstitutional force. By calling out the troops, Yeltsin has violated the 1992 Federation Treaty even as he proposes a new defense law that effectively gives him near-dictatorial powers over the use of the armed forces. This is immediately apparent upon reading the "Draft Laws on Defense and on Peacemaking" currently before the Duma.[39] Nevertheless, it is by no means certain that Yeltsin can successfully use force either at home or abroad without creating a major crisis. The Chechen adventure has exposed a tactically and strategically incompetent Russian military that may not be able to defend Russian interests even in the CIS, let alone beyond it.

The discrepancy between Russia's objectives and actual means is a ticking time bomb that will explode across Eurasia.

Once again, Yeltsin has illustrated the double standard and unilateralism lying behind Russian security policies in Europe. Despite Kozyrev's speeches about human rights (which were intended primarily to put pressure on the Baltics), Moscow's real attitude toward the Caucasus is stated by Yeltsin's advisor Migranyan, who wrote, "The creation of independent states in the Caucasus is impossible outside the sphere of influence of one of the great powers adjoining the region."[40] And, despite their interests in the area, neither Turkey nor Iran could sustain the whole region, or even any one state there. Thus, Moscow's realpolitik implicitly advocates a unilateral Russian sphere of influence.

The West's acceptance of this approach would virtually guarantee constant warfare throughout the Caucasus and the Transcaucasus. The events described in this article—and the entire course of post-1991 history—confirm the insight of Aleksandr Konovalov and Dimitri Evstatiev that

> only the involvement of international bodies in the process of discussion of the matter can provide the necessary objectivity for assessments. Russia cannot solely address the problem of ethnic minorities, since it is perceived by many others (especially the Baltic states and Ukraine) to be the main heir of the imperial past and the main source of totalitarian practice in inter-ethnic relations.[41]

[38] Petro, "Can Decentralization Solve Russia's Ethnic Problems?" pp. 189, 194–99.

[39] For further comment on the former law, see Stephen Blank, "Russian Defense Legislation and Defense Policy," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Apr.-May 1995.

[40] "Migranyan Conclusions on CIS Federalization Disputed," FBIS, *CEur Report,* Mar. 21, 1994, pp. 8–10, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* Feb. 22, 1994.

[41] Alexandr A. Konovalov and Dmitri Evstatiev, "The Problem of Ethnic Minority Rights Protection in the Newly Independent States," in *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue,* ed. Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz, pp. 159–60.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If Russia gains a free hand in the Caucasus and Transcaucasus it will pursue policies that can only nurture antidemocratic, nationalist movements there and in Russia, and heighten regional tensions. Chechnya validates for local observers the conclusions of Konovalov and Evstatiev. But Chechnya also shows that Russia lacks the wealth, political stability, imagination, and willingness to play a stabilizing or peacemaking role. Indeed, like its neighbors, Russia faces the specters of famine, economic decline, violence, and instability arising from failed post-Communist reforms. Given its many weaknesses, Russia cannot muster sufficient military force or political legitimacy to police the Caucasus and Transcaucasus even as a series of satrapies caught in perpetual backwardness and a continuing neo-colonialist division of labor.

In sum, for the first time in modern history Russia has nothing to offer its neighbors, neither a legitimating culture nor an ideological principle to justify its imposition of "order" and co-optation of local elites. While Russian forces will wreak much havoc and do so brutally, they are also demonstrably incompetent, and many are unwilling to fire on Russian citizens or fight Afghan-type wars, precisely what they have brought upon themselves in Chechnya. Thus, Russia cannot easily maintain even its own integrity, not to mention that of the CIS, for which it claims to be guarantor.[42] This discrepancy between Russia's stated objectives and actual means is a ticking time bomb that will explode across Eurasia.

So Chechnya, like the other areas discussed here, does test Europe's will to defend its own security structures. In the Caucasus, as in the former Yugoslavia, Europeans prefer to "insulate" themselves. But even that non-strategy can "work" only if Russia is a status-quo power willing and able to provide stability. Such is not the case today.

Conclusions

Europe and the United States must understand the consequences of their unwillingness to defend their own treaties. If Russia can act unilaterally, everyone else will do so, too. The result will be a renationalization of Europe's security agenda. Europe will again break up into spheres of influence. Rival blocs will reemerge. Russia, like the USSR of old, will perceive as a threat any institution of which it is not a member, and attempt to use what memberships it has to tie everyone else's hands while leaving its own free.

This is obviously unacceptable to Europe and the United States. If in the quote below we substitute the words "the Caucasus and Transcaucasus" for "Yugoslavia," and the word "Russia" for the "Soviets" or "Soviet Union," we will see the double standard at the heart of Moscow's current policies and

[42] Eugene Rumer, *The Building Blocks of Russia's Future Military Doctrine* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1994), p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia's continuing assumption of old Soviet positions. Celeste Wallander and Jane Prokop note

> two fundamental problems in Soviet policies on European security with respect to institutions. First, the institutions the Soviet Union most opposed are those that may be most effective, and the one that the Soviets supported—the CSCE—has been least capable of responding to the [Yugoslav] conflict. . . . Furthermore, the source of the CSCE's ineffectiveness may be the very features the Soviets valued in it—comprehensiveness with respect both to membership and issues. Second, the very interdependence of security (military, economic, political, and so on) in Europe which lay behind Soviet calls for a "European space" contradicted the notion that the Yugoslav conflict was an "internal" matter. It was not merely a question of principle; armed conflict within that country might produce international conflict. *In order to have a consistent policy on interdependence and security in Europe, the Soviet Union would have had to open its domestic political affairs to international influence.*[43]

So the cold war may be over, but the patterns of Soviet policy live on in the Russian successor state, and the patterns of East-West conflict will reemerge as well if the Western powers do not insist on the indivisibility of European security. For as Lawrence Freedman rightly notes, Europe cannot allow many more cases of state-sponsored violence in the CIS:

> The tolerance of the European system to major upheavals in Russia and/or Ukraine should not be judged high. Even smaller-scale ructions can become dangerous if they start to threaten the equilibrium of a number of countries. If there is an underlying tendency towards instability, then the issue of intervention starts to be seen in a different light. The interest in the prevention of disorder takes on a higher value, because there can be less confidence that, left alone, most conflicts will peter out as the belligerents become exhausted.[44]

The West now faces a challenge of its political will. Having earlier asserted its collective prerogative through the OSCE's and Azerbaijan's willingness to stand up to Russia and secure Western backing, the West was able to compel Russia, formally (at least), to accept Europe's extension of its security agenda and influence into the CIS. However, the Chechen invasion, the attempted coups leading up to it, and the similar attempted and successful coups in Baku reveal the obstacles Europe and the West face in obliging Russia to accept international constraints on its behavior for its own good.

The Kremlin's policy constitutes a standing challenge to Europe, which still hesitates to accept the responsibilities of opening up the CIS to international influence and pacification so that it may become a peaceful, legitimate, democratic, independent, prosperous region. To the degree that Europe has already

[43] Celeste A. Wallander and Jane E. Prokop, "Soviet Security Strategies Toward Europe: After the Wall, with Their Backs up against It," in *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 98. Emphasis added.

[44] Lawrence Freedman, "Introduction," in *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accepted this responsibility by including the area in the OSCE and North Atlantic Cooperation Council, failure to meet the Russian challenge will mean the collapse of any mechanism capable of pacifying Eastern and Southern Europe, and ultimately Western Europe as well.

Those are the stakes in Transcaucasia. They transcend energy and local security to include the most fundamental issues of European security and democratic reform in Russia. To pass the test, the West must engage Russia and the belligerents, probably through multilateral peacemaking operations under the OSCE or the United Nations. At a minimum, Western financial, political, and logistical support must weigh in to preserve a balance. Otherwise we will have sanctioned a precedent where parties having important interests in a local conflict are empowered to resolve it by themselves regardless of consequences. That means spheres-of-influence peacemaking. Since peacemaking and peacekeeping are today's functional equivalents of imperial policing or of gunboat diplomacy, spheres-of-influence peacemaking essentially means that might makes right. Tempting Russia thus only encourages those still addicted to the imperial vocation with the lure of "something erotic" always happening on the distant borderlands of the empire, in tsarist minister P. A. Valuev's words.[45]

In effect, comprehensive Western engagement must save Russia and the smaller, warring nations from themselves, each other, and Russia's imperial temptation, a temptation often manifested in support for divide and rule policies like the current ones in Transcaucasia. Since empire has always been the main obstacle to democratic reform and demilitarization of security policy in Russia, if it returns in a new guise we will have neither regional peace nor genuine Russian democracy.

[45] Cited by Dietrich Geyer in *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914*, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 89.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As Go the Baltics, So Goes Europe

by Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius

Today, the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia constitute a political keystone in the construction of a larger, integrated Europe. Clearly, their importance does not stem from their size, scale, economic might or military strength. They are important, rather, as potential exemplars. For while the West can do little to influence the Russian Federation directly, judicious Western support of the Baltics could yield a tremendous payoff throughout Europe, including Russia. Building states and defining national identities in the Baltics would have considerable regional impact by creating a powerful precedent for other post-Soviet states, revitalizing Europe and the NATO alliance, and providing the West with a genuine cultural, civilizing mission. "Europe" could then represent an ongoing process of expanding and binding together the realm in which European cultural values and norms of civilized behavior apply, and not merely an elaborate exercise in bureaucratic scaffold-making. The Baltics could function as the proving ground of this process, bringing together West and East, and endowing the Western alliance led by the United States with a commitment that goes "beyond containment," as policy thinkers now urge.[1] Lastly, in an age of global devolution and regionalism,[2] the Baltic republics provide a sterling example of the viability of small states and the contributions they can make in a larger Europe.

Promise, however, coexists with grave menace. Because of their leadership role in the dissolution of the Soviet empire, and precarious location in what Russians call their "near abroad," the diminutive Baltic States are threatened by the prospect of reannexation or even annihilation. In the worldview of Russian neo-imperialists, the Baltics must be punished. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democrats, rages: "I'll bury radioactive waste along the Lithuanian border and put up powerful fans and blow the stuff across at night.

[1] Malcolm Wallop, "America Needs a Post-Containment Doctrine," *Orbis*, Spring 1993, pp. 187–203.
[2] *The Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 24, 1995.

Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius is assistant professor of history at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and is currently completing a postdoctoral fellowship at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in German and East European history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They'll all get radiation sickness. They'll die of it. When they either die out or get down on their knees, I'll stop."[3] The spectacular disproportion of such an animus against the Baltic States reflects their symbolic importance. The West must take seriously such fantasies of hatred and be on guard against Russian ploys to reabsorb or destroy the Baltics, if for no other reason than that Western interests are already engaged in the region.

Last year, Sweden's then prime minister Carl Bildt argued forcefully that the future of the Baltic states is a "litmus test" of relations between the West and a changing Russia.[4] In fact, it is more: a test of Europe. How the West reacts to developments in the Baltics speaks to the question: What is Europe? As former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski states, a coherent vision and plan for Europe needs to be crafted and acted on today.[5] The West's own response to the Baltic challenge, therefore, will determine whether the idea of Europe is active or static, a construction built on abiding, ambitious principles, or merely a collection of empty slogans and bureaucratic arrangements.

The Resonance of the Past

An understanding of Baltic history is indispensable for a clear view of the present situation and an estimation of likely futures. And the question to start with is simply this: What do we mean when we speak of "the Baltics"? Today, the term is used as shorthand for the three republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and their native peoples. But this usage is recent and masks a great underlying diversity. From prehistoric times, the southern coastal lands of the Baltic Sea were inhabited by anarchic tribes speaking languages of great antiquity. The Estonians to the north, like the Finns, spoke a language of the Finno-Ugric linguistic family. To the south, unrelated to the Estonians, lived Latvians, Lithuanians, and the now-extinct Old Prussians. These peoples shared a common culture, and together their languages formed the Baltic linguistic family. While some interaction took place between the Balts and Finnic peoples, the pagan tribes that would coalesce into the nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia lived for centuries in an independence born of political *dis*organization, as well as isolation from Christianity and political developments to the East and West alike.

Inevitably, the realities of the geographic situation asserted themselves. Situated on the great Northern European Plain, a flat expanse stretching from northern Germany to the forests of Russia, the Baltic peoples inhabited an exposed position in the center of Europe, bereft of natural barriers, at a great crossroads between East and West, North and South. Their lands were a natural corridor for trade, as well as for the movement of migrating peoples and

[3] Quoted in Kevin Fedarko, "A Farce to Be Reckoned With," *Time,* Dec. 27, 1993, p. 37.
[4] Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," *Foreign Affairs,* Sept./Oct. 1994, pp. 72–85.
[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* Jan./Feb. 1995, pp. 26–42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conquering armies. They were caught in a zone between great families of peoples, the Germanic and Slavic, between Western Latin Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy. The outside world broke in on them furiously with the Baltic Crusades launched by the Order of Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century. To the north, the Latvians and Estonians fell to the crusaders, while to the south, the Old Prussians were enslaved and progressively exterminated to make way for German settlement. Between these crusading realms, a paradoxical development took place. The Lithuanians were able to forge a centralized political state by 1236, beat back the Teutonic Knights, and, by the early fifteenth century, conquer an expanse of Slavic lands down to the Black Sea, creating the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For a time the largest state in Europe, the Grand Duchy was a remarkable collection of peoples and faiths, ruled by tolerant pagan princes feeling no need to impose their culture on subject populations. Lithuanians adopted Roman Catholicism from the Poles in 1387 and sealed a political partnership culminating in the union of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. Latvians and Estonians, meanwhile, accepted the Lutheran faith of their German overlords, who came to be known as the "Balts" or Baltic barons (just as the conquerors of the Old Prussians took their name as well). From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, these lands were a perennial battleground, as dynamic Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and an emergent Muscovite Russia contended for great-power status in the Livonian Wars (1558–1583), the Swedish-Polish War (1600–1629), and the Great Northern War (1700–1721). By the 1721 Treaty of Nystad, which ended the Great Northern War, the Baltic provinces ruled for a century by Sweden fell to Russia. Russian hegemony was finally assured when Lithuania and Poland were absorbed in the last partition of the Commonwealth in 1795.

Tsarist policies of subjugation and russification then submerged the Baltic peoples' diverging experiences of statehood and religion as they together struggled to maintain their cultural identities. With the advent of romanticism and nationalism, a world-view first launched in the Baltic region by German thinker Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), national movements rose to political aims, striving for independence. In the case of Lithuania, the sizable population of Prussian-Lithuanians living across the border in the East Prussian region called Lithuania Minor (today Kaliningrad) played a crucial role in the development of a national consciousness. Lithuanian literature published there and smuggled into Lithuania galvanized the society into a remarkable public conspiracy to subvert the tsarist language ban (1865–1904).

Hopes for independence were realized only after the simultaneous collapse of the surrounding empires in the fires of the First World War. With Russia and Germany both defeated by 1918, and the victorious Allies preaching self-determination, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia emerged. In their brief twenty years of freedom—and despite the troubled conditions of inter-war Europe—the republics made impressive strides. They developed viable economies and modern educational systems, participated fully in European culture, enjoyed political stability graced by laws for the protection of ethnic minorities (before falling to authoritarian dictatorships), and encouraged vibrant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civil societies.[6] Caught as they were between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the Baltic States also tried to cooperate on mutual security, though with disappointing results.

After the Balts' totalitarian neighbors signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Baltic independence was brought to an end by the Soviet annexation of 1940. The Second World War, mass deportations and extermination, and a bitter guerrilla war in the forests lasting into the 1950s brought decades of great suffering. But despite half a century of forced Russian immigration, Communist dictatorship, and ecologically disastrous industrialization, the Baltic peoples preserved the memory of independence and resistance. Finally, in the late 1980s, their situation changed fundamentally with mounting internal crisis in the Soviet Union. As Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to put the Communist state on a firmer footing with his program of perestroika, central control was relaxed and the tradition of resistance found expression in Baltic popular movements. By joining cultural issues to political demands, the movements led to a peaceful, democratic "Singing Revolution." While Gorbachev had hoped to use the Baltic republics as pace-setters and laboratories for reform, the peoples' fronts soon outdistanced him, made radical demands for independence, and took the lead in confronting the Soviet "center." Events reached a bloody climax in early 1991, when Soviet troops killed unarmed civilians in Vilnius, Lithuania, and Riga, Latvia. But rather than fleeing the storm troopers, the Balts instead rushed to surround and protect their parliaments. Neither economic blockade, political pressure, nor military terrorism could force them back. The protracted crisis ended only with the failed coup attempt of August 1991 and dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev wanted to use the Baltics as laboratories for reform, but the peoples' fronts demanded independence.

With international recognition of their restored independence, the Baltic republics set about the difficult task of becoming "normal countries." They faced enormous problems: the wrenching transition to market economies, withdrawal of more than 130,000 Russian troops still stationed in the region, construction of viable democracies after the changes and deformations of the previous five decades. In the largest sense, it was a matter of defining their "national identities" as societies. While the Baltic region had always been ethnically diverse, the Soviet period left the republics, especially Latvia and Estonia, with large Russian minorities, resulting in intense debates about citizenship rights. Defining their national identities also meant looking outward, and although the Baltic States prefer to see themselves as an outpost of Western European civilization, their economic ties also link them to the East. As they strive to establish themselves on the international stage, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia continue to cooperate, seeing that it is in their interest to speak together as Baltic States.

Nevertheless, the Baltic States must redefine their links to each other. It seems natural, to a Westerner, to view them as a group, but the concept of

[6] John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, *The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 46–48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Baltic unity" actually bridges vast chasms of unrelated languages and ethnicity, religious and cultural backgrounds, and historical heritages. Even their own descriptions of what the nineteenth century called "national characters" show seemingly irreconcilable contrasts, for instance, between the reserved Estonian "pragmatism" and Lithuanian "romanticism."[7] The coherence of the Baltic States as a unit is really based on something else: common historical experience. And the very fact that the historical experience they share is a centuries-long resistance to outside domination means that the Baltics must break out of historical patterns and invent themselves all over again. The central role of historical experience is also reflected in the nature of the national project in the Baltic region. Rather than being based on irreducible ethnic criteria, national identity there depends far more on active, committed participation in a community of language and history. Baltic unity, therefore, would be a novel, remarkable achievement, pointing the way to a truer sort of federalism and voluntary association in international affairs.

The Baltic Model

The experience of the Baltics is intrinsically important because historical developments in this crossroads of Europe have not merely been reflections of forces working on them from outside. In fact, ideas and projects originating here have had far-reaching impact, out of all proportion to the area's diminutive size. In this, the Baltics may be compared to regions like Scandinavia and the Low Countries that have had a disproportionate influence on European cultural, intellectual, and social history.

This phenomenon dates back to the remote past. In the Middle Ages, the consolidation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania robbed the Teutonic Knights of a secure overland route to the Baltic provinces in the north, cutting them off from large-scale colonization by German farmers, and thus put a brake on the centuries-long process of *Drang nach Osten,* the German drive to the east. At the same time, the Grand Duchy's conquest of east Slavic lands split the Ukrainians and Belarusians off from the Great Russian sphere, permitting their development of distinct identities. The genesis of nationalism as a passionately avowed system of ideas first articulated by Herder began in this region. The Baltic provinces, by dint of their high rate of literacy, economic development, and openness to contacts with the West, had an importance in tsarist Russia far beyond their size. Latvia's radicalized socialist movement and Latvian Rifle regiments played a fateful role in the triumph of Lenin, lending crucial early support for the Bolsheviks. In the period between the world wars, the progress of the independent Baltic Republics seemed to prove the wisdom of Woodrow Wilson's principles, in sharp contrast to, for instance, the states of southeastern Europe.

Even after annexation in 1940 the Baltics were a model—this time for escape from the "inner empire" of the Soviet Union. If one could imagine

[7] Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Path to Independence,* 2d ed., (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 17–37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liberalization and increasingly independent courses for countries of the Warsaw Pact, or "outer empire," reemergence of independence within the borders of the USSR seemed impossible. Yet the Baltic peoples resisted assimilation on the model of *Homo Sovieticus*. Soviet citizens visiting from further East would remark that there, in the Baltics, they felt they had reached Western Europe. A common saying went: "The Baltics are the Soviet Union's West" ("Pribaltika—eto zapad Soyuza"). In the gulags and prison camps, Baltic prisoners exchanged ideas with Russian dissidents and those of other Soviet nationalities. They created bonds of solidarity that proved important later, as the Soviet state hurtled toward crisis. When the drive for independence in the Baltics first confronted Moscow, Russian democrats supported it even as they regretted the fact that Baltic independence would deprive Russia itself of the Baltics' leaven of activism and ideas. Indeed, the influence of Baltic independence movements extended far beyond their own borders, propagating a model for democratic and nonviolent liberation. The Baltic leaders consciously pursued this aim. The Lithuanian independence movement *Sajudis* revived the slogan of the nineteenth century uprisings, "For Your Freedom and For Ours!" and also made contact with the *Rukh* movement in Ukraine, whose formation had been "spurred by the example of the Baltic Republics."[8] The democratic movement in Belarus likewise followed the Baltic example.[9] Most vividly, civilian defense of the Baltic parliaments in 1991 provided a model to be repeated in Moscow later that year, with Boris Yeltsin at the fore.

The same models find echoes today in present events in Chechnya, whose secession struggle has been compared to that of the Baltics. As the Russian army bogged down in its disastrous siege of Grozny, after the failed attack on the presidential building, Russian authorities broadcast claims that Baltic soldiers had been sent to fight on the Chechen side, including women snipers (supposedly organized into a brigade named "White Pantyhose").[10] Estonia's parliament gave vocal support for Chechen independence, recalling that Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev had shown solidarity with the independence struggle of Estonia while stationed there as a Soviet air force division commander.[11]

Thus, the experience of the Baltic States continues to be influential throughout the former Soviet Union (FSU). As the only FSU republics not being reintegrated into a system under Moscow's control, the Baltic States continue to affirm through their independence and viability the possibility of escape from the "inner empire."[12]

[8] Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: The Politics of Independence," in *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 75.

[9] Michael Urban and Jan Zaprudnik, "Belarus: A Long Road to Nationhood," in *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, p. 110.

[10] "Lithuanian Citizen Detained in Chechnya, Charged with Spying," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), Jan. 23, 1995, pp. 1–2, from *Izvestiya*, Jan. 17, 1995.

[11] "Colleague Says Dudayev Studied Estonian Laws," FBIS, *CEur*, Feb. 9, 1995, p. 80, from Tallin BNS, Feb. 8, 1995.

[12] *The Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 27, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Present: Moment of Decision

The next few years will determine whether the Baltic States take their place in an integrated Europe, or remain caught in a perilous and debilitating limbo of uncertainty.[13] Indecisiveness at this moment of decision is reflected in domestic Baltic politics: all of the republics have experienced a turn to the left. In Lithuania, the ex-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party won elections in the fall of 1992, presaging the return to power of ex-communist elites in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. Most recently, Estonia's March 1995 parliamentary elections delivered an overwhelming victory to leftist parties. In Latvia, the dominant Latvia's Way Party has turned left, responding to a strengthening coalition of parties on its right. Yet in spite of these changes in the political landscape, "consensus on major domestic and foreign policy objectives is so firm that no major changes in policy are expected."[14]

Significant progress has been made toward strengthening of market economies, with Estonia leading the way and already attracting foreign investment. Free trade agreements with the European Union (EU), initialing of the EU's European agreements on associate status, and associate partnership in the Western European Union (WEU) move the countries closer to EU membership. All of the Baltics have joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program and are pressing for full membership in NATO as soon as possible. Workable citizenship laws have been passed in all three countries, beginning the process of integrating ethnic Russians, many of whom had supported the drive for independence. Lithuania, with the smallest Russian minority (9 percent of the population), led the way with its November 1989 citizenship law, which offered citizenship to all residents of the republic. Latvia and Estonia, meanwhile, with much larger Russian minority groups (34 percent in Latvia, and 30 percent in Estonia) and low birthrates among the native populations, were caught up in tense debates over citizenship, which Moscow sought to link to the issue of troop withdrawals. Now, however, under the citizenship laws in force in Estonia (from November 6, 1991) and Latvia (from August 11, 1994), a new stage has been reached, promising constructive development toward social integration. There are hopeful signs at present, with minority groups actively participating in local elections and demanding adequate language classes.

The outstanding foreign-policy concern of the past years—the presence of Russian forces in the Baltics—was resolved on August 31, 1994, as the last Russian troops withdrew from Baltic territory. Russian troops had left Lithuania a year before, but had remained in Latvia and Estonia. As concessions to speed the exit, Moscow was allowed to retain control for several years over the Skrunda radar station in Latvia and the Paldiski submarine base in Estonia, while preparations are made for their dismantling. The United States exerted diplomatic pressure on both sides: on Russia to complete the withdrawal on

[13] See The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Baltic Republics,* 4th quarter, 1994.
[14] Saulius Girnius, "Reaching West While Eyeing Russia," *Transition,* Jan. 30, 1995, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

schedule, and on Estonia and Latvia to make the potentially dangerous concessions that would smooth the exit of the occupation forces. This achievement is cited as one of the major foreign policy successes of the Clinton administration. But some worrying issues remain. Among the concessions agreed to by Latvia and Estonia were social guarantees for Russian military retirees who remain in those countries. Prior to the pull-outs, the army demobilized thousands of younger officers to take advantage of the new situation. While the term "retirees" conjures up pictures of aged veterans, harmless and infirm, the reality is much more threatening. Latvians and Estonians fear these young demobilized officers were left to be an active "fifth column."[15]

Meanwhile, as Russian soldiers were leaving, the Baltic States began building their own armed forces, providing "excellent case studies in the challenges of starting new national armies from scratch."[16] Ambitious conceptions of national defense had to make way for more modest, realistic planning. The military priorities are quick response and mobility, a sturdy protection of frontiers, and sustained resistance to an occupying force. This last means creating citizen armies with popular participation and support, a difficult break from the bombastic traditions of the Soviet armed forces.

Kaliningrad is a small, heavily armed camp stranded far from the rest of Russia.

The most pressing defense issue is Baltic unity. As recent polls indicate, unity is already a reality in the minds of citizens of the republics, even though adequate institutional expressions of this solidarity are only now being crafted. An interparliamentary Baltic Assembly meets to coordinate domestic and foreign policies. The three countries are organizing a six hundred–man Baltic peacekeeping battalion (Balt-Bat) for service with the United Nations. Common training and experience will bring closer the prospect of inter-operability and effective coordination.

Baltic unity, it is hoped, will facilitate even broader regional cooperation for mutual security, especially with the Scandinavian countries, whose diplomatic support was crucial during the drive for independence. Economic activity all around the Baltic Sea is intensifying and hopes are high for reviving a historical web of contacts similar to those of the Hansa traders of the High Middle Ages.[17] But the most remarkable developments are in the area of common security. There seems to be a tacit division of labor in partnerships of Scandinavian countries with their Baltic neighbors. Finland gravitates naturally toward Estonia, bound by a close cultural kinship. Sweden, acting on its older great-power traditions, concerns itself with all three, generally. The previous Swedish government had gone so far as to declare that in the case of aggression against

[15] Stefan Marx, "Russia's Withdrawal from the Baltics," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Dec. 1994, pp. 565–66.

[16] Albert M. Zaccor, "Lithuania's New Army," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies,* June 1994, pp. 198–217; Andrei Martov, "Baltic States Emerge from Cold War Shadow," *International Defense Review,* May 1994, p. 9.

[17] "Future of Baltic Economic Ties Analyzed," FBIS, *CEur,* Feb. 17, 1995, pp. 72–73, from *Hufvudstadsbladet,* Jan. 5, 1995; Wolfgang Zank, "Neue Brücken übers Meer: Die Arainerstaaten der Ostsee lassen ihre Wirtschaftsbeziehungen wieder aufleben," *Die Zeit,* Nov. 22, 1991, p. 38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Baltic States, it would not remain neutral, as those countries were *its* "near abroad" as well as Russia's. Most surprising of all is Danish cooperation with and aid to Lithuania, since there is no historical precedent for it, no long-standing tradition of ties to be revived. Lithuanian diplomats profess themselves mystified but gratified. In addition to scholarly ties between universities, the relationship includes military assistance and advice. Since August 1994, a thirty-two-man Lithuanian platoon serves together with the Danish U.N. peacekeeping battalion in Croatia.[18] This active service and instruction from a member of NATO promises practical experience toward integration.

In pursuit of other regional ties, Lithuania is also looking toward Poland. Warsaw offered consistent and vocal support for Lithuanian independence until it was achieved in 1991, but relations cooled afterwards, with disputes over minority issues (the Polish minority makes up 7 percent of the population of Lithuania, and there are Lithuanian minorities in Poland's Suwalki district) and contentious debates about the conflict between the countries in the interwar period. Since the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation on April 26, 1994, relations have improved, in a step towards overcoming historical animosities (which often obscure underlying sympathies) dating all the way back to the medieval Commonwealth. Incentives for Lithuanian and Polish cooperation are now growing in tandem with an emerging German-Polish relationship. There have been suggestions for exploring possibilities of common air and coastal defense.[19] Moreover, Poland and Lithuania share a special anxiety over a potentially explosive hot-spot on their borders, the Russian military outpost of Kaliningrad.

Kaliningrad oblast (region) is a geopolitical anomaly, a patch of land on the Baltic Sea at the mouth of the Pregolya (Pregel) River, populated and garrisoned by Russians, yet without any direct territorial link to Russia itself. It is separated from the Russian Federation by Lithuania, Latvia, and Belarus. The area, measuring 15,000 square kilometers (approximately the size of Connecticut), holds a population of 900,000. Before World War II, it formed the northern half of the German province of East Prussia, with its center in Königsberg. Stalin demanded and received the region at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, citing the need for an ice-free Russian port on the Baltic and for some territorial reward at the expense of Germany. (Although the area was assigned to Soviet administration, its permanent status was to be determined in a final conference ending World War II).[20] Moscow turned the area into the western-most "home" outpost of the Soviet navy and army. When the whole region was part of the Soviet Union's overarching structure, its bizarre defiance of geography meant little. But today, with the crumbling of the *Pax Sovietica*, Kaliningrad has been stranded far from Russia, and has become an armed camp reinforced by troops

[18] Hans Haekkerup, "Peacekeeping: A Danish Perspective," *International Defense Review: Defense 1995*, p. 106.

[19] *Draugas*, Feb. 18, 1995.

[20] Raymond A. Smith, "The Status of the Kaliningrad Oblast Under International Law," *Lituanus*, Spring 1992, pp. 7–52; Vytautas Landsbergis, "Karaliauciaus krasto priklausomybes teisiniai aspektai," *Lietuvos aidas*, Dec. 15, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Experts estimate that the troops stationed there number over 300,000.[21] Such concentrations exacerbate already formidable problems of supply and reinforcement. In the fall of 1994, Moscow was pressuring Vilnius for a treaty conceding military transit rights through Lithuania for the Russian army. Some experts suspect that Russian secret service forces took a hand in the bombing of a Lithuanian railway bridge on November 6, 1994, as part of the campaign of intimidation.[22]

The Baltic countries have reacted to this situation with alarm. On November 13, 1994, the fifth session of the Baltic Assembly passed resolutions calling for the demilitarization of Kaliningrad and the convening of a European conference on the area's future. The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the resolutions as interference in domestic affairs, "anti-Russian," and "irresponsible." The Foreign Ministry's statement said: "Kaliningrad is, was, and will be part of the Russian Federation. Any further encroachments upon Russia's sovereignty will be met by a serious rebuff."[23] As *The Wall Street Journal* pointed out, that was a very violent response to Russia's "neighbors' legitimate concern about a very large concentration of troops on their borders."[24]

While Lithuania had intended to regularize the situation with rules of transit applicable to all countries, rather than a special treaty with Russia, the rules were shelved on January 18, 1995, and the earlier arrangements allowed to stand (in exchange for Russia's allowing most-favored-nation trading status for Lithuanian imports), thus in effect prolonging the unclear situation for the next few years. Apparently, U.S. diplomats had urged Vilnius to come to some accommodation with Moscow on this issue, arguing that any agreement with Russia was better than none. Clearly, that is a dangerous argument to make, since the territorial sovereignty of an independent country is at stake. Moreover, it seems impossible that Lithuania could join NATO if the country is reduced to a corridor for regular Russian military transit.

Kaliningrad, moreover, is an area of great historical and emotional significance to Lithuanians. Dubbed "Lithuania Minor," with majority populations of Protestant Prussian Lithuanians once living in the border areas, it played a crucial role over the centuries in the development of Lithuanian literature and nationalism. The attachment continues today. As a potential hot-spot, conflict over Kaliningrad could draw in Lithuania, Russia, Poland, and Germany. Another player in these events is the civilian population of Kaliningrad, not consulted by the oblast's military management, but having a keen interest in Kaliningrad's transition from a "garrison state" to a magnet of commerce and international cooperation.[25]

[21] Maj. Albert Zaccor, *Baltic States and Kaliningrad: A Briefing* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Foreign Military Studies Office/Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1993), p. G35.

[22] "Russian Army Intelligence Service Denies Relation to Lithuanian Bridge Explosion," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* Nov. 11, 1994.

[23] Quoted in "No More Yaltas," *The Wall Street Journal,* Nov. 21, 1994.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Phillip A. Petersen, "Kaliningrad—Transition from Garrison State," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Dec. 1994, pp. 572–73; "Kaliningrad Can Become an Example of Multilateral Initiative," *Baltic News,* Jan. 17–31, 1994, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Three Possible Futures

The future of the Baltic States will probably follow one of three very different scenarios. The crucial factor in each case is the role—engaged or passive—played by NATO and the United States.

In the most dire scenario, the Baltic States would face an overwhelming military onslaught from an increasingly undemocratic and neo-imperial Russia. It seems unlikely that the West could stand aside in such a case, if only because that would create a new international situation violating all the current understandings on cooperation, stability in Europe, and respect for common norms. Thus, in such an uneven contest of forces in the Baltic, defense planners joke grimly that their strategy would amount to a "CNN defense," calling for a constant and active military resistance until the West is forced to intervene. But if NATO should decide to remain a passive onlooker (in defiance of its own avowed principles), it must brace itself to view a long and terrible struggle of resistance. Young Balts hold to this determination for a specific historical reason. They have a fierce resolve not to repeat (perhaps to redeem) the shame of surrender to the Soviet Union in 1940, in contrast to the brave resistance of the Finns in their Winter War. To be sure, armed resistance would have been useless in 1940, but a deep-seated emotion persists. Moreover, the tradition of the guerrilla wars against the Soviet occupiers lasting into the 1950s also provides a powerful example. So, though many in the international community wish that the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya would end with a quick, decisive bloodbath (the U.S. administration pointedly urges that the fighting in Chechnya be "ended," rather than "stopped"), one can project with certainty that this craven expectation would be disappointed in the Baltic States.

The most likely, and more prosaic, scenario is a long destabilization of the Baltic region impelled by serial threats from the East. Robbed of the stability needed to attract investment, the economies of the Baltics would make disappointing progress. Their foreign policies would be reactive, the agenda dominated by Russian encroachments. To extract concessions, Moscow would use economic pressure and advocacy of Russian minority rights. Caught in an international "gray zone" between Central and Eastern Europe, the unity of the three Baltic States would be strained and then fatally ruptured. Estonia, with its close cultural ties to Finland, would have a powerful incentive to go it alone, seeking integration into Scandinavia. To the south, Russia would continue to use Kaliningrad, still bristling with troops and weaponry, as a constant source of tension, to be turned on or off as required. Such a situation could last for years, but in the long run would be very dangerous, assuming Western neglect.

Lastly, the "best case scenario" for the Baltics envisions an environment of international stability based on a clearly defined schedule for the expansion of NATO and the EU. Thus absorbed into "Europe," the Baltic States could concentrate their energies on economic growth, export goods to east and west and north, and serve as a bridge for international trade. In a stable international environment, Russian minorities in the Baltic States could readily integrate themselves and identify with the republics, and participate in their civil societies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and culture through the medium of the native languages, while at the same time retaining their own. They would come to see themselves as "Baltic Russians," their interest and identity bound to this region, its shared history and culture. Indeed, a prosperous and unified Baltic federation might have a potent effect on Russia itself, inviting Russians to experiment with a real federation of autonomous regions and jettison the model of a centralized state around a powerful Muscovy. Kaliningrad, now demilitarized and self-ruling, would seek to integrate itself into the region as a "fourth Baltic State," as its citizens also came to understand themselves as Baltic Russians.

But this hopeful scenario will not come to pass spontaneously. It all depends on a stability that only Western and U.S. policy can provide.

Policies to Meet the Baltic Imperative

In crafting policies to make use of the possibilities latent in the position of the Baltic States, Western thinkers must recognize the opportunity offered by the fact that, historically, developments in the Baltic region have had a far wider effect. Making use of that potential hinges on two fundamental points.

Western support for the Baltics affects Russia as well. An active program of support and involvement in the Baltics is a good investment. It represents pushing on an open door, as these countries have made the greatest progress of all of the former Soviet Union. The ability of the Baltic States to become full-fledged European countries exerts powerful influence on those further east, by way of example and incentive. In addition, the way in which Russia acts toward the Baltics speaks to the nature of Russia as a state, as Carl Bildt has pointed out. It is the litmus test indicating whether Russia is moving in the direction of empire or nation-state. In the next decades, the Russian Federation faces a long and difficult process of decolonization, as regions and ethnic groupings once violently incorporated into the state struggle to escape the control of Moscow. This process, already undergone by imperial powers such as Britain and France in this century, is complicated by the territorial contiguity of areas such as Chechnya to the Russian core. But the fact remains that for Russia to cling to these regions by force is incompatible with democracy.[26] As Russian decolonization proceeds, it would be valuable to have the model of the Baltics in place. They would demonstrate a more productive and peaceable option, of free interaction and association.

The historical experience of the Baltics also offers the exciting possibility of a new understanding of nationalism and its role in policy making. Blanket condemnations of nationalism, such as President George Bush's speech in Kiev in 1991, can lead to fateful consequences and some poor investments, as acute observers of politics point out.[27] Increasingly, as in the case of Serbia, it is clear

[26] Shlomo Avineri, "Setting Sun," *The New Republic,* Mar. 20, 1995, pp. 13–14.
[27] Anne Applebaum, "The Real Danger in Eastern Europe," *The Wall Street Journal,* Nov. 28, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the danger lies not in nationalism per se but in so-called "red-brown" governments that cynically manipulate national passions. Already, a new understanding is emerging, as scholars reexamine the links between nationalism and democracy.[28] What if it were possible for the West to engage the nationalist projects of these countries, and, through judicious policy to turn them in positive directions, steer the states toward mutual understanding and cultural synthesis, rather than division and hatred? The nature of nationalism in the Baltics shows the potential of a nationalism that is a force for integration. The Baltic national projects elude the juxtaposition of civic and ethnic nationalisms postulated by Western social science. Instead, they have historically viewed national identity as a process of personal cultural commitment, and statehood not as an end in itself, but as a means—a necessary precondition for the unfolding of shared national culture.

As in the case of America's traditional "melting pot" nation-building, the possibility of participation is left open. In the Baltic case, above all, use of the native language, not ethnicity, is the crucial sign of one's identification with the national project. This fact highlights the importance of the local minorities' learning the language of the country (while retaining their own), for only in this way can integrated societies and full, meaningful participation in a common culture be achieved.

Baltic nationalism works in ways different from that of the West. While centralizing states created nations in the West, in the East national groups sought to create states in a long, arduous process of articulating identities directed against an imperial center. Thus, there is an element of conscious, personal choice, of "elective ethnicity." This confounds Western scholarship that so often treated nationalism as a (false) consciousness not conscious of itself, "inventing traditions" and "imagining communities" in willed ignorance of the artifice of its project.[29] In this region, on the contrary, the nationalist project has been constantly aware of its precariousness and contingency, affirming instead a "tradition of invention" and a "community of imagination." This is the reason for the great stress laid on consciousness, choice, and personal commitment in the voluntaristic articulation of national identity, in a region where a multiplicity of different ethnic traditions lay claim to the loyalty of the indigenous population.

Specific historical reasons account for this phenomenon in the Baltic region, which lies at the point where so many tectonic plates of culture, language, ethnicity, and religion meet, grinding up against one another in conflict, but also producing remarkable amalgams. Over the centuries, this activity at the Baltic seismic center has thrown up new ideas of belonging and identity. The

[28] Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," in *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 3–22; Michael Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1994, pp. 87–99.

[29] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Baltic region has been the crucible from which an astounding succession of national identities has emerged. In such a welter of competing claims to loyalty and legitimacy, national identity necessarily implied not something one *was*, but much more something one *did*. Families often splintered along different ethnic lines of fracture, with branches of the same clan passionately avowing different nationalities. The spectacle is repeated again and again, of an individual *choosing* a national identification, of "ethnic conversion experiences." In the Baltic, scholars and writers leapt across abysses of language and ethnicity to intense participation in the national projects of *other* peoples. Such "elective ethnicity" baffles Western scholars' certitudes about the phenomenon of nationalism, but offers the possibility of intriguing departures. By recognizing the importance of cultivating varieties of nationalism that lead to synthesis and mutual understanding between peoples, policymakers can achieve a more subtle view of nationalisms and their uses.

Real danger lies not in nationalism per se but in governments that cynically manipulate national passions.

What is at stake in the Baltic States is nothing less than the dream of a secure, stable, larger, more integrated Europe. To win the stake, the Western allies must pursue a set of specific policies.

NATO should give a clear timetable for the acceptance of the Baltic States as members of the alliance. The timetable should not be automatic, breeding complacency, but made conditional on internal progress in the countries, building in incentives for pragmatic, open politics. The sheer symbolism of such an offer would be more important than the security guarantees NATO membership would bestow. In setting a timetable, the allies should make it clear that acceptance is a gradual process, but can be accelerated in the event of a serious threat. The timing of successive stages would be a matter to be negotiated between NATO and the Baltic States, working together to meet the requirements of closer association. This advance toward membership would also have a positive effect on the internal politics of the republics, arresting the trend toward temporizing ex-communist governments. It is essential that NATO understand its great political influence and implicit cultural mission—not in any nebulous institutionalized sense, but in its potent effect on the internal evolution of aspiring members. This mission of integration and active, constructive involvement with the future members would contribute to NATO's revitalization, giving it renewed purpose and mission. Meanwhile, the transparency and clarity of these arrangements should also make clear that expansion represents no threat to Russia. But contrary to prior discussion of NATO expansion, Russia is not the only concern. For example, if Partnership for Peace–members Poland and Finland were to move closer to NATO membership, the Baltics could not be left out of the equation, in terms of the simplest questions of security. Recognizing this dynamic, the allies should encourage Baltic integration with the Scandinavian countries. Closer cooperation already emerging between Lithuania and Poland should also be energetically affirmed, as an extension of the planned German-Polish security relationship. Lastly, even such regional ties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cannot stand alone, for they could also potentially *erode* Baltic unity by drawing individual countries away from each other. Regional cooperation will be a positive development only within the context of a clear, intensifying commitment between NATO and the Baltic States as a unit.

While increasing aid and assistance to the Baltic States, the Western allies should focus not so much on economic help but rather on measures that encourage open civil societies. International norms of citizenship and protection of linguistic minorities can address the special conditions of the Baltics. Private projects of civic education are especially important. The influence of intellectual and moral support is not readily quantifiable, but can be great. One successful example is that of the "Open Society" project in Lithuania funded by George Soros, which (along with extensive education-reform projects) has translated and published important texts of the Western intellectual tradition, making a whole world of thought available to a society cut off for fifty years. Similar projects are at work in Latvia and Estonia. The importance of such initiatives becomes clear when we recognize the influence of this area's experience, which filters through the larger region.

The Baltic region has always been a welter of competing claims to loyalty and legitimacy.

Such Western involvement to foster and certify international norms in the Baltics would be part of a larger commitment: to enunciate clearly principles applicable to all, as international standards of behavior. Western failure to speak out about the violation of minority rights in the Russian Federation, such as in Chechnya, sends a dangerous message. So, too, does the West's current course of assuaging Russian pride and self-esteem by affirming Russia's continued superpower status, which only plays into the hands of neo-imperialists without addressing the day-to-day hardships of ordinary Russians. Such lack of candor impedes a more sober Russian assessment of the country's real interests and capacities.

The West should also insist on the speedy demilitarization of Kaliningrad, and at the same time offer aid to the region. A promise of assistance, coupled with pressure for demilitarization, could provide a powerful incentive to turn what is now an armed camp into a normal area. Only then can Kaliningrad take on a real existence and exploit the economic and political potential its geographic position offers. The future of Kaliningrad symbolizes Russia's choice: Whether to become a national state or remain a far-flung empire.

Lastly, all policies should serve to encourage Baltic unity. By treating the Baltic States as a unit, the West can hold all of them to the highest achievements and standards of the three. Thus, for instance, policymakers should expect all three states to emulate Estonia's economic reforms and Lithuania's accommodation of its minority populations.

Conscious use of the Baltic States as models for European expansion and integration can only be wise. Historical precedents prove the far-reaching impact that success in this small but important region could have on Russia and the West alike. Drift and neglect, on the other hand, are bound to entangle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe in unforeseen conflicts, damage post-Soviet experiments elsewhere, and threaten a new bipolar split on the continent.

A Lithuanian proverb distills the hard experience of the last millennium: "When you are in the Devil's wheel, you must learn how to spin." For a thousand years that meant twisting and turning to avoid extinction or slavery. It is in our power now to stop the wheel for good. If we choose not to do so, the wheel will spin again, furiously, sooner or later, and will cast off sparks that scorch us all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Will Modern Technology Remilitarize Russia?

by Sumner Benson

Western efforts to promote Russian economic growth and technological modernization presuppose that such policies will help strengthen civilian reformers. But market-oriented reformers are not the only people who see advanced technology as critical to their future. Executives in the military industry believe that they can capitalize on their legacy of leadership in both military and civilian technologies to marshal Russia's resources for the next stage of economic development. Important elements in the uniformed military, moreover, believe that Russia must remain technologically competitive with the Western powers, in both military and dual-use (civilian/military) technologies. If these two groups reinforce each other, technological modernization could lead to a gradual but significant remilitarization of Russia.

Changing Russian Priorities

U.S. and allied attempts to demilitarize Russia draw on developments that began under Mikhail Gorbachev and have intensified under Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev's perestroika (1985–1991) assumed that excessive military spending had contributed to the economic "stagnation" (*zastoi*) of the 1970s and early 1980s and was helping to keep the Soviet Union from entering the computer age. Gorbachev reduced Soviet defense expenditures, cut production of major weapon systems, and transferred defense sector technology and managers to the civilian economy. He also adopted a new "defensive" military doctrine both to justify these budget shifts and to induce Western countries to permit more transfers of advanced technology to the Soviet Union.

Yeltsin has further altered Russia's military posture. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), defense outlays in 1993 were less than 30 percent of peak Soviet levels in the late 1980s. The authorized strength of the Russian armed forces has fallen from about 2.8 million in early 1992 to slightly more than 2 million in summer 1994, with Yeltsin setting a final goal of 1.5

Sumner Benson is special assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

million (one percent of Russia's population). Production of tanks has dropped from 900 in 1991 to 700 in 1992, to 200 in 1993; production of fighters and fighter-bombers from 325 in 1991, to 150 in 1992, to 75 in 1993; and production of strategic ballistic missiles from 175 in 1991, to 70 in 1992, to 35 in 1993. The DIA estimates that weapons production will remain low for the rest of the 1990s.[1] Russian arms industries have also been weakened by a decrease in arms-transfer agreements with the Third World from $27 billion in 1987, to $1.6 billion in 1992 and $1.8 billion in 1993.[2] Russian setbacks in Chechnya in winter 1994–95 show that the country's ground forces are weaker than most Western analysts had thought.

Playing the Economic-Development Card

Western governments have taken their own measures to encourage reform of Russia's political, economic, and military institutions. Steven Rosefielde has observed that the United States and its allies are trying to repeat with regard to Russia the "transformation of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan into anti-militarist, democratic, market regimes." They have rejected both a "passive approach" and "punitive measures" such as those imposed on Germany after World War I.[3] Instead, Russia has gained admission to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and signed a cooperative agreement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. These organizations, plus the Group of Seven (G-7) and Western national governments, are advising Moscow on methods for converting from a command economy to a market economy. The G-7 has arranged multi-billion-dollar loans to the Russian government, and President Yeltsin now participates in the political (though not the economic) discussions at the G-7 summits.[4]

The Western allies have also removed most restrictions on exports to Russia, notably controls on computers and telecommunications. The institution through which the West kept militarily significant goods and technologies from the Soviet bloc during the cold war, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), ceased to exist in March 1994. The United States

[1] William Grundmann, "Statement for the Record of Mr. William Grundmann, Director for Combat Support, to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress," (Defense Intelligence Agency [hereafter DIA], Washington, D.C., July 15, 1994, mimeograph), pp. 5, 13, 16, 33 (table 1). Production figures for 1991 are for the Soviet Union; figures for 1992 and 1993 are for Russia alone.

[2] Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986–1993,* CRS Report for Congress 94-612F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994), pp. 7, 50 (table 1A). The 1987 figure is for the Soviet Union; the 1992 and 1993 figures are for Russia alone.

[3] Steven Rosefielde, "What Is Wrong with Plans to Aid the CIS," *Orbis*, Summer 1993, p. 357.

[4] Shirley A. Kan and Patricia A. Wertman, "International Financial Institutions and the Restructuring of the Soviet Successor States," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Study Papers: The Former Soviet Union in Transition,* vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1993), pp. 360–76; *Economic Report of the President* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), pp. 223–24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now approaches export controls with the two-fold objective of "assisting the modernization of the former Soviet Union" while at the same time "keeping tight control on those critical technologies which have the potential to negate or severely challenge areas of U.S. military superiority."[5]

The United States and its allies also are acting to shift the orientation and incentives of the Russian military and its associated industry. NATO believes that cooperation under the Partnership for Peace will help steer Russian military planning toward international peacekeeping missions rather than great-power rivalries. The U.S. Department of Defense is pressing for "defense conversion" and "demilitarization" in Russia and the other Soviet successor states. The Defense Department's goal is to "promote the orderly downsizing of the mammoth military-industrial complex inherited from the Soviet Union, reorient those capabilities to peaceful scientific and other civilian endeavors, and promote the economic progress and stability of these states."[6]

Within this framework the United States-Russian Commission on Conversion of Defense Industry works to "collect and disseminate information on investment opportunities in Russian defense conversion and diversification" and to "identify and remove obstacles that limit increased U.S. investment in Russian defense industry diversification. . . ." The Department of Energy and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are helping the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to convert Russian nuclear weapons facilities into "self-supporting, commercial enterprises" involved in civilian pursuits such as "environmental cleanup," "production of safe, clean energy," biomedicine, and telecommunications.[7]

Where is Economic Reform Heading?

Prospects for reform have been weakened by the parliamentary elections of December 1993, the removal of key reformers from Yeltsin's cabinet in January 1994, and the economic and political disorder caused by the attack on Chechnya. In spring 1994, for example, Yuri Afanasyev, who had been an ally of Yeltsin and Andrei Sakharov in the democratically elected Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, foresaw a "strengthening of the military-industrial complex in union with the neo-Soviet *nomenklatura,* which will result in an authoritarian regime, today headed by Yeltsin, tomorrow perhaps by someone else."[8] In

[5] Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), p. 48.

[6] Aspin, *Annual Report,* p. 44. See also, *The Wall Street Journal,* Dec. 13, 1993.

[7] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Information, "Joint Statement on the U.S.-Russian Commission on Conversion of Defense Industry," Nov. 11, 1993, p. 2; and, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Information, "Third Russian-American Entrepreneurial Workshop on Defense Technology Conversion for Russian Nuclear Weapons Scientists," June 21, 1994, p. 1. See also, *The Washington Post,* Sept. 24, 1994.

[8] Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russian Reform Is Dead: Back to Central Planning," *Foreign Affairs,* Mar./Apr. 1994, pp. 22–23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

March 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that a "fully democratic and market-oriented Russia" is the "best possible outcome imaginable in Russia today," but Perry also noted the possibility of a "worst case outcome." In that scenario, Russia would emerge from its present "turbulence" as an "authoritarian, militaristic, imperialistic nation hostile to the West." That could lead to a "renewal of some new version of the old Cold War—Russia without the Warsaw Pact, but still with a formidable nuclear arsenal."[9] Former prime minister Yegor Gaidar said in January 1995 that the "bloody debacle unfolding in Chechnya" was the "inevitable result of the general switch of Russian policy, evident from the beginning of 1994, back toward an imperial mentality and toward the so-called 'strengthening of the state.'"[10] In March, Gaidar stated that his political party would not support Yeltsin for reelection in 1996.

What seems to be emerging in Russia is an economy that grafts elements of the Western market system onto the social hierarchy and many of the industrial and agricultural enterprises that remain from the Soviet period.

Throughout most of 1994 Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin pressed forward with the Gaidar team's policies of stable prices and rapid privatization. Chernomyrdin's program was apparently slowing the rate of economic decline and laying the groundwork for recovery in the next year or two.[11] But the attack on Chechnya has added to the projected 1995 budget deficit, increased inflation, and reduced foreign investment. Politically, Yeltsin's turn to a narrow circle of advisors, as well as his split with the Duma liberals over Chechnya, has allowed the opponents of reform to strengthen their position.

These developments further weaken an approach to free markets that has made many concessions to the organizations and social classes of the Soviet command economy. "Privatization" often has meant transfer of ownership from the state not to independent shareholders but to the workers and managers of the enterprise concerned or to regional governments. In the stock market, the lack of regulation or public disclosure of information damages confidence in the free market. The dramatic growth of organized crime keeps potential entrepreneurs out of business and gives control of many banks and other enterprises to groups that oppose the public and orderly conduct of business. This combination of corruption and unpredictability weakens Russia's appeal to foreign investors, who are needed to press for containing inflation and establishing the rule of law.[12]

[9] William J. Perry, "Speech at George Washington University, Mar. 14, 1994," News Release from Office of the Assistant [to the] Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), p. 4.

[10] Yegor Gaidar, "Destination Disaster on the Road to Chechnya," *The Washington Times,* Jan. 9, 1995. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev defends the Russian government against Gaidar in "How Punishment Could Hinder Reform," *The Washington Times,* Feb. 4, 1995.

[11] See Philip Hanson, "The Future of Russian Economic Reform," *Survival,* Autumn 1994, pp. 28–45; the very optimistic account by Anders Aslund, "Russia's Success Story," *Foreign Affairs,* Sept./Oct. 1994, pp. 58–71; *Financial Times,* Oct. 21, 1994; and, *Financial Times,* Oct. 28, 1994.

[12] Rosefielde, "What Is Wrong," pp. 358–60; Darrell Slider, "Privatization in Russia's Regions," *Post-Soviet Affairs,* Oct.-Dec. 1994, pp. 367–96; *The Washington Post,* Nov. 13, 1994; *The Washington Post,* Dec. 19, 1994; Michael McFaul, "Why Russia's Politics Matter," *Foreign Affairs,* Jan./Feb. 1995, especially pp. 91–97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This hybrid state/market economic system eventually may be seen as the heir to the reform communism of Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in the 1960s and of Gorbachev rather than to the economic liberalism of Yeltsin's early reform team. And that mix may also conform in broad terms to the bent of Russian public opinion. Surveys conducted in 1993 show support for a "centrist position on economic change," for a "gradual" transition to a market economy, and for a combination of support for competition among individual enterprises with continued state ownership of heavy industry.[13]

This perspective on Russian economic reform helps us understand two trends that might contribute to a resurgence of Russian military power. Both trends draw strength from the movements for economic reform and technological modernization of the late Soviet period. Both could fuse with certain reformist and modernizing tendencies of the post-Soviet era.

Military Industries as Economic Leaders

The first indication that economic modernization could bolster Russian military strength significantly comes from the tenacity and flexibility shown by the military-industrial complex under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Industries working for the military typically have plant managers who have long enjoyed responsible and privileged positions, and work forces and communities that understand conversion to civilian production to mean loss of jobs. Many managers in such industries have opposed Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's economic reforms on the grounds that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for most factories to convert completely to civilian production.[14] Yeltsin, in turn, has justified his decision to sell arms abroad by stating that a major cutback in weapons production would have dealt an "enormous blow to the plants which make them . . . [and] would have led to social tensions and placed millions of people on the edge of unemployment. So trading in arms is a kind of buffer."[15]

But the military-industrial complex is more than a carryover from the old regime or a social safety net for the new order. It differs, for instance, from collectivized agriculture, which has consistently failed to innovate and has no claim other than raw political power to preserve its role in post-Communist Russia. Leaders of military industries maintain that because theirs was the most technologically advanced sector of the Soviet economy, as well as the largest

[13] Jerry F. Hough, "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes toward Economic Reform and Democratization," *Post-Soviet Affairs,* Jan.-Mar. 1994, p. 6; William Zimmerman, "Markets, Democracy, and Russian Foreign Policy," *Post-Soviet Affairs,* Apr.-June 1994, p. 123.

[14] See U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Study Papers: The Former Soviet Union in Transition,* vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 704–38, 754–66. For more recent examples of successful opposition to reform, see Michael J. Barry, "Privatization, Conversion, and Restructuring in Russia's Military-Industrial Complex: Macroeconomic Implications of a Sector Set Apart," *Comparative Strategy,* Oct.-Dec. 1994, pp. 419–27.

[15] *The Washington Post,* Feb. 23, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

producer of many consumer durable goods, it is uniquely suited both to marshal Russia's resources for the next stage of economic growth and to find a niche for Russia in the highly competitive international economy. In this view, the military sector has a legitimate claim to outlast both the Communist Party and the Soviet state at the center of Russia's economic life.

During the economic debates under Gorbachev, a strong technocratic strain of thought maintained that modernizing—and to some degree privatizing—the existing industrial system would be a more practical and less socially disruptive approach to economic reform than a "shock therapy" that involved adopting the market system.[16] Military industries formed the core of the Soviet industrial system. They had long produced not only weapons but also a wide range of machine tools, civil aircraft and ships, computers and other electronic equipment, and relatively high-quality consumer goods. Julian Cooper, the leading Western student of Soviet industrial innovation, estimates that in 1988 the ministries of the military complex undertook three-quarters of total Soviet industrial research and development (R&D) and almost half of the country's civilian industrial research.[17] Only a year after taking office Gorbachev stated that it was "necessary to follow the example of the defense industries to the utmost" if Soviet science and technology were to advance rapidly.[18]

The attack on Chechnya has increased inflation, reduced foreign investment, and strengthened opponents of reform.

Several of Yeltsin's top officials have likewise pressed the concept of a national industrial policy in which the military industries would play a leading role, perhaps the leading role. First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrei Kokoshin has stated that Russia's "military-technical policy" serves as "one of the basic elements of national industrial and scientific-technical policy" and must contribute to the development of "critical technologies, including dual-use technologies."[19] Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Branches of Industry, has said that an effective "state industrial policy" for converting military industries must not only "provide the armed forces with reliable and advanced weaponry and military equipment" but also "effectively utilize the scientific-technical potential of defense enterprises for civilian needs."[20]

[16] Julian Cooper, *The Soviet Defence Industry: Conversion and Economic Reform* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), especially chapters 4, 5; Anders Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform,* updated and expanded edition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), especially chapter 2.

[17] Cooper, *The Soviet Defence Industry,* p. 14.

[18] Quoted in Paul Cocks, "Soviet Science and Technology Strategy: Borrowing from the Defense Sector," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Study Papers: Gorbachev's Economic Plans,* vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987), p. 153.

[19] A. A. Kokoshin, "Protivorechiia formirovaniia i puti razvitiia voenno-tekhnicheskoi politiki Rossii," *Voennaia mysl',* 1993, No. 2, p. 2. On Kokoshin, see Julian Cooper, "Transforming Russia's Defence Industrial Base," *Survival,* Winter 1993–94, pp. 147–62.

[20] "Glukhikh on Implementation of Conversion Program," Joint Publications Research Service, *Central Eurasia: Military Affairs* (hereafter JPRS, *CEMA*), Sept. 14, 1994, p. 21, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* Aug. 18, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In August 1994 the Russian government announced the formation of a Federal Center for Dual-Use Technologies of Defense Enterprises to spur the "broad use of so-called dual-use technologies in the production of civilian products by defense sectors of industry."[21] The government also is establishing "financial-industrial groups" that combine research and production facilities from the military industries with civilian commercial banks. These conglomerates draw on Japanese and South Korean examples and aim at ensuring adequate financing for R&D and production and at encouraging synergy between civilian and military technologies.

This approach to converting military industry has been backed by the State Committee for Industrial Policy and by the Council for Industrial Policy, which advises the Council of Ministers.[22] Presumably it would draw support from a public which, according to the surveys cited earlier, favors combining a market economy with continued state supervision of heavy industry. Yeltsin promised both renewed attempts to control inflation and the budget deficit and continued support for the military industries in his state-of-the-nation speech in February 1995.

Military industries continue to hold a virtual monopoly on production of selected consumer goods, some of which (videocassette recorders, tape recorders, televisions) are sufficiently advanced technologically that they should help modernize the Russian civilian economy just as they helped modernize the Japanese economy. Moreover, the sharp drop in military orders means that the proportion of civilian goods in the output of the military industries has risen from about one-half in 1990 to about three-quarters in 1993. Russian officials state that two-thirds of military enterprises and over half of military R&D facilities are undergoing some form of conversion.[23]

Military Industries as International Competitors

Military industry representatives also maintain that their sector is better suited than any other to compete in the world market and earn the hard currency needed to import Western technology.

In May 1992, for instance, Kokoshin stated that the "defense complex is perhaps our main resource" in seeking to "occupy a worthy place in the world economy."[24] In early 1994 Mikhail Malei, a key Yeltsin advisor on

[21] "Federal Center for Dual-Use Technology Created," JPRS, *CEMA*, Sept. 14, 1994, p. 33, from *Krasnaya zvezda*, Aug. 27, 1994.

[22] Cooper, "Transforming," p. 152.

[23] Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), Directorate of Intelligence, *The Russian Economy in 1993* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), pp. 14–15; Albert Trifonov, "Russian Defense Industry Policy: Military, Technical and Foreign Economic Issues," *Comparative Strategy*, Jan.-Mar. 1994, p. 87. For examples of diversification of military R&D and production facilities, see David Bernstein, ed., *Defense Industry Restructuring in Russia: Case Studies and Analysis* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994).

[24] "Deputy Defense Minister on Long-Term Security," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia*, June 1, 1992, p. 27, from Russian Television Network, May 31, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conversion of military industries, asserted that Russian arms sales had dropped from about $15 billion in the last years of the Soviet Union to about $4 billion at present, but that a major export drive could increase annual sales from that $4 billion to $10 billion.[25] One 1994 analysis referred favorably to France's "special state support" for arms exports, which includes higher-than-average wages, reinvestment of much of the profits in R&D, and export of about 60 percent of the weapons and military equipment that France produces.[26] Moscow recently has made important sales of advanced fighter aircraft and ground systems to nations such as Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates, has become the principal supplier to Iran's multi-billion-dollar military buildup, and is transferring advanced military systems and technology to China for the first time since the Sino-Soviet split.[27] Executives of military industries claim that eventually these industries will become internationally competitive in selected dual-use goods as well as strictly military products.

These considerations explain why leaders of military industries speak of "diversifying" their facilities into production of civilian as well as military goods, rather than of "converting" them from full and permanent military use to full and permanent civilian use.

Would Military-Led Modernization Meet Western Goals?

A modernization of the Russian economy that is led by the military industries might serve Western interests in the near term. Russia's present economic troubles call out for mobilization of whatever managerial and technological resources the country possesses in order to increase production for domestic and international markets. Furthermore, military companies have considerable experience in producing civilian goods, and may increase that production significantly as the Russian economy recovers from the depression of the past four years. Diversification inevitably will bring substantial conversion of facilities from military to civilian use, even though this conversion is not complete or permanent. In this sense, military industries may carry the seeds of their own destruction.

Over the longer term, however, this type of modernization could be unsettling to Western security. The reason is that it would skew Russia's evolving industrial system toward those research and production facilities that are inherently more likely to concentrate on military than on civilian goods.

[25] *The Washington Times*, Feb. 21, 1994. The DIA estimates that a major sales effort could boost Russian arms exports "moderately" (to a total of $4 to $6 billion annually) by the turn of the century. Grundmann, "Statement for the Record [1994]," p. 24.

[26] "Changing Share of Defense Order in Defense Industry," JPRS, *CEMA*, Sept. 14, 1994, pp. 23–24, from *Voprosy ekonomiki i konversii*, No. 1, 1994.

[27] Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers*, pp. 7–8, 44 (chart 12), 57 (table 1H), 68 (table 2H). See also, "Russia's Arms Exports: Back to Business," *Defense News*, Oct. 3–9, 1994, pp. 14–15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Much of the argument for a dual-use industrial policy led by military industries rests on the Japanese example of joint government-industry planning. This approach to economic competitiveness was compelling to many in the mid- to late 1980s, when Japanese technology seemed destined to lead the world. In the 1990s, that view has been weakened by the Japanese recession and the resurgence of the U.S. semiconductor and consumer-electronics industries. Western analysts and policymakers are less certain than they were a decade ago that they can identify which technologies drive economic growth. Most U.S. government and private sector lists of "critical technologies" have been quite broad, and government sponsorship of dual-use technologies has remained selective. Additionally, recent historical research indicates that the technologies most important to the economy become evident only as laboratories and factories apply basic research to the development of commercial products.[28]

There is no reason to assume that Russian economists, scientists, and industrial planners will be better able than their American, European, and Japanese counterparts to determine in advance which technologies are most needed by the civilian sectors of their national economy.

Leaders of the military industries should find it easier to judge which technologies are required to achieve Russia's military goals. First, managers in these companies are more familiar with military than with civilian technologies. That helps explain why many managers who were transferred to light industry and consumer goods under perestroika failed in their new assignments. Moreover, as we shall see, Russian strategists seem confident that they understand the evolution of military technology and that they know which weapons and supporting equipment must be developed and deployed in order to guarantee Russia's security and win any future wars.

Military Industries and Military Might

Any tilt toward military R&D and production that is generated by granting military industries a broad role in economic modernization could be accelerated by certain trends in Russian military doctrine. Many Russian military leaders and strategists seem to believe that even after the cold war, Russia must continue to compete with the Western powers in advanced weapons and military-related technologies. To the extent that this view influences military policy, it will increase the incentives to develop those dual-use technologies most needed by the military.

In the late 1970s and the 1980s the Soviet military establishment had its eye on many of the same technologies as did civilian economic reformers. For example, military journals noted that the Soviet Union's failure to invest sufficiently in machine building was hurting military industries. Subsequently,

[28] David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, *Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

machine building was made one of the highest priorities in the Twelfth Five Year Plan (1986–1990). Some Soviet military statements acknowledged the overlapping of advanced civilian and military technologies in a manner that was almost a textbook definition of dual-use technology. In 1985, for instance, a Soviet general officer asserted that the Communist Party was committed to the "acceleration of *scientific-technical* progress" in connection with "strengthening *military-economic* potential." He went on to say that the "most important elements in *scientific-technical* progress—further, high priority development of machine building (particularly machine tool building), robotics, computer technology, instrument making, and electronics"—were "simultaneously the catalysts of *military-technical* progress."[29]

Military reformers argued that the ongoing "military-technical revolution" would have a cumulative impact comparable to that brought about by tanks and aircraft in the 1920s and 1930s and by nuclear warheads and long-range ballistic missiles in the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1970s and the 1980s Soviet investment in military R&D rose more rapidly than spending for weapons procurement.[30] In 1987 the Central Intelligence Agency told Congress that "many of the products needed for Gorbachev's modernization program" in the areas of information processing, computers, and microelectronics also had "military applications."[31]

Russia's competition with the West in military technology has outlived the cold war.

This focus on competition in military technology has outlived the cold war. Although warfare along Russia's borders is portrayed as the most likely form of future conflict, the industrialized Western nations are apparently still seen by many in Russia as the country's most serious long-term military rivals. Moscow clearly believes that it needs weapons of a higher level of technology than would be required to counter threats on Russia's southern periphery or even from China.

Despite the present severe economic downturn, Russian design and production organizations are developing and manufacturing new fighter aircraft, air-to-air missiles, tanks, and other weapon systems of Western quality. Glukhikh, chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Branches of Industry, has stated that a "military-technical and technological lag behind the developed nations of the world must not be permitted. . . ."[32] Sergei Rogov, Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has pointed out that one major scenario in Russia's new military doctrine involves a "large-scale war," with enemy use of "long-range, precision, conventional

[29] Quoted in *Study Papers: Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, vol. 1, p. 382. Emphasis added.

[30] Undersecretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), *The Fiscal Year 1987 Department of Defense Program for Research and Development* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1986), p. II-3.

[31] CIA and DIA, "Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report," paper presented to the Subcommittee on National Security Economics, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Mar. 19, 1987, p. 35.

[32] "Glukhikh: Defense Industry in 1994," JPRS, *CEMA*, Aug. 17, 1994, pp. 45–46, from *Konversiya*, no. 4, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons capable of striking strategic targets of all types on Russian territory." Rogov states that only the United States, Germany, France, and Japan now possess or are able to develop such technologically advanced weapons. In Rogov's view, therefore, this scenario implies the "possibility of a [Russian] clash against a coalition of the strongest and industrially most developed states" and shows that "the West continues to be considered as the most dangerous opponent [*protivnik*]."[33]

Dual-Use Technologies Win Wars

Russian writers maintain that the most important single model for future conflict is Desert Storm, where "aerospace" systems proved dominant over tank-heavy ground forces. Advanced conventional weapons (relying heavily on electronics and computers) are now seen as performing many of the functions previously reserved for nuclear weapons. In a detailed study completed in mid-1993, Mary FitzGerald found substantial agreement between late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian military writings to the effect that command, control, communications, and intelligence will be decisive in the rapidly paced warfare of the future.[34] According to the DIA, Russian military leaders are more concerned about "R&D for future weapons and system improvements" than about "procuring large numbers of current weapons."[35]

In terms of intramilitary politics, this emphasis strengthens the advocates of high technology at the expense of the ground and naval forces. Those services already had been weakened by the cuts in Soviet and Russian military budgets, coupled with NATO–Warsaw Pact agreements to reduce ground and tactical-air forces in Europe.

Affirming the military importance of advanced dual-use technologies bolsters the bid of military industries to take the lead in developing Russia's technology base. First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, for instance, states that the Ministry of Defense has a program for "critical technologies" that includes microelectronics, optical electronics, computer technology, aerodynamic and hydrodynamic systems, and improved energy sources.[36] Kokoshin's list overlaps

[33] S. M. Rogov, "Novaia voennaia doktrina Rossii," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia*, Apr. 1994, pp. 9–10. (Rogov does not indicate why he omits Britain from his list of technologically advanced military powers.) For a similar assessment by an American analyst, see Jacob W. Kipp, "Russian Military Doctrine and Military Technical Policy: An American Military Historian's Perspective," *Comparative Strategy*, Jan.-Mar. 1994, pp. 30–37.

[34] Mary C. FitzGerald, *The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on Russian Military Affairs*, vol. 2 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hudson Institute, 1993). See also FitzGerald, "The Russian Military's Strategy for 'Sixth Generation' Warfare," *Orbis*, Summer 1994, pp. 457–76; and, Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia's Continuing Work on Space Forces," *Orbis*, Summer 1993, pp. 413–23. Compare Shulong Chu, "China and Strategy: The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War," *Orbis*, Spring 1994, pp. 185–90.

[35] William Grundmann, "Statement for the Record of Mr. William Grundmann, Director for Combat Support, to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress," (DIA, Washington, D.C., June 11, 1993, mimeograph), p. 8.

[36] Kokoshin, "Protivorechiia," p. 8; FitzGerald, *The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution*, pp. 396–98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

substantially with the annual U.S. Department of Defense Critical Technologies Plan and with lists of key technologies that have been published by the U.S. Department of Commerce and by advisory groups to the U.S. government. Almost all of the critical technologies that the Ministry of Defense has identified would help energize Russia's civilian as well as military economy.

Implications for U.S. Policy

We have seen that the leaders of Russia's military-industrial complex maintain that they should direct Russia's technological modernization under a centrist program of economic reform. We also have seen that important segments of the Russian military believe that their country's standing as a great power will depend upon rivaling the West in military-related technologies. These two trends could reinforce one another because both managers and strategists wish to develop many of the same dual-use technologies.

It is not yet clear whether either effort will succeed. Military industries are having difficulty adjusting to a market economy at a time of dramatically decreased military spending.[37] The experience of the Soviet period indicates that high-technology reformers in the Russian General Staff will face resistance from the individual services over issues of military doctrine, investment, and force structure.[38] Moreover, Western policy toward Russia may help liberalize the economy and weaken the military establishment sufficiently that the attraction of the international community will outweigh a resurgent nationalism.

Nonetheless, it seems prudent to assume that managers of military industries and military strategists will come to exercise considerable influence over Russian technology policy. If they do, even a democratic government might increase significantly Russian spending on military R&D and on production of advanced technology weapons, and might deemphasize the conversion of military industries to civilian use. Western policy makers might address this problem in these ways.

First, Western governments should consider the military as well as the economic implications of transfers of advanced technology. For instance, the Russian government and leaders of its military enterprises prefer partnerships with foreign firms that will maintain the technological strengths of Russian companies. They do not like agreements that pull Russian companies "down" the technology ladder and away from military- and space-related products toward consumer goods.[39] In order to promote demilitarization, however, Western governments might take the opposite view. Certainly they should do

[37] CIA, *The Russian Economy,* p. 15; Grundmann, "Statement for the Record [1994]," pp. 18–20.

[38] Dale R. Herspring, *The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989: Personalities and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rose E. Gottemoeller, "Intramilitary Conflict in the Soviet Armed Forces," in *The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy,* ed. Bruce Parrott (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, 1990), pp. 79–117.

[39] *The New York Times,* Aug. 11, 1994; *The Wall Street Journal,* Sept. 19, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so if political relations with Russia turn sour. One criterion for the United States, NATO, and Japan would be to apply the current U.S. standard of preventing the transfer of technologies (military or dual-use) that have the "potential to negate or severely challenge areas of U.S. military superiority."[40] Because the Western nations need to control only a limited number of technologies and because they are also committed to furthering Russia's economic growth, such an approach would not require a renewed COCOM-like arrangement.

Secondly, Moscow's preference for diversification (rather than full and permanent conversion) of military enterprises complicates Western efforts to understand how fully Russia is shifting from a military-oriented to a civilian-oriented economy. This could lead at best to honest uncertainty about Russia's military capabilities, at worst to fears about hidden remilitarization. If Russia's intentions are benign, therefore, both the Western and Russian governments have an interest in devising an acceptable method of determining the proportion of civilian goods that are produced by "diversified" Russian military enterprises and the speed with which those enterprises could return to primarily military production.

It should be possible for the two governments to agree to reciprocal, carefully controlled access to key R&D and production facilities. This might include short-notice visits to sites of particular concern, somewhat like the "challenge" visits allowed in certain arms control agreements. Experienced Defense Department personnel, as well as other official and non-official visitors to Russia, report that in the past three years they have been able to visit many more military-related facilities than during the Soviet period.

Thirdly, Russian and Western military officials might explore the degree to which Moscow needs to measure its security by the exacting standards of U.S. technology. Russian leaders do not wish their country to be a lesser military power than the United States. Yet the Russian government would shoulder a major economic burden if it sought (once again) to compete systematically with the Western countries in military-related technology. That is particularly true because advanced dual-use technologies play to the Western strength of a diversified and dynamic industrial base. Put bluntly, if a "military-technical revolution" were to fuel another arms race, both sides would pay and Russia would lose.

[40] Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, p. 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 1013-2511

Issues & Studies

A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs

Published monthly under the auspices of the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, ISSUES & STUDIES is an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the discussion and analysis of problems related to contemporary China and East Asian international relations. The editors welcome manuscripts dealing with East Asian international affairs in general and China in particular.

Articles in recent and forthcoming issues of ISSUES & STUDIES include:

Mainland China's Emerging Role in the World Economy: Implications and Future Prospects, *Robert F. Ash*, University of London

Market-Oriented Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in Mainland China, *Ricky Tung*, National Chengchi University, Taipei

Linkage Effects of Foreign Enterprises on the Mainland Chinese Economy: Retrospects and Prospects, *Peter C.Y. Chow*, City University of New York

Between Sovereignty and Security: A Mixed Strategy Analysis of Current Cross-Strait Interactions, *Chih-cheng Lo & Jih-wen Lin*, University of California, Los Angeles

New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship, *Alexei D. Voskressenski*, Russian Academy of Sciences

The 1994 Elections in Taiwan: Continuity, Change, and the Prospect of Democracy, *Jaushieh Joseph Wu*, National Chengchi University, Taipei

Translation of Chinese Document:

Ren Jianxin's Speech at the National Conference on Political-Legal Work (December 21, 1993)

Annual subscription rates: Individuals, US$44.00 (surface mail), US$66.00 (air mail); institutions, US$64.00 (surface mail), US$86.00 (air mail).

Address for subscription: Editing & Publishing Section, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 64 Wan Shou Road, Wenshan 116, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

Tel.: 886-2-939-4921 FAX: 886-2-938-2133

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond

by Steven Lambakis

On February 25, 1991, an Iraqi ballistic missile hit an American barracks, killing 28 soldiers. Fortunately, that was an isolated incident. But imagine that Baghdad had been able to drag Desert Storm out an additional four months, hitting other critical targets, straining coalition cohesiveness, stoking political opposition to the Persian Gulf war in allied countries, and turning it into an even more bloody and costly venture. Impossible? Consider the following hypothetical course of events.

First, the Iraqi military modifies its primitive Scud missiles and deploys a handful of ballistic missiles capable of exploiting the commercially available U.S. fleet of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to improve targeting accuracy. Then, using information derived from commercial sources or an imagery satellite operated by an ally, Iraq scores direct hits on the coalition's three major fuel dumps in the theater. The space-derived information also tips off Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to the build-up of forces in northwestern Saudi Arabia in support of the coalition's "left-hook" counteroffensive strategy. So he launches missiles tipped with chemical warheads to disrupt and confuse these no longer secret preparations. To be sure, the coalition will still ultimately triumph over Iraq, but by maximizing his limited access to space systems Saddam confounds allied leadership and makes its victory more grueling, and several times more costly.

Of course, that was not how Desert Storm proceeded. But the above "what if" should serve to underscore the growing importance to modern warfare of outer space and space combat operations. Unfortunately, in the mountainous public record of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, references to space activities, especially space control, are about as easy to find as an undiscovered comet. This may be in part because those who planned the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi military occupation made preemptive political efforts to deny space-derived information to Saddam Hussein. Agreement by coalition forces to cut off such information made offensive space control operations so easy—or unnecessary—that the war's chroniclers have simply ignored them.

Steven Lambakis is an analyst at National Security Research, Inc., in Fairfax, Virginia. He has researched and written on space policy, strategy, and doctrine, and is also the author of *Winston Churchill—Architect of Peace: A Study of Statesmanship and the Cold War* (Greenwood Press, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, the U.S.-led coalition came to the desert battlefield with a near-total dominance of Earth orbits and marshaled unprecedented space-dependent military capabilities to help it achieve decisive victory. The Iraqi leadership, conversely, approached war in so conventional and outmoded a fashion that it did not even exploit the space-based information potentially available to it.

Perhaps this unchallenged, lopsided advantage in space has persuaded American military analysts that such orbital hegemony may be taken for granted. If so, that is a dangerous error.

To be sure, the Pentagon and the defense community at large are sensitive to the emergence of information warfare and the decisive role satellites play in present and future military operations. Yet even the best analyses often ignore the real or potential countervailing efforts available to the enemy. The debate on the desert war, regarding associated strategies, operations, tactics, and technologies, is vital to the betterment of U.S. defenses; but it remains deficient regarding the emerging dynamics of political-military contests and cooperation in the newest warfighting environment.[1]

The United States and Russia led the charge to exploit the space environment, and satellites now have many important commercial and civil functions, including environmental monitoring, urban planning, and meteorology. But space platforms have also been a boon to armed forces, revolutionizing intelligence gathering, battle management, and weapon accuracy. Today the United States is the undisputed leader in space-assisted warfare, and, as the country expands military space functions, questions must be asked about the purposes and mechanics of space control. Why must orbital assets be defended? When and how should hostile space activities be challenged?

This article attempts to come to grips with the space control mission—denying space to our enemies and ensuring U.S. access to the space environment. It will demonstrate that existing policy is long on rhetoric, yet dangerously short on supporting capability, and it will show that the successful use of orbiting systems in Desert Storm required an uncontested, threat-free environment. As potential enemies increasingly aspire to space capabilities of their own, the availability of a robust and reliable space-control capability will rise in importance. When an enemy can use the orbital highways overhead at will, or interfere with U.S. space missions critical to the course and outcome of a war, space control will no doubt receive the attention it deserves. But by then the only salient question will be: Is it too late to rid the heavens of this new menace?

The battle over the control and use of space in the Persian Gulf war was as impressively one-sided on paper as it was in the theater—simply no contest. A variety of space assets from the civilian, commercial, and military sectors of the United States, Great Britain, France, and even the Soviet Union were available to the multinational coalition to support victorious air, land, and maritime operations. Iraqi space power, by contrast, scarcely registered.

[1] An exception is Lieutenant Colonel Steven J. Bruger, "Not Ready for the First Space War: What about the Second?" *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995, pp. 73–83.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coalition Satellite Operations

Satellites provided reliable and near-total intra-theater communications (secure and non-secure voice, data, and facsimile transmissions) for military aircraft, maneuvering troops, and ship-to-shore operators. Satellite communications supported inter-theater message traffic as well, making possible secure and timely conversations between the commander of the allied forces and the White House, nightly live television broadcasts from the Persian Gulf region, and unprecedented diplomatic and military coordination among a score of governments (see table 1).

Dedicated meteorological satellites stationed over the Middle East were a particularly useful and reliable source of weather information critical to campaign planning on the ground, at sea, and especially in the air. Navigational satellites helped guide the armed services through uncharted, featureless, and nighttime deserts. The Iraqis mistakenly relied upon an old belief that no foreign army could venture into the rolling oceans of sand with any degree of confidence, let alone undertake winning military maneuvers there. The NAVSTAR (navigation system using time and ranging) GPS satellites not only allowed the coalition to coordinate troop movements, mark minefields, and position artillery, they also assisted the mid-course guidance of stand-off missiles.

Multispectral imagery satellites gave the coalition forces a celestial viewpoint of the terrain and activities in the theater of operations. The lower-resolution imagery satellites assisted military mapmakers and allowed planners to survey and reconnoiter the battlefields and track Iraqi troop movements. High-resolution visual and radar imagery platforms in space (5 meters to >1 meter) detected individual tank and artillery pieces and provided extraordinary detail useful for battle damage assessment and the delivery of precision-guided weapons. The coalition also had access to satellites that could give early warning of ballistic missiles, and these satellites quickly became part of the campaign to detect and shoot down incoming Scud missiles launched against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia.[2]

Coalition Space Control

Space control in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was fairly straightforward. Members of the anti-Iraqi coalition took steps during Desert Shield (the five-month operation used by the allies to project forces onto the Arabian Peninsula) to deny the Iraqi leadership and armed forces the benefits of space imagery. Following negotiations with Spot Image, the corporation that operates the Spot series of imagery satellites, the French government agreed to sell its Gulf images

[2] For a survey of coalition space assets during Desert Storm, see Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, "The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War," in *The First Information War*, ed. Alan D. Campen (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1992), pp. 121–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1
Satellite Systems Available to the Coalition

Function	Satellite System	Aug. 2, 1990	Jan. 16, 1991
Communications	FLTSATCOM	2	2
	LEASAT	2	2
	GAPFILLER	1	1
	DSCS II	2	2
	DSCS III	4	4
	Skynet	2	2
	NATO-3	1	1
	INTELSAT (C)	4	4
	INMARSAT (C)	1	1
	LES-9 (C)	1	1
	DARPA MACSAT	1	1
Meteorology	DMSP	2	3
	NOAA TIROS (C)	2	2
	METEOSAT (C)	1	1
Multispectral Imagery	LANDSAT (C)	2	2
	SPOT (C)	2	2
Navigation	GPS	13	16
	TRANSIT	7	7
Early Warning	DSP	2	3
Surveillance	Classified	Classified	Classified

This chart shows the number and types of satellite systems available to the coalition when Iraq invaded Kuwait (Aug. 2, 1990), and at the outset of Desert Storm (Jan. 16, 1991). "(C)" denotes a civilian system. All other systems are military.

Source: David Tretler and Daniel T. Kuehl, "A Statistical Compendium," in *A Statistical Compendium and Chronology,* vol. 5 of *Gulf War Air Power Survey,* ed. Eliot A. Cohen (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 128.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only to countries belonging to the coalition. The Spot spacecraft could have revealed to the Iraqis critical intelligence about allied troop positions and movements.

Now, an export control agreement is effective only to the degree that all suppliers comply. The space-imagery embargo against Iraq was possible because the few countries capable of providing space imagery of the Middle East region consented to the general aims of the coalition. An alternative scenario, however, must be considered. Had Soviet leaders believed themselves compelled to provide imagery to their erstwhile ally, the U.S.-led coalition would have had to accept this potentially significant encumbrance or otherwise work to sever the communications links between Baghdad and Moscow or intercept imagery deliveries to Baghdad.

During the Persian Gulf war, CNN was Baghdad's best source of intelligence.

In a war where the military objectives did not have such ringing moral and political support, private companies within allied countries might be driven by profit to supply sensitive images surreptitiously to the foe. Or, without such treachery, companies might work to the ultimate detriment of a U.S. war effort by undermining export controls with sales to third parties. During the Persian Gulf war, U.S.-based EOSAT, a Spot Image competitor that operates the Landsat series of satellites, insisted on maintaining its sales of imagery even to concerns in non-coalition countries, arguing that it had a legal obligation to do so.[3]

For Saddam to succeed in defending his ill-gotten gains, he had to maintain communications with his forces. Over the years, he had constructed one of the "hardest," most redundant communication systems in the developing world, a sophisticated network of command posts and communication stations, some of which were mobile. His equipment ranged from buried fiber-optic cables and microwave radio relays to telephone switching facilities, radio antennas, and satellite communications stations. High on the list of the coalition's operational campaign objectives, therefore, stood the destruction or neutralization of Iraq's political-military leadership and its command-and-control apparatus. The objective was to compel Saddam to use primitive, less reliable means of communication, and to limit or degrade his ability to react to coalition initiatives and control his own forces.

As part of the campaign to cut Saddam off from his forces and paralyze his "central nervous system," the coalition air forces sought early on to sever Iraqi satellite-dependent communication links. Taking advantage of their dominance in the air, allied bombers knocked out of commission a least two satellite communication stations in the initial raids on Baghdad. Air strikes also were conducted against electrical power grids that fed critical command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) installations. At this time, Iraq used space communications on a limited basis. Unlike the forces arrayed against them,

[3] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 19, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saddam's forces were not equipped to use satellite communications at the operational and tactical levels. Such a capability could have been useful only to the top leadership, perhaps to communicate with the outside world and help link Iraqi cities together. Still, the use of force against these space links represented a significant step in the campaign to deny Iraq access to space.

The coalition nevertheless failed in its bid to cut Saddam completely off from information derived from space systems. Ultimately, the weak link in the space control campaign was wrought by the West's appetite for war news. Reporters from television, radio, and newspapers, among others, canvassed the Gulf region, poking and prodding for information, and testing the limits of the otherwise strict U.S. guidelines on coverage of the war. Washington reasoned that an enemy deprived of traditional intelligence sources could be expected to monitor timely and continuous news programs, perhaps using the information gleaned to military advantage.

Cable News Network (CNN), most notably, was available to Iraq throughout the war and no doubt became the best source of intelligence for Iraqi leaders. Its extensive coverage of the war included live briefings and news conferences, up-to-date weather reports for the theater of operations, access to expert long- and short-range military analysis, and viewer reactions from deep within America's heartland (significant, given that continued prosecution of a U.S. war turns largely on public favor). To the degree that Ted Turner's media empire provided news derived from space sources (e.g., weather reports), or used space to channel its services, CNN's business represented a real and potentially serious lapse in the space control mission.

A Friendly Environment

Compared to what might have been, however, the need for space denial in Desert Storm was not great. The United States did not have to neutralize Iraqi space-based systems because Iraq had none. The coalition did not have to worry about jamming or spoofing satellites or concern itself with extensive Iraqi exploitation of the GPS positional signal. The Iraqi military's minimal reliance on computers meant that the introduction of viruses into Iraqi computer software, in order to disrupt information and power flows, was not a high priority (although reportedly attempts were made to "infect" some of Iraq's information processing capability). The Iraqis did employ a sophisticated 1970s-era mainframe computer to enable the leadership to determine the scale and origin of enemy air strikes across most of Iraq, and to direct intercepting attack aircraft to the violated border areas. Coalition air forces successfully targeted sectors of this computer air-defense network at the outset of the air war.[4] Also,

[4] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), pp. 106–7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the effectiveness of allied bombing of ground-based space systems did not require the employment of special-operation demolition units.

Yet even the limited space-denial objectives of the coalition might not have been so easily attained had Iraq been able to challenge the coalition for air supremacy. The allies ruled the skies over the Persian Gulf region and could attack nearly any target in Kuwait or Iraq at will, subject only to the stiffness and persistence of irregular Iraqi air defenses. Moreover, the war took place in a desert setting, with a battlefield unfavorable to concealment and deception. According to the *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (GWAPS) sponsored by the secretary of the air force,

> the circumstances of the Gulf War did not merely present a conducive environment for the successful application of Western-style air power; circumstances were so ideal as to approach being the best that could be reasonably hoped for in any future conflict.[5]

The Iraqi political system also assisted coalition space control efforts. The entire power structure centered on one man, Saddam Hussein, who dictated policy and was the supreme commander of Iraqi military operations during the Persian Gulf war. Tactics and operations undertaken by sub-commanders depended upon a single figure, often in hiding, and located hundreds of miles away in Baghdad.

The pyramidal political structure also meant that the most sensitive and capable telecommunications and C^3I installations were centralized in Baghdad, though others undoubtedly could be found in other major Iraqi cities. Thus, coalition bombers could concentrate strikes around the political capital in order to disrupt command-and-control centers. Yet the favorable dispersion of such a vital target set, which may be likened to shooting fish in a barrel, may not present itself in the next war. As it was, Iraq's telecommunications system was more resilient and redundant, and less vulnerable, than was assumed prior to the start of the war. Future conflicts may present a more challenging distribution of enemy assets, one purposefully constructed to confound future enemies and vex counter-space operations.

It is a virtual law of history that a relative military advantage enjoyed by a given state will soon be subject to challenge. Why should space power be any different? Prior to his becoming secretary of defense in early 1994, William Perry noted:

> Because C^3I was significant [in the war], it will be carefully studied by other nations, not only to learn how to emulate it, but also how to counter it. Many of the C^3I systems used in Desert Storm could be degraded by foreseeable countermeasures. In addition most of the communication systems were stretched beyond their capacity, and available Iraqi countermeasures could have reduced the capacity further. C^3I systems got a "free

[5] Barry D. Watts, "Effects and Effectiveness," in *Operations and Effects and Effectiveness*, vol. 2 of *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, ed. Eliot A. Cohen (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1993), p. 363.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ride" to some extent, because inexplicably they were not subjected to countermeasures. But this is unlikely to happen again.[6]

The "free ride," the perfectly benign environment encountered by coalition forces, cuts straight to the heart of our present predicament in space, as well as to the limitations on current space control capabilities and the hemmed-in thinking on this matter outside the enclaves of the U.S. space commands.

Why coalition C^3I systems were not attacked by the Iraqis is naturally a matter of speculation and great interest. Iraqi forces (which did attempt to interfere electronically with U.S. airborne warning and control system [AWACS] radar operations) were known to have had at least four Soviet-made UHF jammers capable of shutting down up to 95 percent of the wartime communications to and from the U.S. Navy.[7] All U.S. commanders relied extensively on UHF satellite systems, so much so that saturation of the navy fleet satellite-communications system (FLTSATCOM) and the air force satellite-communications system (SATCOM), both UHF systems, was a serious concern early in the conflict. The lack of capacity on these systems forced campaign planners to resort to commercial UHF systems, which also were vulnerable to jamming.

That the United States had undisputed control of the air may have deterred the Iraqis from using their UHF jammers to interfere with coalition communication satellites. The Iraqis knew that the moment these systems were activated, they would send out electronic emissions that would reveal the locations of their jammers. The Iraqi Air Force, after all, was not in a position to fend off retaliation strikes by coalition air forces. Once detected, the allies could attack the emissions sources. Deterrence in this instance, however, depended almost entirely upon the allies' air supremacy, another condition we cannot take for granted in the future.

Had Iraq succeeded in disrupting coalition communications with its UHF jamming systems, naval operations could not have been executed at top efficiency. Orders might not have been relayed in time; contact with command headquarters might have been unreliable and uncertain; warning of Iraqi actions on land and at sea might have been delayed. Given the precision and close-cut nature of modern military operations, Saddam's ability to throw sand in the gears of the coalition military machine might have doomed more American soldiers.

The absence of hostile anti-satellite systems during Desert Storm also made the achievement of space control for the positive uses of space extraordinarily simple. Not too long ago, however, the United States could not take the liberty of planning for war without providing for satellite survivability. During the cold war, the United States had to defend against an enemy that had developed the capability to disrupt and destroy space systems. For almost two

[6] William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, pp. 78–79. See also, Vincent Kiernan, "Former CIA Analyst Warns Spy Satellites Are at Risk," *Space News*, Aug. 28-Sept. 4, 1994, p. 1.

[7] Alan D. Campen, "Iraqi Command and Control: The Information Differential," in *The First Information War*, ed. Alan D. Campen, p. 175.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decades, until its collapse, the Soviet Union maintained a dedicated co-orbital interceptor in readiness at its launch site at the Tyuratam cosmodrome. The Soviets also deployed exoatmospheric nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow, which could have been used against U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit. It was believed that Moscow also sponsored research and development of directed-energy weapons, lasers, and nonnuclear direct-ascent interceptors for use against enemy satellites.[8] Today, Russia continues to deploy nuclear interceptors and may still have an operational co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.

Hypothetically, if Iraq had succeeded in constructing its first nuclear weapon and fitting it onto an intermediate-range Al-Abbas ballistic missile or Tamouz satellite launch vehicle (SLV), and if Iraq had been capable of tracking satellites in low Earth-orbit, Saddam could have targeted one or more of the coalition imagery satellites positioned to survey the Persian Gulf region. Iraq also could have launched a nuclear weapon to generate a destructive electromagnetic pulse, causing a theater-wide atmospheric disturbance, disruption of signal propagation and destruction of electronic circuitry in military systems. In this manner, Saddam could have exploited the coalition's dependence on electronics.

As a consequence of our growing reliance on satellites to perform military functions, a future ASAT-wielding adversary of the United States might be capable of leveraging a victory out of otherwise hopeless military circumstances. By striking down, disrupting, or neutralizing U.S. imagery satellites, the enemy blinds critical intelligence sensors. By denying U.S. forces segments of the GPS constellation, the enemy makes troop movements and logistics more difficult and may render weapons that rely on mid-course and terminal guidance useless or unreliable. Although the United States is not likely to encounter an enemy skilled in counterspace operations for the remainder of this century (unless the enemy is Russia), space is rapidly becoming this country's Achilles' heel.

Iraqi Space Operations

Despite Iraq's general lack of space power, the country's ties with space might have been more of a factor than most analysts first believed. Baghdad had made small but steady investments in military space activities and was a member of three international telecommunications networks. It had access to the civilian-run, treaty-organized companies Intelsat and Inmarsat, which facilitate long-distance communications and data-sharing. It also was an investor in the two regional telecommunications satellites operated by Arabsat and was home to an Arabsat transmitting and receiving station. Had Iraq possessed the proper equipment and been a member of the right alliances, it also could have exploited

[8] See Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power—1990* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), pp. 60, 61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

universally available meteorological data, GPS navigational signals, and Earth imagery data.

Indeed, Iraq did have steady access to network radio and television broadcasts and cable feeds (e.g., CNN). Moreover, Iraqi commanders had at their fingertips a few GPS receivers, used extensively in the oil exploration industry, although at the time they had not integrated GPS positional data into military operations. Thus, Iraq was a space-aware regional hegemon, and it may have been on the brink of deploying and integrating space capabilities into its military operations.

Iraq's space and missile-launch facilities, under somewhat different conditions, might have proved vexing to allied operations. In December 1989, Iraq tested its first Tamouz satellite launcher, which was expected to become operational around the time of the invasion. Through its close ties with the Soviet Union, China, France, and Brazil, Iraq might have been in a position to launch and operate its own imagery satellite within a few years. Access to reasonably current satellite imagery would have given Baghdad snapshot assessments of theater-wide deployments, installations, and force movements. Such a capability, if left unchallenged, would have allowed Saddam to coordinate his defenses and possibly stall the allied counteroffensive.

Under different circumstances, space might also have afforded Saddam the means to consider significant offensive operations. As suggested in the hypothetical scenario above, if Iraq had possessed the ability to use the GPS satellites to improve the accuracy of its missiles, Iraqi ballistic missile tactics might have been far more devastating. And had Iraq possessed the capability to operate its own satellites to military benefit during the Persian Gulf war, coalition forces might have had to rely primarily on precision air strikes to destroy or neutralize the ground segments in order to achieve space control, placing aircraft and crews at great risk.

At times, however, U.S. air forces may not be in a position to use this method of attacking the satellite indirectly. At other times, when it is necessary to deny an enemy the benefits of space in anticipation of battle, space control options by air forces will be politically unacceptable, as they would amount to a premature declaration of war. Prewar battle preparations in space are a more ambiguous matter and potentially less provocative than prewar battle preparations involving the other geographic environments. These and many related issues regarding future security must be addressed.

Space Control and Future Security

Desert Storm was America's first space war, the first significant conflict wherein sure and rapid success depended upon steady access to satellites for all of the armed services. Space operational support usually did not make front page news, no doubt adding to the public's lack of appreciation for the importance of military space power. Nevertheless, U.S. dependence on military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capabilities in space is rising with each passing year. The Persian Gulf war teaches the defense community that certain advantages accrue to the nation that ensures its freedom to use Earth's orbits. Conversely, an inability to exploit space (owing to our own policy and material deficiencies, or to enemy actions) will place our warriors at a distinct disadvantage that may someday spell the difference between victory and defeat.

Thus, in the future, space control will be as important as sea control or command of the air is today, depending on the importance of space to the course and outcome of the particular war. Like all other classes of power, space power can offer a unique and complementary capability to nearly any prospective war effort. Consequently, should an adversary deny the United States access to space, all forces on land, sea, and in the air will lose vital enabling capabilities, paralyzing some operations while severely restricting others. Likewise, if an enemy achieves effective dominance in space, and if the United States has no means to contest that dominance, the enemy will hold military advantages America cannot duplicate or easily circumvent.

The ability to exploit space may someday spell the difference between victory and defeat.

Defense analysts agree that the Persian Gulf war was a unique case, not likely to be repeated. The desert terrain favored coalition air power, and Saddam's blatant aggression served as a rallying point for a most unusual coalition of countries, depriving him of meaningful allies. Add to this list of oddities the coalition's complete, unchallenged dominance of space.

Desert Storm, therefore, should not be looked upon as a standard for future combat. The war affirmed the importance of space to military operations in the eyes of many, especially in the Middle East and Asia.[9] Thus, we must expect future enemies to be more aware of the advantages that space can bring and even to have a tentative foothold in space. Indeed, as we reach the end of this century, the number of spacefaring nations is expected to rise to roughly forty.[10] Perhaps no developing country has more of an appreciation for military space than India. Indian defense professionals tout the vital contributions of spacecraft to intelligence acquisition, battle management, and weapon precision, and they understand such technologies to be a sine qua non for all nations seeking power status.[11] We should look at the orientation of India's space-minded military and space-aware officials as an indication of the likely global trend.

[9] See, for example, Patrick J. Garrity, *Why the Gulf War Still Matters: Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security* (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1993), p. 68.

[10] Statement of Gen. Charles Horner, in "Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994 and the Future Years' Defense Program," in *Unified Commands and Specified Commands,* part 1 of *Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), p. 427. A spacefaring nation is defined as one with at least one operational object in orbit.

[11] See, for example, A.S. Kalkat, "The Gulf War—A Reappraisal," *U.S.I. Journal,* Jan.–Mar. 1992, p. 31; Sanjay J. Singh, "Impact of Technology on Modern Warfare," *U.S.I. Journal,* Apr.–June 1991, p. 176; V.K. Madhok, "The Philosophy behind Anti-Satellite Weapons," *U.S.I. Journal,* Apr.–June 1988, p. 155; and, V.K. Madhok, "Impact of Military Technology on Conventional Warfare," *U.S.I. Journal,* Oct.–Dec. 1990, p. 442.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some instruction on these points may be found in a simulated war against the People's Republic of China conducted at the Naval War College in the spring of 1994. The war game, set in the year 2010, was a part of the Pentagon's ongoing study of the revolution in military affairs. In the scenario, Beijing provokes the U.S. Navy into patrolling China's shores, luring vulnerable aircraft carriers and other surface ships within range of precision-guided cruise missiles. The Chinese begin their ambush by attacking U.S. satellites, which confounds American targeting abilities and precludes any significant counter-offensive by the U.S. Navy. The Chinese also use space-based assets to enhance the effectiveness of their own forces. U.S. players in this war game were routed, their forces hit before they could throw up adequate defenses.[12]

This military simulation taught the participants that U.S. military technologies may be neutralized by a resourceful, technically innovative country, and that the United States must make the effort to preserve its relative technological advantage. Military innovation may allow an enemy to reduce or overcome current U.S. military advantages (especially in the area of information warfare) and to challenge the adequacy and flexibility of existing mindsets and doctrines. A further noteworthy point to be taken from this exercise is that space is the one environment that can afford an imaginative Chinese leadership of fifteen years hence the opportunity to achieve a manifold increase in military leverage over a once-formidable foe. The simulated American failure to prevent China from using space led to projections of the largest numbers of U.S. casualties in the Pacific since World War II.

As noted, however, states do not need to deploy their own satellites in order to exploit space for political and military benefit. GPS navigational signals are universally available. Satellite imagery and meteorological data are products marketed worldwide. Information from network and cable television can be kept from enemies only with difficulty. And proposed satellite-based telephone links promise to bring global, fast, and reliable communications even to countries with tremendous infrastructure problems such as India and Brazil.

The obvious message in this trend is that outer space will not remain a safe, friendly environment for Americans unless they take steps to ensure it. Admittedly, space control is an emotional issue. According to General Charles Horner, former commander in chief, U.S. Space Command, many people do not like to discuss it. Others make head-in-the-sand plans to turn space into a sanctuary from war (a muddled pretense exploded by the Desert Storm experience). Despite this, Horner insists "space control will be more and more important," not limited to deterrence and the passive defense of satellites. After all, as Horner says, if American soldiers are dying on the battlefield because of what the United States can or cannot do in space, "I am going to do whatever I can to protect their lives."[13]

[12] Barbara Opall, "China Sinks U.S. in Simulated War," *Defense News*, Jan. 30–Feb. 5, 1995, p. 1.

[13] Peter B. de Selding, "Selling Ultrasharp Images Raises Hackles in France," *Space News*, Sept. 5–11, 1994, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nevertheless, a strong arms control lobby in the United States seeks to restrict U.S. space-control activities by depriving the country of the tactical benefits of operating any anti-satellite weapons, for fear of harming U.S. interests in arms control. This lobby's solution to countering the threat from space is to compile a target list of ground space facilities, mobile and fixed, that would have to be attacked through the air.[14]

A number of points demonstrate how limited, and prone to failure, such a space control strategy could be. First, in order for a target list to be useful, it must be updated and expanded regularly. To do that, the United States would need good to near-perfect intelligence. Assume U.S. intelligence agencies had the luxury of needing to watch only one potential enemy. To understand how difficult obtaining the required intelligence would be on just one country under a spotlight, remember that the United States was unaware of the true extent of Iraq's nuclear production facilities in peacetime prior to the Persian Gulf war, and that coalition air forces experienced agonizing difficulties in locating mobile Scud missiles during the war. Defense planners and policy makers who rely heavily on satellites for intelligence need to adopt a bit of humility, appreciating how much we do not and cannot know.

America's continued leadership in the world requires leadership in space.

Secondly, the strategy of striking all or most of a space system's ground nodes and terminals requires enough air superiority so that U.S. fighters can routinely suppress enemy air activities. Although the United States has an advanced air combat capability, command of the air must not be presumed in all future conflicts. Thirdly, one must consider the problems of allocating resources. U.S. air forces will always be compelled to set priorities according to a calculus of risk and reward. It is simply irrational to plan for the bombing of thousands of earthbound terminals, stations, and nodes when a similar result can be achieved by disabling a few objects in space.

Fourthly, tremendous logistical burdens may be involved in an intense, ground-oriented space control strategy. During Desert Storm, air combat fighters and bombers found convenient basing in-theater. Absent such basing our forces will have to rely more on long-range bombers to accomplish their missions. That will mean fewer sorties flown and fierce competition among targeters for the allocation of precious bombing runs. The course of the war may demand attacks on armored columns rather than on ground nodes and terminals. And lastly, one must consider the question of time. In a long war, an intense air campaign to destroy hundreds or thousands of targets is plausible. In a short, high-tempo war, such a space-control strategy may be only partially executed and fall short of its goal.

To continue this line of argument, one must acknowledge that jamming a selection of satellites may be unreliable or ineffective, and stiff air defenses

[14] Dunbar Lockwood, assistant director of research, Arms Control Association, quoted by Steve Weber in "ASAT Proponents Fail to Reverse White House Policy," *Space News,* Sept. 19–25, 1994, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or a proliferation of targets can impose extreme hardship on forces assigned to destroy ground-based systems. Thus, it may make sense to attack satellites directly not only for reasons of economy (more targets are taken out at less cost by hitting the enemy's weakest link), but because it is the surest, most efficient way to cut off the enemy from his space assets.

In short, dominance in space is mandatory for military success today. As a consequence, America's continued leadership in the world also requires leadership in space. Space systems provide intelligence about enemy strengths and weaknesses; they help to monitor likely threats and instabilities; they support arms control verification regimes; and they enable U.S. political leaders to observe crises, make timely decisions, and assess U.S. and enemy activities. In sum, space assets are a vital ingredient in this country's fast-paced, global diplomatic and economic pursuits.

Conclusion

Desert Storm demonstrated, among many other things, that we are on the verge of a new era in warfighting, called by some "information warfare." The Persian Gulf war demonstrated in no uncertain terms the life and death importance of modern C^3I networks to current military doctrine. Never before has a theater commander planning a campaign been able to rely on an almost completely unhindered flow of information at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In the past, broken or unreliable communications were to be expected and not regarded as show-stoppers. Today, such disruptions can have decisive consequences for the course of military operations and the lives of those engaged in battle.

Despite these recent dramatic changes in military affairs, no significant changes have been made in the U.S. military's space policy over the past fifteen years. Existing space policy is correctly directed to "assuring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space" and "negating, if necessary, hostile space systems."[15] President Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive 37 initiated the current policy and has been supported by successive generations of national space policy (culminating in the Bush administration's policy of November 1989). Yet today this policy remains without proper material or organizational support, a condition that leaves U.S. forces exposed to future military defeat.

The new military environment will not be forgiving of shortcomings. Desert Storm offered a glimpse of a future dominated by information technologies dependent on space systems. Those who skillfully employ such technologies will have decisive operational and tactical advantages over less adept enemies. Thus, military space policy must ensure effective exploitation of the space environment, and those who make policy for space war must strive to understand

[15] The White House, "National Space Policy," *Fact Sheet,* Nov. 16, 1989, p. 6; see also, The White House, "The National Security Strategy," *Fact Sheet,* July 21, 1994, p. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its significance relative to other policies. Space operations are, after all, essentially joint or supportive operations. The makers of space policy must have a good understanding of broad national purpose and the military policies and doctrines adopted within the three existing military departments.

Today, the United States lacks sufficient experience to know when it has fashioned the right space-warfighting doctrines. Indeed, defense planners will probably need to proceed by trial and error before deploying the most capable space-force structure. But whatever the course of action taken, it must anticipate the threats as well as the capabilities made possible by information technologies. What we do know is that the country must prepare itself to meet the challenges of the new age in warfighting.

All progress in the area of military space must begin with education.

We know also that space control starts with diplomacy and, when other courses fail, ends with destruction. Such operations are not primarily concerned with an anti-satellite capability, although ASAT weaponry is one important tool among many. Truly effective space control will incorporate political initiatives to restrict access to space by potential enemy states. These initiatives might include restrictions on technology transfers or prewar agreements to deny enemies the wartime use of a satellite. Space control includes capabilities to disrupt, delay, or deny enemy access to space by launching air attacks or ground assaults against ground nodes and terminals, jamming enemy satellite links, introducing viruses into computer programs, and destroying hostile satellites.

ASAT weapons, however unpleasant to some sensibilities, promise a distinct capability to strike at the enemy's center of gravity. Imagine a proliferation of ground-based transmitting installations and mobile communications facilities spread over a vast area on enemy soil. The task of locating and launching air strikes against every space station, node, and terminal relevant to enemy military operations, perhaps during the night or under enemy fire, may be impossible. Given recent technological advances, the number of space data receivers and transmitters can be increased without bounds, especially as new technologies allow for further miniaturization. When the redundancy of an enemy's ground-based telecommunications and C^3I targets can be increased two-, five-, or even ten-fold, the only effective way to paralyze his C^3I is by hitting the space links. Military space policy must therefore legitimize and enable a diversity of offensive as well as defensive tactics.

Of no less importance is the establishment of an organization to orchestrate U.S. space power. U.S. space assets are too scarce and sought-after to continue to allow the present separation of control over satellites and space operations among the defense agencies. Indeed, it required the effective coordination of over sixty agencies during a five-month period to establish the Desert Storm communication infrastructure.[16] The U.S. defense organization cannot continue in this manner.

[16] J.R. Wilson, "A Commanding View," *International Defense Review,* Jan. 1995, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor do proposals to make the air force the sole executive agent for space in the Department of Defense appear to be the right remedy for our organizational woes. Concerns about service independence, objectivity, and the prudent allocation of space assets among all warriors create significant obstacles to such plans. Air force control of national space operations may be the best interim solution, however, if accompanied by dramatic restructuring of the air force. For example, separating space operations institutionally from air activities makes good political and sound organizational sense.

Ultimately, a formal institutional separation of space power from air, land, and sea power seems to be in order. A new uniformed service in a separate military department would have as its primary mission the facilitation and support of joint warfare. It could also lobby for acquisition of the tools required to perform its mission. A U.S. Space Force would organize and equip the national space forces, draft military space doctrine, and train the nation's space warriors. As information-age warfare progresses, space forces will in any case become more and more autonomous. With a space force, the United States would have in place an organization that could permit rational expansion to adapt to new security challenges.

But all progress in the area of military space must begin with education. As of today, American space power receives minuscule attention from public officials, military analysts, and journalists, despite the desperate need to harness political support for a more robust space-control policy and to improve space-mindedness in the armed forces. This need cannot be adequately addressed amid public ignorance and apathy.

Moreover, public discussion of military space requirements and deficiencies cannot proceed as long as these subjects remain cloaked by the capes of our nation's intelligence agencies. Excessive secrecy hobbles effective public discourse and debate. At present, what the American people think they know about space capabilities and their importance probably owes more to *Star Trek* than to the real-world symbiotic connection between space and the well-being and prosperity of the United States.

Greater space awareness among Americans would undoubtedly put pressure on U.S. policymakers to support intelligently the nation's military space program. Thus, the creation of effective space policy in this country depends on the release of pertinent information about space threats, capabilities, and defense options—information upon which to base sound judgments. While continued censorship of information betraying critical vulnerabilities is always desirable, the importance of space power creates a countervailing need to declassify more information about U.S. space forces in order to foster space awareness, in the public and in the services, feed a discourse on our defensive and offensive requirements, and promote U.S. space power at home and abroad.

The current information deficiency can be highlighted by a look at the paltry "Space Report" (two and one-half pages in a bulky, five-volume study) prepared for the *Gulf War Air Power Survey*. Despite acknowledgment by the authors that the effectiveness of coalition air power would have been dramatically reduced had it not been for space forces, the lead paragraph of the "report"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on space operations has a tone of disappointment, announcing that "the bulk of information in this area could not be released without compromising national security."[17]

What a drag this is on scholarship, general understanding, and the promotion of the U.S. space power agenda! Policymakers and those responsible for zealously guarding U.S. secrets must review established classification procedures and work to bring the space-unconscious American public out of the Dark Ages. If Desert Storm has taught us anything, it is that only when space is recognized as a strategic environment central to the American way of war will the security and power of the United States attain its highest measure. The alternative is to await another shock—a Pearl Harbor in space—by which time it may be too late.

[17] Richard A. Gunkel, "Space Operations," in *Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations,* vol. 4 of *Gulf War Air Power Survey,* ed. Eliot A. Cohen (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), p. v.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Journal of International Affairs

The Single Topic Journal with Multiple Perspectives

Volume 49.1

Conflict and Cooperation: Towards a New Middle East

The next issue of the *Journal* will examine prospects for cooperation, peace and stability in the Middle East. Articles will address issues such as nuclear stability, minority rights, direct foreign investment, privatization, natural resources and foreign and military policy.

Articles and authors include:

Iran: A Leader of Change in the Islamic World Gary Sick

Democratization in the Middle East Lisa Anderson

The Rise of the Private Sector Andrew Hess

Conventional Arms Trade in the Middle East Ambassador Robert Neumann

---

One-year Subscription:
- ☐ Individual ($16.00)
- ☐ Institution ($32.00)

Two-year Subscription
- ☐ Individual ($31.00)
- ☐ Institution ($62.00)

Foreign Postage: $7.50/year (no postage necessary for U.S., Canada or Mexico)
Prepayment required in U.S. dollars drawn on U.S. banks.

Name _____

Instituion _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

Send check with order to *Journal of International Affairs*, Box 4, International Affairs Building, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027 USA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

Who Should Be in Charge of Mobilization?

To the Editor:

The article by John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Late, Great Arsenal of Democracy" (Spring 1995), provides an expansive perspective on mobilization in the United States since the 1940s. It also reminds us that there are a number of important questions that need answers regarding our military readiness. Unfortunately, it also makes flawed assertions concerning how we should get those answers, and takes a gratuitous, unjustified swipe against the current director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

There is no question that serious resource shortfalls would likely occur in a military crisis involving two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts (the current design threat for the Department of Defense [DOD]) or even a single major regional conflict. Hence, Brinkerhoff and I agree that someone needs to have a clear idea of what those shortfalls might be, how they might be filled rapidly, and what are the first steps in doing so. We would also feel better if someone were to consider the implications of not being able to fill those shortfalls rapidly.

All of this, of course, comes under the heading of mobilization planning, a subject for which the DOD has long shown a noted lack of interest. An important contribution of Mr. Brinkerhoff's article is his insight into the complex and sometimes convoluted reasoning that has led the defense establishment to forsake mobilization planning in the past.

Where Brinkerhoff and I part company is on the way in which he feels mobilization planning should occur. First he takes repeated shots at FEMA's management of this function, citing a 1994 letter from [FEMA Director] James L. Witt to Anthony Lake:

> The need for mobilization functions on a scale sufficient to support mobilization for a major conventional war has virtually vanished. . . . The residual concern (i.e., the reemergence of a belligerent and expansionist Russia or a militarily capable and belligerent China) is remote. . . . Consequently, FEMA's mobilization preparedness function should be made relevant in light of the post–cold war environment.

While Brinkerhoff agrees that the statements above "reflect the conventional wisdom and, on the surface, are true," he goes on to assert that the "whole intellectual approach is wrong." In fact, Witt has made a major effort to clarify and consolidate the mission of FEMA and has done so by focusing almost exclusively on the disaster mission of the agency—an absolutely essential

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

action needed to ensure that this nation has a viable capability to respond to domestic disasters.

Witt has also, independently, conceptualized the proper role for FEMA in mobilization planning. He has eschewed setting up standby organizations, developing elaborate mobilization plans and/or asking questions that should better be asked by the DOD. Instead, he has established a small group of knowledgeable persons and has charged them with the task of knowing how to get started if a major mobilization effort is required.

In the current geopolitical environment, this is the only mission that has any hope of being cost-effective. If a major mobilization effort were required (which, in itself, is highly unlikely), the president would not turn to the director of FEMA to manage that effort. He would reach for a person recognized by both the nation's national-security and industrial leadership, e.g., a Brzezinski, a Rumsfeld, or a Cheney.

How a mobilization would then unfold would be totally a function of the tactical situation and the leadership in place at the time. It would have little to do with whatever plans FEMA had on the shelf, however elaborate. What FEMA could do and should do in such a situation is to be available to walk into the office of whoever has been appointed by the president to manage the mobilization effort and outline for that person what the initial issues are, what the initial options are, the authorities undergirding each and what they would recommend as first steps.

The current resources preparedness group of four highly qualified staff members set up by Witt can do precisely that. Herein lies the problem in the Brinkerhoff article. His view of what FEMA should do is infinitely more elaborate than this modest concept. He would establish a gigantic organization of some two hundred people as the staff of a National Preparedness Council.

What Brinkerhoff fails to do is to provide a compelling set of tasks that would engage these two hundred people. Interestingly, the seven functions of that organization he cites are each a different "monitoring" task. The nation does not need nor can it afford two hundred additional monitors.

If we are serious about getting the answers to the questions cited by Brinkerhoff, then there is a much simpler way of doing so. The easiest is for the secretary of defense to demand that the answers be forthcoming. In the DOD Master Mobilization Plan, responsibility for generating those answers is assigned to the services and the staff offices.

Why not, then, ask them to do their job instead of deflecting it onto a small independent agency, FEMA. The answer to that question, of course, we already know. The DOD really does not want the answer to these questions. If we were to be somewhat cynical, we would say neither does the Congress, because the whole defense system is more concerned about home-district cash flow than it is about real defense capability.

We will not, however, take a cynical approach and will instead offer an easier way of answering the Brinkerhoff questions. Simply have the president, the national security advisor, and/or the secretary of defense designate one of the persons who might be asked to head a mobilization effort to head a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commission to assess our ability to fight two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. If the Services and the staff offices were directed to cooperate, such a commission would get the necessary answers in under six months.

We do not need a large standing organization constantly monitoring the DOD from the outside. . . . If we want the answers, we will need to figure out a way to get the DOD itself to generate them. And that can be done for a lot less than creating a National Preparedness Council.

The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.

John R. Powers
Senior Policy Advisor for Strategic Planning
Federal Emergency Management Agency

John R. Brinkerhoff Responds:

The letter by John Powers, the putative head of mobilization preparedness at FEMA, indicates how difficult it is to persuade people to prepare in advance for unlikely events. Powers agrees that answers are needed about how to solve shortfalls between military strategy and defense resources, but he says there is no need to work on this in advance. He proposes the traditional solution of waiting until a war starts, *then* appointing a mobilization czar, *then* identifying the issues, and *then* making some impromptu arrangements to marshal resources.

Powers asserts that a team of four professionals assigned to the resource preparedness team in FEMA is adequate to perform whatever work is necessary now for mobilization planning. I believe that more people than that are needed to review the emergency authorities, prepare the concepts, and lay the groundwork in advance for rapid mobilization as required. In any case, the point is moot, for FEMA's Phase II Reinventing Government Proposal of March 13, 1995, called for these four employees and the whole resource preparedness function to be "devolved" to another (unidentified) agency. Director Witt was thus dumping mobilization preparedness even as John Powers was taking me to task for accusing Witt of wanting to do that very thing. The National Security Council staff has convened an inter-agency working group to deal with this unexpected and unwelcome development, but there is little awareness within the Clinton White House of the need for national security preparedness.

Powers agrees with me that the Department of Defense will not conduct proper mobilization planning on its own accord even as it balks at having an outside agency charged with doing so. War is a national affair, and while the Department of Defense does the lion's share in war, all agencies of government have to be involved. Mobilization preparedness is too big for Defense alone.

I do agree with Powers that President Clinton would never turn to the director of FEMA to manage a mobilization, for Witt and his cronies have demonstrated neither the aptitude nor the inclination to deal with national security matters. Those Americans who advocate a strong national defense posture welcome Witt's latest actions designed to get FEMA out of the mobilization preparedness business. We need to establish another kind of continuing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mechanism to plan and prepare for future wars, or we shall always be doomed to play catch up as John Powers apparently advocates and as we have so often done in the past.

If you think that President Clinton's willingness to condone Witt's abdication of his assigned mobilization preparedness functions is scary, just wait. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City terrorism attack, consider also that FEMA is charged with preparing to deal with the consequences of terrorism—another function that has been neglected by Witt in his effort, as John Powers says, to focus "almost exclusively on the disaster mission of the agency."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essays

Melvyn Leffler and the Origins of the Cold War

by Marc Trachtenberg

A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. By Melvyn P. Leffler. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992. 711 pp. $55.00; $19.95, paper.)

Melvyn Leffler's *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* is a remarkable piece of work. The book's sweep is encyclopedic: it covers both military and foreign policy for the entire period from 1945 to January 1953, and deals systematically with American policy in all the important areas of the world—eastern and western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Far East as well. The book is based on a vast amount of archival research, cited in over a hundred pages of notes, and on a large number of published works, listed in a thirty-page bibliography. It is all pulled together by one overarching theme. Leffler's goal throughout the book is to describe and analyze a way of thinking—focused directly and overtly on *power*—which in his view lay at the heart of American policy in this period.

But the book is more than just a study of U.S. national security policy. Leffler also wants to explain the coming of the cold war, and that is what I focus on here. What is important about his interpretation of the cold war is that he is not fundamentally concerned with blaming either side for the conflict. He does have certain judgments to make, but these relate not to the core of policy but rather to what were in the final analysis fairly secondary issues. The Americans, he thinks, might have gone too far with their policies, especially in extending the conflict to the Third World. But their course of action was at its heart shaped by basic security considerations, and the same was true of the corresponding Soviet policy. When one side pursued its security interests, however, the other side felt threatened. Neither sought to hurt the other, but both sides were more or less trapped: the rival's pursuit of security was seen as menacing, and actions taken by the adversary in pursuit of that goal simply underscored the need for a tough security policy of one's own. The result was

Marc Trachtenberg is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently writing a book on international politics during the cold war period.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a "spiraling cycle of mistrust," and it was this dynamic that lay at the heart of the cold war (p. 98–99).[1]

Thus Leffler's theory of the cold war pivots on the idea that the conflict was in essence a product of the "security dilemma," the idea that international tension may be largely rooted in the clash of essentially defensive, security-oriented policies. Indeed, Leffler makes explicit use of this political science concept. The idea runs like a thread throughout his analysis.

And in fact it takes a purer form in his conclusion than it had earlier in the book, as though in the process of grappling with the problem of the cold war Leffler became increasingly convinced of the explanatory power of this concept. Toward the beginning of the book, he stresses the role of psychological factors in driving the security dilemma, and again he relies explicitly on the work of the leading political science theorists in this area.[2] American officials, he argues, "were unable to see the extent to which the position and power of their own country made it a potential menace to others" (p. 98). Their perceptions were shaped by certain well-known cognitive biases: they focused on the more menacing aspects of Soviet behavior and "dismissed the more favorable signs" (p. 51). To reduce "cognitive dissonance," complex situations had to be simplified, and this was done by "attributing to the Russians the most malevolent of motives and the most sinister of goals and by denying that their grievances had any legitimacy" (p. 121). The result was a policy that sought to "deter and contain rather than reassure the enemy"—a policy which Leffler views as one of the key elements generating the cold war (pp. 121, 140). The spiral of mistrust is thus seen in this part of the book as fueled largely by phenomena of a psychological nature, and the implication is that the problem was mainly in people's minds—that if only officials had seen things more realistically, the spiral might have been kept under control. The great powers might have been able, if not to escape from the security dilemma entirely, then at least to keep the problems it generated within narrower bounds.[3]

Leffler's picture of Soviet policy is not a whitewash. "Graywash" would be a better term.

Later on, however, Leffler sees the security dilemma dynamic as more deeply rooted in the fundamental realities of the international political system. Misperception may still have played a role on the margin, but it no longer lay at the heart of the problem. In 1947, in his view, "U.S. officials were altogether aware that their initiatives would antagonize the Soviets, intensify the emerging rivalry, and probably culminate in the division of Germany and of Europe. Their intent was *not* to provoke the Kremlin, but they recognized that this result would be the logical consequence of their actions" (p. 504).[4]

[1] See also, Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 81, 121, 219, 504, 506–11.

[2] See Leffler, *Preponderance*, pp. 51–52, 98, 121.

[3] Ibid., pp. 51–52, 99.

[4] See also, ibid., p. 219.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But whatever twist Leffler gives the theory, it is clear that the security dilemma plays a central role in his interpretation of the cold war. The security dilemma approach in general does not see international politics in terms of aggressors and defenders. Instead, it regards states as primarily interested in security—that is, in an essentially defensive goal. The problem is that, to pursue that goal, states sometimes must adopt aggressive strategies which oblige rivals, perhaps reluctantly, to take a tougher line themselves. Both sides are trapped by the dynamics of the situation; the basic problem (as A.J.P. Taylor once said in a somewhat different context) is political and not moral; the "security dilemma" interpretation of the cold war is a story (to paraphrase Taylor again) without heroes, and perhaps even without villains. And indeed in Leffler's account, neither side comes across as particularly aggressive, nor, for that matter, as entirely without fault. Certainly, he is not out "to whitewash Soviet behavior" (p. 134); "graywash" would in fact be a better term.

Leffler's picture of American policy is also painted in shades of gray. In toughening their line, he argues, the Americans were not essentially reacting to Soviet aggressiveness, as the old orthodox view would have it. Their policy was instead rooted in a more far-ranging set of fears—"socioeconomic instability, political upheaval, vacuums of power, decolonization"—and the emerging anti-Soviet thrust of American policy is somehow to be understood as a response to those deep-seated concerns (pp. 51–52).[5] The U.S. government, Leffler thinks, should not have allowed its policy to move so sharply in that anti-Soviet direction. American leaders should have taken a more objective view of Soviet behavior, a view that recognized Soviet restraint, at least outside "the periphery of their armies of occupation." They should have "displayed more tolerance for risk," and tried harder to "reassure and placate" the Russians instead of just seeking to "contain and deter" them (p. 99).

All this—this general picture and this set of judgments—is based on certain fundamental claims about the balance of power throughout this whole period. The idea that the Soviets were relatively restrained is linked to the assumption that they were also relatively weak. And indeed if they were as weak as Leffler says, then they *had* to be moderate (p. 102). Similarly, the notion that the United States held the initiative—that U.S. policy was not essentially reactive, but was rooted in the Americans' attempt "to perpetuate their nation's preponderant position in the world political system"—is also based on assumptions about the "overwhelming power of the United States" (pp. 55, 99).[6] His judgments follow from the same set of assumptions: America was so strong that she could have afforded to be moderate, and could have settled for something less than "preponderance" (p. 99).

These are the aspects of Leffler's argument that I want to focus on here. The following sections will deal first with his picture of American and Soviet

[5] Ibid., pp. 100, 110, 124.
[6] See also, ibid., p. 96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy, then with his assumptions about the dynamics of U.S.-Soviet interaction, and finally with his claims about the nature of the global balance of power.

Soviet Policy and American Policy

One of the most striking features of Leffler's book is his portrayal of both Soviet and American policy. American officials, in his view, took the initiative in pressing for action that would "perpetuate their nation's preponderant position in the international system." The Americans, he says, were not essentially reacting to "unrelenting Soviet pressure"; the anti-Soviet interpretation of international developments was instead something the American government simply "latched onto" as a way of rationalizing its policies (pp. 51–52, 55, 100).

The proof that American policy was not essentially reactive is that the Soviets, in Leffler's view, were not behaving in a particularly threatening manner. They wanted to dominate eastern Europe, of course, but this was something the Americans felt they could live with.[7] The question is whether the Soviets posed a threat beyond this area. American officials at the time certainly argued that Soviet policy was aggressive, and charges about Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran were key counts in Truman's indictment of Soviet behavior at the very beginning of the cold war in January 1946.[8] But Leffler takes issue with these charges, and a major part of his argument turns on the claim that there was nothing particularly aggressive about Soviet policy in the Middle East in 1945–46.

The Turkish Straits affair of 1945–46 plays an important role in Leffler's analysis, and in fact over the years he has devoted a good deal of attention to this subject.[9] His basic claim in these writings is that Soviet policy on Turkey was relatively benign. In his view, the Soviets in 1945 "had not engaged in any threats or intimidation" directed at the Turks; "American fears" in 1946, he says, "did not stem from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note" (pp. 78, 124). The Americans

[7] Ibid., pp. 54, 99.

[8] The key document bearing on Truman's state of mind at this point is his famous Jan. 5, 1946, letter-memorandum to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. For the text, see Harry S Truman, *Year of Decisions,* vol. 1 of *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 551–52. Although the letter was evidently never sent or even read to Byrnes, it is a genuine document and certainly captures the spirit of Truman's thinking at the time. For an analysis, see Robert Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 157–65.

[9] Leffler first dealt with the issue in a long review of Bruce Kuniholm's book *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East.* See Melvyn Leffler, "From Cold War to Cold War in the Near East," *Reviews in American History,* Mar. 1981, pp. 124–28. He addressed the subject again in a rather detailed exchange with Kuniholm in 1985. See Melvyn Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48," *The American Historical Review,* April 1984, pp. 346–81, especially p. 368. This article is followed in the same issue by Kuniholm's "Comment," pp. 385–90, and Leffler's "Reply," pp. 391–400. See especially, pp. 394–95. The following year, Leffler published another article on the subject, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945–1952," *Journal of American History,* Mar. 1985. And, of course, the issue receives a good deal of attention in Leffler's *Preponderance.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

took a tough line following the receipt of this note; in fact, Truman spoke as if war were a distinct possibility.[10] Was this a wild overreaction? Leffler's account leaves the impression that the Soviet threat was at best a figment of the Americans' rather fevered imagination; at worst, it was artificially conjured up to justify policies that had little to do with counteracting direct Soviet pressure.[11]

Is Leffler correct in saying that the Soviets were not pursuing a policy of intimidation directed against Turkey, aimed in particular at getting the Turks to agree to Soviet military bases on the Straits? Certainly the Soviets wanted bases there and had brought up the issue with Turkey shortly before the Potsdam conference. The question was then discussed at length at Potsdam in July 1945, and was raised repeatedly in late 1945 and 1946.[12] American and British officials spoke of Soviet "pressure" and "demands," and it is quite clear from the evidence that the Russians were doing more than making a simple request that the Turks were free to turn down.

In fact, the Soviet government kept bringing up the issue. The Turks made it clear they did not want any Soviet bases on their territory, but the Russians would not take "no" for an answer. Leffler stresses the point that at the end of an interview in April 1946 with the American ambassador in Moscow, Stalin indicated that "he might be satisfied with much less than a base," but even after making this "concession," the Soviets kept asking the Turks to grant them base rights.[13]

Certainly an invasion of Turkey was never imminent, and it is also clear that the Soviets never issued an ultimatum. Leffler is correct to stress these points. But pressure can be exerted even if an attack is not imminent, and a policy can be menacing even in the absence of blunt and overt threats. The road to war may be long, but any movement down that road, any increase in political tension, is bound to generate anxiety, given what is at stake. This is particularly true when power relations are as lopsided as they were between Russia and Turkey after World War II. Given that imbalance, an insistent "request" could not be dismissed as innocuous: Soviet manipulation of tensions—the USSR's refusal to take "no" for an answer—clearly had political meaning.

And the Soviets were certainly manipulating tensions. They were conducting a press and radio campaign against Turkey, and, as Leffler recognizes,

[10] Acheson to Byrnes, Aug. 15, 1946, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 840–42. By Aug. 20, Truman's position had become known to the British and thus, one assumes, to the Soviets as well. Acheson memorandum, Aug. 20, 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 849–50.

[11] See Leffler, *Preponderance,* pp. 124–25, 551 (n. 117).

[12] See U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1945: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference),* vol. 1, pp. 1017–22, 1030–31; and, ibid., vol. 2, especially pp. 256–60, 301–5, 365–67. For developments after Potsdam, see also, *FRUS, 1945,* vol. 8, pp. 1236–93; and, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 801–99. See also, Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 255–70, 355–73.

[13] Leffler, "Reply," p. 395; Wilson to Byrnes, Mar. 1 and June 26, 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 817–18, 825–27. Given this context, the provision in the Soviet note to Turkey of Aug. 7, 1946, proposing a joint defense of the Straits, is also to be interpreted as a "request" for base rights. Ibid., p. 829.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there were troop movements and other preparations of a military nature that caused concern about Russian intentions in the region (p. 78).[14] These moves were of course to be understood in the context of what was going on in the diplomatic area. At Potsdam the Soviets had staked out a claim to control of the Straits, declaring it to be a basic strategic interest, equivalent to the American interest in the Panama Canal or the British interest in Suez. The implication here was that they had the right to take control of the area, no matter how the Turks felt about the idea.[15]

And there were other, more minor, diplomatic straws in the wind that fit in with the general idea that Soviet power was being brought to bear on this issue. In late 1945, the Soviets claimed (falsely) that their 1921 treaty with Turkey had been negotiated "under duress," suggesting that they no longer felt bound by it, and thus vaguely hinting that they might feel free to change the border with Turkey established by this treaty, through force if necessary.[16] In February 1946, moreover, the Soviet ambassador in Turkey characterized the Soviet interest in the Straits as "vital," which in diplomatic parlance means the sort of interest over which one is willing to go to war.[17]

All this tended to confirm certain general impressions: that in asking for bases on the Straits, the Soviets were not just making a simple request that the Turks were free to reject, but that an attempt at what might fairly be called "intimidation" was in fact going on. The general point is quite familiar from everyday life. Suppose a teenager repeatedly asks a much smaller boy for money, and the "request" is accompanied by insults as the teenager fondles his knife. Even if no overt threat is made, can there be any doubt about what is going on?

Leffler's handling of the Turkish affair is a good example of the way Soviet policy is treated in the book. Evidence of Soviet pressure or aggressiveness is played down, while the Americans are portrayed as far more assertive than they in fact were. Two examples of this are particularly striking: his account of American policy on Italy at the beginning of 1948, and his picture of American policy on Korea in the three-year period prior to the outbreak of the war there in June 1950.

On Italy, Leffler has the United States deciding to use military force to prevent that country "from falling under Soviet domination," and his text strongly implies that this was true even if a Communist government came to power legally in Rome (pp. 195–96).[18] But the evidence—even the evidence to which Leffler himself refers—clearly points in the opposite direction.

[14] See also, Leffler, "From Cold War to Cold War," p. 127. On Soviet preparations, see a report of Mar. 18, 1946, noting, for example, that hospitals in Bucharest were being prepared to receive Soviet casualties. *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 818–19.

[15] *FRUS, 1945: The Conference of Berlin,* vol. 2, pp. 303, 365.

[16] *FRUS, 1945,* vol. 8, p. 1235. On the 1921 treaty, see Kuniholm, *Origins,* p. 277n.

[17] Wilson to Byrnes, Feb. 13, 1946, *FRUS, 1946,* vol. 7, pp. 815–16.

[18] Leffler introduces this section by talking about how U.S. officials were considering how to deal with a Communist "seizure of power, or, more likely (and more worrisomely), a Communist electoral victory in Italy." And two paragraphs later he reaches his conclusion: Top U.S. officials ultimately agreed that "if necessary, military power should be used to prevent Italy from falling under Soviet domination."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NSC 1/2 of February 10, 1948, one of the documents he cites in this context, was the basic U.S. policy document on Italy at this time. It said specifically that U.S. forces were not to intervene "in a civil conflict of an internal nature in Italy." The only exception was that if an illegal Communist government gained control of the Italian mainland, the United States, with the consent of the legal government, could send forces to Sicily and Sardinia. If the Communists came to power by legal means, a follow-on document called for a U.S. military buildup, particularly in the Mediterranean, as well as other measures; but it did not call for armed intervention in Italy to get rid of the regime.[19] Leffler says top American officials—George Marshall, Robert Lovett, and George Kennan—"were willing to take risks because they wagered that Soviet leaders so much wanted to avoid sliding into a war that they would constrain local Communists" in Italy (p. 196). But it is hard to see how the Americans were in any way threatening the Soviets with moves that might result in war. Kennan and the others proposed to react to a seizure of power by the Communists in Italy by building up American power in the region. Because the USSR would find this prospect unpleasant, they thought that the specter of an American buildup might act as a deterrent.[20] But this is a far cry from implying that they had decided to run a major risk of general war. And the overall impression one gets from reading the published documents and the relevant section in the official Joint Chiefs of Staff history on the period is that American leaders were far more cautious, and more sensitive to their own weakness, than Leffler portrays them as being.[21]

The same general point emerges, with perhaps even greater force, from an analysis of Leffler's treatment of U.S. policy on Korea. In his chapter on the 1946–47 period, he recognizes that top War Department officials "wanted to withdraw" from Korea, but says their views "did not prevail," and that the administration as a whole "felt it had to hold southern Korea." In the chapter on 1947–48, he has American officials digging "in their heels in Korea," and concludes the section by stating that "the U.S. commitment was far from over" (pp. 167–68, 253).

To support his conclusion that the Truman administration "felt it had to hold southern Korea," Leffler cites William Stueck's *The Road to Confrontation,* which is indeed a first-rate study of American policy on Korea and China in the period before June 1950. Stueck's basic picture, however, is not of an America fundamentally committed to South Korea. He portrays U.S. policy as "an increasingly desperate juggling act between conflicting pressures." The basic

[19] "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy" (NSC 1/2), Feb. 10, 1948, *FRUS, 1948,* vol. 3, pp. 767–69; "Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means" (NSC 1/3), Mar. 8, 1948, ibid., pp. 775–79.

[20] For Kennan's views, see especially, Policy Planning Staff, "Review of Current Trends," Feb. 24, 1948, *FRUS, 1948,* vol. 1, p. 519.

[21] Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,* vol. 2 (1947–1949) (Wilmington, Del.: Glazier, 1979), pp. 65–73. Note also that the minutes of the three NSC meetings Leffler cites at this point (n. 56) deal with Greece, not Italy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem U.S. leaders faced, according to Stueck, was "how to arrange a graceful withdrawal from an awkward entanglement." The Americans would of course have liked to liquidate their commitment (in the words of one key document) "without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination." The question was whether this was possible, and top officials ultimately decided that it probably was not: "Army planners now conceded that the United States might eventually have to accept Communist domination of Korea, and the State Department agreed." This conclusion was reached at an important meeting held in September 1947. It was decided, Stueck goes on, quoting the record of the meeting, that "'ultimately the U.S. position in Korea is untenable even with expenditure of considerable . . . money and effort.' The United States, however, could not merely 'scuttle and run.' The Truman administration should seek 'a settlement . . . which would enable the U.S. to withdraw . . . as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effects.'" By late September, Stueck concludes, "a consensus had emerged among State and Defense planners in favor of a graceful withdrawal from Korea."[22]

Even so, Stueck argues, American officials thought that there was a certain chance, although not a very good one, that South Korea might "survive as an independent, non-Communist state." Having it come into being under U.N. auspices—the strategy the Americans chose to pursue—would give it a certain international legitimacy and thus increase its chances of survival. The U.S. government took various additional minor steps to indicate a continuing interest in Korea so as to improve the prospects for South Korea's survival, but on the whole, Stueck says, U.S. actions "did not fall into a consistent pattern that conveyed a deep American commitment." In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson placed South Korea outside America's defense perimeter (in a famous speech whose significance Leffler minimizes, but which the North Koreans evidently took seriously); and a few months later, when Senator Tom Connally, the Democrat who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that South Korea might have to be abandoned if it were overrun, the administration issued only a "feeble" response.[23]

All this, of course, is rather different from the picture that emerges from Leffler's account. A casual reader of *A Preponderance of Power* would scarcely get the impression that the troop withdrawal from Korea had any political meaning, or even that the withdrawal had been completed by the middle of 1949. The minor rear-guard actions that were taken to indicate continuing American interest, including the decision to postpone the troop withdrawal for

[22] William Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 75, 86–88, 111. With regard to the Sept. 1947 meeting, the reference to how America could not "scuttle and run" was the only part of the record of that meeting that Leffler chose to quote. See Leffler, *Preponderance,* p. 252.

[23] Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation,* pp. 95, 153, 161; Leffler, *Preponderance,* p. 367. On North Korea and the "perimeter" speech, see the report of an interview with a retired North Korean general cited in Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 8* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993), p. 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a few months, loom much larger in importance. All this supports a picture of an America determined to do whatever was necessary to keep the Communists at bay.

One is particularly struck by Leffler's accounts of the Turkish, Italian, and Korean episodes, but these are by no means atypical examples, and the book's general picture of both U.S. and Soviet policy is somewhat skewed. The Soviets are portrayed as less aggressive than they in fact were, while the assertiveness of American policy, in the late 1940s at least, is rather exaggerated. Leffler's readiness to take American cold war rhetoric at face value—and he devotes an extraordinary amount of attention to such effusions as the Clifford-Elsey report of 1946—reflects the same general tendency to exaggerate the anti-Soviet thrust of American policy in this period. It is not that Leffler makes the Americans into devils, or the Soviets into angels. He is critical of U.S. policy, but in the final analysis not that critical, and he is by no means an apologist for Soviet policy. But the USSR and the United States are placed on the same moral plane. The logic of power is what is crucial, and it works the same way for both countries.

The Cold War Dynamic

Given a Soviet and an American policy of the sort Leffler portrays, how do we get to the cold war? The author is a firm believer in the spiral model. "Neither the Americans nor the Soviets sought to harm the other in 1945," he says. "But each side, in pursuit of its security interests, took steps that aroused the other's apprehensions. Moreover, the protests that each country's actions evoked from the other fueled the cycle of distrust as neither could comprehend the fears of the other, perceiving its own actions as defensive." And this belief is linked to a basic judgment. The Americans should have shown "more tolerance for risk"; that was the only way the ratcheting up of tension could have been prevented. The problem was that the United States generally "chose to contain and deter the Russians rather than to reassure and placate them, thereby accentuating possibilities for a spiraling cycle of mistrust"—a prudent policy perhaps, but probably not a wise one (p. 99).[24]

So Leffler's most fundamental conclusions turn on basic assumptions about the nature of international interaction. But does the evidence in the book really support the spiral interpretation? One is struck first of all by the degree to which Leffler's picture of Soviet policy points in the opposite direction. His Stalin "is anything but a large risk-taker" in international affairs (p. 510). He is easily deterred, extremely cautious, and respectful of power realities. He is not the sort who reacts to hostile American action by taking the kinds of counter-measures that might lead eventually to armed conflict. Tensions might increase, but he is not about to let this spiral get out of control. He is in fact terrified of

[24] See also, Leffler, *Preponderance,* pp. 81, 121.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States.[25] Leffler's Stalin is so cautious that he is afraid to do things that the real Stalin actually did: "He grasped that, for the indefinite future, the correlations of strength were incalculably in America's favor. Provocative action on his part, moreover, might accentuate American suspicions, trigger the security dilemma, and ensconce American power on his immediate periphery: in southern Korea, northern China, Japan, Iran or Turkey, and, of course, western Germany" (p. 102).[26] Leffler's Stalin, in other words, is neither strong enough nor careless enough to allow himself to be drawn into an unconstrained spiral of conflict.

Nor does the analysis of key historical episodes from the early cold war years lend much support to the spiral interpretation. The Turkish Straits affair of 1945–46 is once again worth considering closely. Leffler, in one of his earlier writings, cites various indicators of growing Soviet moderation in this affair, which he takes as proving that the Russians were not pursuing a policy of "intimidation" against Turkey in 1946, thus implying that the Americans were overreacting by taking an increasingly tough anti-Soviet line in the dispute. He refers in particular to the dropping of the Soviet claim for territory in eastern Turkey, and to the fact that the Soviet note of August 1946 was viewed by the Turks as "a less formidable blow than expected." He also points out that the Russian note was not accompanied by Soviet troop movements, and that a follow-on note the next month was even milder.[27]

Leffler's Stalin is so cautious that he is afraid to do things the real Stalin did.

Now, certainly, the Soviets were drawing in their horns as Leffler says, but this growing moderation came as the Americans were deepening their involvement in the conflict. If the Soviets were pulling back because of this tougher American position—and my own view is that that conclusion is hard to avoid—one can hardly cite this Soviet moderation as proof that the tough American policy was unwarranted. The same point applies to the coming of the Korean War: the problem was not a spiralling up of conflict resulting from excessive American involvement there, but quite the opposite: the signals—as it turned out, the false signals—given by the American policy of disengagement.[28]

The particular episode where Leffler applies the spiral model most directly is the dispute over Iran in 1945–46, and yet even here one is struck by how weak the evidence is. America, Russia, and Britain had occupied Iran during the war, but had agreed to evacuate the country no later than six months after the end of hostilities. The Soviets repeatedly promised to comply with the agreement, but by early 1946 it became increasingly clear that they were not

[25] Ibid., pp. 99, 136, 442.

[26] As Kuniholm pointed out in his exchange with Leffler in *The American Historical Review,* Stalin's successors certainly understood what Soviet policy had been, and admitted that the policy of pressure had been counterproductive. Khrushchev in particular criticized Stalin for "frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans." Kuniholm, "Comment," p. 387.

[27] Leffler, "Reply," pp. 394–95.

[28] On Stalin's calculation that the United States would not intervene, see Stueck, *Road to Confrontation,* p. 161; and, Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea," especially pp. 24–28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

going to do so. They were protecting a left-wing separatist regime that had taken power in the northern area occupied by their troops. To Truman this was an "outrage if I ever saw one,"[29] and the old conventional interpretation is that this episode played a key role in the emergence of the sharp anti-Soviet policy in the United States at the beginning of 1946.

To Leffler, however, the Soviet intervention, though neither legal nor moral, was probably defensive in nature. The Western powers were developing bases in the Middle East, especially at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. These bases, he argues, could have served as a springboard for a U.S. attack on Soviet oil fields and refineries. The Russians were looking for "defense in depth." "The Soviets no less than the Americans and the British," he argues, "had to think about configurations of power and plans for future war should the great alliance fall apart." The USSR was certainly trying to improve its strategic position in the Middle East, but this was really no different from what the United States was doing in this area at the time. The actions being taken by the two sides "did not mean that Washington or Moscow or London sought or even expected a showdown. Each government was probably acting defensively, but the cumulative effect, as the political scientist Fred Lawson correctly argues, was to trigger a spiraling crisis of misperception and mistrust" (pp. 80–81).

There may be some substance to this theory, but it is really only a theory, a point that Lawson openly admits and that is also suggested by Leffler's tentative phrasing. Before the theory can be accepted, it certainly needs to be supported by a good deal more evidence than Leffler and Lawson provide. Their most important piece of evidence is a passage from a March 1946 Joint Chiefs of Staff document: "Soviet pressure in the Middle East has for its primary objective the protection of the vital Ploesti, Kharkov and Baku areas."[30] But evidence of this sort is always a two-edged sword, because it suggests that American official circles were sensitive to the security dilemma aspect of the problem; and as Leffler is well aware, the security dilemma is most acute when this sort of sensitivity is absent—that is, when the other side's actions are misperceived as simply hostile and aggressive. To support his view that Soviet policy is not to be understood as just unrelentingly hostile, Leffler frequently cites American officials taking a similar, balanced view of Soviet behavior. But the more effectively he makes his case in this way, the more he undermines his basic contention that the U.S. government did in fact view the Soviet threat in such simple black-and-white terms.[31]

The basic point, here, however, is that the mere fact that an American document interpreted Soviet policy along these lines does not in itself prove that the USSR was indeed motivated by essentially defensive concerns. The Joint Chiefs of Staff document is probably more interesting as a reflection of

[29] Truman's unsent letter to Byrnes, Jan. 5, 1946, in Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 551.

[30] Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," p. 813; and, Fred Lawson, "The Iranian Crisis of 1945–1946 and the Spiral Model of International Conflict," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Aug. 1989, p. 320.

[31] See, e.g., Leffler, *Preponderance*, p. 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the way professional military officers view the world than as an indicator of Soviet intentions. It is certainly odd that no evidence is given of Soviet officials, in conversation with American or British representatives, linking their policy in Iran or Turkey to what the West was doing in Dhahran or elsewhere in the region. Even a simple juxtaposition of these two issues would be suggestive. Instead, when Stalin was challenged on this subject in late 1945, he gave what Byrnes called "the weakest excuse I ever heard him make" for Soviet behavior: he needed to protect the Soviet oil fields around Baku from Iranian saboteurs.[32] So putting all this together, the Iranian case really does not provide much support for the spiral model. And yet this was the case where the spiral argument was made most explicitly.

The Military Balance

Leffler's focus is on *power*. You can see it in the book's title, and if you look up "power" in the index, you find nine lines of references. And the concept of power—ultimately war-making power—lies at the heart of Leffler's analysis. He believes that the United States possessed overwhelming power throughout this period, and his account of both Soviet and American policy is rooted in that belief. The Soviets were cautious because they were weak; the Americans could be assertive only because they were strong. And this belief also underpins Leffler's most important judgments. The Americans should have "displayed more tolerance for risk," they should have sought more to reassure rather than to deter, because they possessed such "overwhelming power" (p. 99).

There are major problems with this key part of Leffler's analysis, but before examining his assumptions in this area, one point needs to be stressed, and this is that Leffler understands military realities far better than most historians. People used to assume, a little naively perhaps, that the period of America's nuclear monopoly was almost by definition a period of American military preeminence. But the pendulum then swung in the opposite direction after the basic facts began to come out about the small size of the U.S. atomic arsenal in the late 1940s, the limited power of the early atomic bombs, and the problems of delivering an effective attack. At this point, the prevailing argument was that the atomic bomb posed a "hollow threat," that U.S. officials mistakenly believed it was a "winning weapon," whereas in reality the nuclear monopoly was no trump card at all.

But these conclusions were fundamentally mistaken, and Leffler understands why. They were based on a judgment about the limited effects of an *initial* atomic attack, which would indeed (as Bernard Brodie pointed out at the time) do little more than "bruise" the enemy. But precisely because an initial attack would not end the war, one had to consider how the great conflict

[32] John R. Oneal, *Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1982), p. 88. See also, Leffler, *Preponderance*, pp. 79–80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would run its course. Both sides would mobilize and gear up for a long struggle. The United States would fight it, in large part, with bombs and bombers produced after hostilities had broken out. With a monopoly on bomb production, the Americans could take their time, but the Soviet economy would eventually be devastated and Soviet war-making power would ultimately be crippled. So the final outcome of the war could not be in doubt. That is where Leffler basically stops, drawing the conclusion that the United States possessed overwhelming power during this period.

As far as it goes, that argument is correct. The problem is that it does not go far enough. The main additional point to be made is that if general war had broken out in the late 1940s, America would eventually have won it, but at terrible cost. The nuclear monopoly meant that the United States was able to settle for a tripwire strategy and thus avoid an expensive investment in ground defense on the European continent. But that in turn meant western Europe would be overrun if war actually did break out. The Soviets might then try to harness the European economies to their own war effort, and America would then be obliged to bomb her own allies. This bombing, together with the ground war, would leave Europe devastated at the end of the conflict, so the American victory would be largely Pyrrhic.

This situation had major political implications. To pursue a risky or belligerent policy under these circumstances would put a great strain on the Western alliance. The continentals especially would scarcely relish the prospect of such a war, even if ultimate victory for the West was certain. And the Soviets knew all this. They knew the West would be reluctant to push things too far, and thus they knew that they had considerable room for political maneuver. So political conflicts might develop, but neither side would want to push things to the limit, and this was certainly reflected in both American and Soviet policy at the time of the Berlin Blockade of 1948–49. The balance, in other words, was not nearly as lopsided in favor of America as Leffler suggests.

This rather precarious balance was broken when the Soviets exploded their first atomic device in the late summer of 1949. Although Leffler generally sees both American and Soviet policy as quite sensitive to the military balance, his views on the impact of the Soviet bomb are not totally clear.[33] But he does seem to underestimate the importance of the breaking of the American nuclear monopoly in late 1949. In his view, the Americans still held the upper hand in 1950. But when I worked on this period, I was amazed to see how frightened top U.S. officials were. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, told the National Security Council in November 1950 that if a third world war broke out, the United States might well lose. And this general sense

[33] Compare, for example, his comment in the conclusion that "there is little reason even to think that Soviet risk-taking has been primarily inspired by their growing atomic or nuclear capabilities" with his comment in the introduction that "once the Soviets acquired their own atomic capabilities" they "showed a greater willingness to take risks." Leffler, *Preponderance*, pp. 510, 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of weakness shaped American policy during the early Korean War period, not just in Korea, but with regard to such issues as Berlin as well.[34]

The fear was that the United States could no longer take its time and still emerge the ultimate victor. The Soviets would try to destroy the American nuclear infrastructure—certainly bombs and bombers, but also nuclear and aircraft production facilities—just as America would try to destroy the corresponding target systems on the Soviet side. Success in this part of the war was crucial, since the side that prevailed could then go on to destroy the enemy's economy and war-making power as a whole. But success now depended on the speed and effectiveness of attack, and there was no guarantee, especially if the Soviets struck first, that the United States would win this race and thus prevail in the war.

If general war had broken out in the late 1940s, America would have won, but at terrible cost.

Does Leffler's evidence support a different conclusion? He says flatly that if war broke out at this point, "the Kremlin could not defeat the United States." "The Soviets," he argues, "had fewer than 25 atomic bombs, or so it was estimated, and no effective means of delivering them." America, on the other hand, had a much larger number of bombs and the aircraft and bases it needed to launch an attack. "For Truman, Acheson, and their colleagues," he concludes, "the conclusion was inescapable: the Kremlin would try to avoid global war, at least for the foreseeable future" (pp. 369–70).[35]

In support of these claims, Leffler cites two CIA documents, which, when examined carefully, show precisely the opposite. According to these estimates, the Soviets were preparing for an armed conflict and might well "deliberately provoke" a general war in the near future. A large part of the reason was that the United States no longer had an effective atomic monopoly: the Soviets were capable of launching a nuclear attack against America, and, if they did, even U.S. superiority in the numbers of bombs and bombers might not be decisive.

The first of these documents, the CIA's memorandum of August 25, 1950, on "Soviet Preparations for Major Hostilities in 1950," stated specifically that the "USSR is vigorously and intensively preparing for the possibility of direct hostilities with the US," and reported in some detail on a whole series of Soviet preparations, some of which indicated that the Russians thought war might well break out in the near future. Only in the nuclear area was the USSR judged "relatively unprepared" for major war. But even in this area, the Soviets were considered "capable of employing against the continental US the 25 bombs estimated to be currently available." A nuclear attack, using TU-4 bombers (on one-way missions) and other means "could weaken the UK and US capacity

[34] Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954," in *History and Strategy,* ed. Marc Trachtenberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), especially pp. 119–31.

[35] See also, Leffler, *Preponderance,* p. 441.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to retaliate." The bottom line was that "Soviet leaders would be justified in assuming a substantial risk of general war during the remainder of 1950, arising either out of the prosecution of the Korean incident or out of the initiation of new local operations."[36]

The second CIA document Leffler cites, NIE-3 of November 15, 1950, reached similar conclusions. It stated specifically that "a grave danger of general war exists now," and that the Soviets might "deliberately provoke" a general war with the West at a time when in their view "the relative strength of the USSR is at its maximum"—a period which, in the view of the CIA analysts, had already begun and which would last through 1954.[37] The general tenor of both documents was that the United States had already entered into a period of great peril in its relations with the Soviet Union, and this theme was in fact echoed in many other documents from this period.[38]

Why are these issues important? The reason is simple: if policy is to be understood correctly, the strategic balance and the military environment must also be understood accurately. The United States was not nearly as much in the driver's seat as Leffler makes out, at least not until the very end of the Truman administration. America's freedom of maneuver was thus far more limited than he indicates, and the government therefore had to be more sensitive to the views of others than he realizes. A very powerful America could, for example, simply do whatever she wanted in the part of Germany she dominated. But a country that felt its position was a good deal more precarious, and which felt that it was engaged (as John McCloy put it) in a struggle it might conceivably lose, simply could not behave this way.

Leffler's approach, moreover, does not bring out the really extraordinary shifts that were taking place, particularly in the military balance. For him, the world of NSC 68 of mid-1950 is not fundamentally different from what had preceded it.[39] The makers of NSC 68 wanted to create a "preponderance of power," but that, according to Leffler, had in fact been the American goal all along.[40] One has the sense of a story being flattened. The policy ushered in by NSC 68 really was radically different from the Truman policy of the 1940s. The containment policy aimed at stabilizing the status quo, but now, in 1950, the goal became rollback, and the basic thinking became more aggressive.[41] One of the great puzzles in interpreting the cold war is to understand why this

[36] CIA Intelligence Memorandum 323-SRC, "Soviet Preparations for Major Hostilities in 1950," Aug. 25, 1950. Leffler gives the archival reference, but the document is also available on microfiche: Declassified Documents Reference Service, 1987/3151.

[37] NIE-3, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," Nov. 15, 1950. Again, Leffler gives the archival reference, but major excerpts from the document were recently published. See Scott Koch, ed., *Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950–1959* (Washington, D.C.: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), pp. 165–78.

[38] See Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset,'" pp. 112–15, especially p. 114 (n. 46).

[39] See Leffler, *Preponderance,* pp. 355–57, 491.

[40] Ibid., pp. 55, 277, 281, 284, 439, 446.

[41] For the evidence, see Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset,'" especially pp. 107–15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shift took place, but this will never happen unless people first realize how extraordinary this change in fact was.

Conclusion

A Preponderance of Power is an important book and will without question remain for many years the basic study of American national security policy during the early cold war period. But it is precisely because the book is bound to be a major point of departure for future work that a detailed examination of some of its key arguments was in order. What is the upshot of this analysis?

Perhaps the book's most striking feature is its portrayal of the cold war as the security dilemma in action. This is an appealing argument, not just to political scientists but also to historians and others who are bored by the old debates about cold war "revisionism" and who in any case would like to get away from simplistic devil theories of history. Nevertheless, it is—with one very important exception—unconvincing. Security interests led to defensive strategies, as each side "organized" its own bloc. The result, broadly speaking, was a division of the most important areas of the world into clearly demarcated spheres of influence. The *de facto* settlement that seemed to have taken shape by 1949 was based on the idea that each side could do what it wanted in its own sphere. In such a situation, at least as far as the strategically important areas of the world were concerned, there was little danger of war.

The great exception to this general picture was Germany, and here Leffler's analysis is quite astute. The Soviets really were reacting to the Western policy of building up a West German state. The western zones of Germany had to be "organized" and tied to the West; but the creation of a West German state tapped into basic Soviet security concerns. The West Europeans were also disturbed by the policy, not least because of the possible Soviet reaction, and insisted on American security guarantees. Hence the demand for something like NATO, which the Soviets were bound to view as menacing. The top American leaders, Leffler says, "did not wish to threaten the Soviet Union: they sought only to enhance American security." But each measure they took "added to the Kremlin's perception of threat" (p. 219).

Leffler evidently believes that a "policy of reassurance" in Germany would have been better, although he can understand why risk-averse American leaders preferred not to go this route.[42] Perhaps the key point to make here is that the line between a "policy of reassurance" and a "policy of containment and deterrence" is a bit too sharply drawn in the book. Working out a "comprehensive German settlement" with the Russians was not (as Leffler implies) the only way, or even the best way, to implement a "policy of reassurance" in this key area (pp. 284, 505–6). The NATO system itself, in the

[42] Leffler, *Preponderance,* pp. 283–84, 505–6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form it came to have at the end of the Truman period, satisfied the USSR's most basic security interest, the constraint of German power. Indeed, this was the whole beauty of the NATO system: a structure designed primarily to contain Soviet power also served, although less overtly, as a means of keeping the Germans under control and thus of reassuring the Russians.

And in fact Leffler's own evidence and arguments sometimes point in this direction. When discussing the American government's aversion to a general German settlement, and its preference for an arrangement tying western Germany into the Western bloc, he quotes a CIA assessment approvingly: "The CIA put the matter succinctly: 'The real issue . . . is not the settlement of Germany, but the long-term control of German power'" (p. 284). Note that the "real issue" was not the use of German power to build an adequate counterweight to Soviet power: the control of Germany and not the containment of Russia was seen as the fundamental problem. And he returns to the issue in his conclusion. The prospect of a restoration of German power and independence—the creation of a German state "intent on territorial rectification and reunification"—was a real threat to European stability. The NATO system—"the retention of Allied troops in Germany, the establishment of supranational mechanisms of control," and so on—was the Western powers' way of dealing with it (p. 513). It is hard to tell whether, or to what extent, this was ever really appreciated by the Russians; or, if it was, what effect, if any, it had on their policy. Perhaps a realization of this sort played a key role in tipping the balance against war in 1950–51, but we will not know until people have a chance to go through the Soviet archives for this period.

All of which brings me to the final point, which is that it is perhaps a mistake to focus historical work in this area too narrowly on the question of the origins of the cold war. The more important question is how a stable peace came to the world of the great powers during the cold war period. If the NATO system played a key role in stabilizing international politics, and if the cold war in turn played a fundamental role in bringing that system into being, then maybe the cold war was an essential part of the process whereby the peace took shape. In other words, the cold war may not have been the problem, but rather an important part of the solution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Promising Land? Outlines of a New Israel

by Mark A. Heller

The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle against Kahanism in Israel. By Raphael Cohen-Almagor. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994. 329 pp. $34.95.)

The State of Israel, the Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy. By Shmuel Sandler. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993. 296 pp. $55.00.)

The Israeli Economy: Dreams and Realities. By Yair Aharoni. (New York: Routledge, 1991. 364 pp. $69.95.)

Since 1991, the Middle East has been on an emotional roller coaster known generically as "the peace process." Jerked abruptly back and forth between the ecstasies of political breakthroughs and the anguish of terrorist outrages, Israelis have found it difficult to formulate a solid, long-term view of where this process is ultimately leading. Even in the depths of despair, however, most accept that there is now at least a hope not only of formal peace treaties but also, eventually, of a stable Arab-Israeli accommodation.

Aside from what this situation could mean for the region, it bespeaks a veritable revolution for Israeli society. For almost a century, the evolution of Israeli society, culture, and institutions took place under siege. If the state of war with the surrounding Arab world really ends, Israelis will finally be free, and perhaps forced, to confront some fundamental domestic questions previously deferred or neglected because of the imperatives of national security. If Israel really resolves its existential doubts and steps to the brink of a new era, the next challenge will be to determine the kind of society Israelis want to fashion.

Answering this challenge will mean, at the least, reformulating the constitutional order, redefining the focus of collective identity, and restructuring the economy. All these tasks involve huge uncertainties, but the debates have already been joined. Those who wish to ponder where Israel now stands and what directions it may take will find some valuable insights in the three volumes here under review.

Constitutional Order

For many, the central issue in this debate is the future of Israeli democracy. At first glance, that should not be cause for concern. Protracted conflict is ordinarily inimical to democratic freedoms because the demands of national

Mark A. Heller, senior research associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, is the author or editor of seven books, including *No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,* with Sari Nusseibeh (Hill and Wang, 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security lead to constraints on individual liberties. If Israel has been able to maintain a vibrant democracy during a prolonged state of war, a peaceful environment should lead to an even fuller and more inclusive democratic polity, if anything.

At the same time, there is uncertainty as to how deeply rooted democratic values really are in Israeli society. The Zionist founders, mainly from Eastern Europe, learned about democracy from books, and their improbable achievement today confronts a population whose origins (one or two generations back) are overwhelmingly from non-democratic societies. The question of democracy arises particularly with respect to Israeli Arabs, whose formally equal citizenship has not precluded prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices.

There is uncertainty as to how deeply rooted democratic values are in Israeli society.

In this latter connection, peace itself may sustain and entrench democracy in the longer run, but the ups and downs, bumps and bruises of the peace process may sorely test it. Even abstract debates about whether Israel ought to make painful concessions to the Palestinians or the Arab states are often accompanied by passionate arguments about who should participate in these debates. Opponents of concessions have already raised the demand for "special" or "Jewish" majorities in Knesset votes, or national plebiscites in which the swing-vote potential of minority constituencies is muted, to ensure that the balance in favor of concessions not be tipped by Arab voters or their Knesset representatives. Passions are further inflamed by terrorist incidents, which inevitably bring in their wake calls for retaliation, even incitement to violence against Arabs and their alleged allies and dupes on the Israeli Left, both outside and inside the government. At some point, maybe soon, these passions will provide the context for concrete choices about far more neuralgic issues than Gaza and Jericho—the Golan, the fate of Jewish settlements in the territories, and Jerusalem—and when that happens, the resistance to the risks Israel will have to take to get peace may well take on racist and violent overtones that could threaten the fabric of Israeli democracy itself.

How should Israel deal with this challenge? In *The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance,* Raphael Cohen-Almagor responds with a call for democratic self-defense. Proceeding from a theoretical disquisition on tolerance and a historical analysis of the Kahanist movement in Israel, Cohen-Almagor posits what might be termed the "Weimar defense"—that society is not obliged to tolerate intolerance but should, in carefully defined situations, restrict inflammatory speech and disqualify violent parties that are unequivocally undemocratic or aim at the physical annihilation of the state. The vehicle for these actions should be a creative approach to judicial activism grounded in "normative constitutional principles."

Cohen-Almagor's purpose may be unobjectionable, but important questions remain about the method he proposes. The need for an independent judiciary to safeguard democracy is self-evident to the point of banality, and the Israeli High Court of Justice has carried out with vigor and honor the role

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of curbing governments and publics intolerant of minorities and impatient with minority views.

In recent years, however, the Court has become increasingly active, not only as a watchdog for human and civil rights, but also in reviewing the legality of such quintessential political matters as coalition agreements. Political leaders, most notably the prime minister, have often expressed annoyance with the Court's intervention, but this is both predictable and healthy. More significant are signs that the Court itself may be wary of jeopardizing its authority by intruding too deeply into matters properly belonging to other branches of government.

The correct balance between parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review remains a point of permanent contention, which Cohen-Almagor does little to resolve. But the experience of other democracies suggests that judicial authority will be best preserved and enhanced if the Court also exercises some self-restraint, whatever its normative principles may be. If constitutional construction strays too far from prevailing political beliefs, the Court itself will be constrained or ignored by government and parliament, with the support of public opinion.

On the specific matter of party disqualification, it is worthwhile recalling that the Court understood its role very much in this light in 1984, when it reminded the Central Elections Committee (CEC)—itself a party body—that it could exercise its authority to disqualify parties only on the basis of clear legislation for which the Knesset, not the Court, was responsible. As a result of this reminder, legislation was passed in 1986 outlawing incitement to racism and, on the basis of that legislation, the Court had a standard by which to review the CEC's 1988 disqualification of Kach (the Kahanist party) and the Progressive List for Peace: it upheld the former and overturned the latter.

In short, the Court did not fight racism and intolerance with its own normative principles, but instead forced the elected representatives of Israeli society to confront these phenomena head-on. And if parliament and public opinion had not been prepared to face these threats by formally delegitimizing them, it is unlikely that judicial construction of Israel's (unwritten) constitution would have made a critical difference.

Of course, the fact that some legislation was passed does not mean that the dangers addressed by Cohen-Almagor have disappeared. Even if we assume a solid Jewish majority, as long as Jewish opinion on issues of national identity is divided closely enough for Arab votes to make a difference, tensions between the Jewish and democratic character of Israel will persist. As long as that is the case, moreover, some responses to these tensions will probably assume racist proportions. Peace may mitigate the most virulent contradictions, but it will not eliminate them completely, and others will continue to intrude on the national agenda.

So how should the political community be defined? How should relations between religion and the state be regulated? Is it appropriate, for example, for the Knesset to vote on legislation defining "Who is a Jew?" (in fact, "Who is a Rabbi?") If so, is it anomalous for non-Jewish parliamentarians to take part in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that vote, as actually happened a few years back? Such questions can be resolved, if at all, only in the context of a fundamental reevaluation of the Israeli polity, which lies behind the recurrent calls for a written constitution.

Collective Identity

In *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel,* Shmuel Sandler does not launch a frontal assault on the question of collective identity, but he nonetheless addresses it by indirection. His ostensible purpose, summarized in the book's subtitle, is to determine the respective impact of what he calls "statist" and "ethnonational" components on Israeli foreign policy. Sandler's thesis is that a conventional statist-security rationale dominated Israeli foreign policy and military strategy until 1967, when ethnonationalism—understood as the commitment to some redemptive, historical mission concretized in territorial terms—began to play a greater role in self-legitimization, national reassurance, and collective values. This trend was accelerated by Israel's relative deprivation in the international arena and by the growing political expression given to the relative deprivation felt by Israel's Sephardi population. It culminated in the upheaval that swept the Likud into power in 1977 and ushered in what Sandler calls a "compound" foreign policy with a much sharper emphasis on ethnonational themes.

Sandler's argument is intriguing but problematic. His periodization seems forced and the contrast between "reason of state" and "reason of nation" is overdrawn. Ever since the defeat of pure "statism" in the debate over Uganda at the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, the whole Zionist enterprise has been an exercise in ethnonationalism; Labor leadership before 1977 was also motivated by historical attachments and it, too, pursued a "compound" policy. The difference is that Labor showed greater sensitivity to the global and regional political context in which Israel operated. And the Likud, though undoubtedly more animated by ethnonational themes, was also realistic enough to refrain from formally annexing the West Bank and from pushing relations with the United States beyond the point of no return.

Moreover, the exclusive identification of ethnonationalism with a historical attachment to land is questionable; it is not at all clear why redemption of the historical patrimony is more "ethnonational" than redemption of the people through the absorption of massive waves of immigration. The latter had been Israel's conscious priority since David Ben-Gurion's time, until it was deliberately complicated, if not jeopardized, by Yitzhak Shamir's preference for settlement construction over loan guarantees in the 1991–92 period.

Lastly, many of the decisions Sandler cites as examples of ethnonational foreign policy can be explained just as persuasively in other ways: either by a conventional security calculus (for example, peace with Egypt as a way to break the most threatening possible military coalition); or by the sheer inability to understand the limited utility of military force (for example, the 1982 war in Lebanon), which Americans and Soviets also exhibited in Vietnam and Afghani-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stan, without any ethnonational distortions except, perhaps, the distortions of racial stereotypes. In short, Sandler's explanation of the conceptual sources of Israeli foreign policy is provocative but incomplete.

As an inquiry into the elements of collective identity, however, *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel* is an excellent example of the strategy of the indirect approach. The Israeli search for self-definition is manifested in three sets of evolving relationships. One concerns Israeli ties with the Jewish Diaspora; the other two involve secular-religious and Jewish-Arab relations inside Israel itself. If Sandler's basic thesis is correct, a reduction in relative deprivation sensed by and in Israel should strengthen statism as a focus of collective identification. Pushed to its logical conclusion, this trend should attenuate Israeli-Diaspora ties and facilitate the integration of Israeli Arabs into a state-centered polity. But, given the expected diminution of religiously inspired inputs in national identity, it could also exacerbate secular-religious tensions by diminishing the willingness of the secular majority to accommodate religious demands in public norms and institutions.

Economy

Assuming that peace relieves Israel's sense of relative international deprivation and eventually permits a reduction in the defense burden, the major factor determining the feasibility of this scenario will be the country's economic performance. Hence the importance of Yair Aharoni's fine volume, *The Israeli Economy: Dreams and Realities.*

Aharoni presents a graphic picture of severe economic underachievement. Israel's accomplishments are impressive by almost any standard; its gross domestic product now exceeds that of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon combined. Nevertheless, Aharoni argues, the results could have been far better but for the distortions and inefficiencies owing to "*ad hoc,* often paternalistic and certainly opportunistic government intervention—with perhaps the highest rate of intervention in the Western world in individual business decisions" (p. 9).

Some of these distortions, he explains, are the result of objective factors, such as the small size of the economy and the high defense burden. But Aharoni attributes much of the problem to an ideological vision of nation building, with its emphasis on paternalistic central management and resource allocation in the service of land settlement, population dispersal, immigrant absorption, and low unemployment (not to mention coalition building and patronage).

Anyone even remotely familiar with Israel's economic history will not be surprised to read Aharoni's litany of government and General Federation of Labor (Histadrut) interventions: licenses, subsidies, loans and loan guarantees, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to imports, concessions on and exemptions from capital and foreign-exchange regulations, and so on, almost without number. Nor, given his frequent references to "the Chicago school," will his recommendations come as much of a shock: Aharoni believes that attention to the demands

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of efficiency and profitability will rationalize the economy, improve international competitiveness, produce accelerated growth, and give back to Israelis the "opportunity cost" imposed over the years by corporatist institutions and ideological policies.

How likely is it that this prescription will be adopted? To judge by Israel's own record and by the experience of others, the answer must be: "Not very." The Likud—the obvious alternative to the Labor inheritors of Israel's socialist legacy—have already demonstrated that the terms "socialist" and "populist" ("left" and "right") mean very little insofar as economic policy is concerned. Likud constituents, too, were addicted to government protection and subsidies—Aharoni shows that the public service sector share of GNP and total employment actually *rose* under Likud governments and peaked in 1984. Modest moves towards privatization and marketization were deferred after 1977 and resumed only when, in the Government of National Unity, Labor took control of the Finance Ministry and introduced some measure of market and budgetary discipline. Indeed, signs of impatience with the old ways are even stronger in the Labor camp than among Likud supporters—witness the rebellion against the Labor establishment led by Haim Ramon before the last Histadrut elections.

But even limited economic liberalization, some dimensions of which are too recent to be covered by Aharoni, has had the effect of *widening* income disparities, and if this continues, the public may well demand, not that the government cease dividing the pie, but simply that it do so in a different way. As any French fisherman or Japanese rice-grower can testify, the absence of socialist ideology does not mean the triumph of Chicago-school economics and the end of interest-group politics. In short, there are political limits on how far economic rationalization can go, and in Israel, those limits are likely to be tight.

Promises Made, Promises Kept?

A reorientation in areas as profound as political culture and collective identity must be even more constrained than in the economy. Peace, if it is achieved, will not erase the ethnic boundary inside Israel; it may help Arabs attain full legal equality, but it will not make them psychically complete citizens as long as they are unwilling or unable to assimilate. Israel will continue to grapple with the problems of ethnic politics, though perhaps of a more benign variety.

By the same token, Israel will almost surely remain culturally and economically oriented to Europe and North America and will not fully assimilate into the Middle East. Its relationship to Jews elsewhere will begin to resemble that of other "mother-countries" with their diasporas—less intense, less asymmetric in both psychological and material terms—but it will not disappear.

Lastly, peace will probably sharpen the religious-secular schism in Israeli politics. But here the most likely alternative to the current parameters is a *Kulturkampf* implied by reformation of the electoral system in such a way that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

small parties, many of them religious parties, will have less clout than they have had heretofore. Secular politicians may come to believe that peace enables them to run that risk without also risking their own political futures, but that is far from certain.

In short, peace, if it comes, may produce some significant changes, but it will hardly transform Israel beyond recognition. Instead, like the end of the cold war and the new world order, peace is likely to eliminate some familiar sources of anxiety and bring others to the fore.

The Israeli agenda after peace will almost certainly be less apoplectic, however, for the existential stakes will seem, and probably will be, lower. But even when the challenge of security is displaced and Israelis can confront all the other problems inherent in the country's uniqueness, the dream of the first Zionist visionaries—some ill-defined but luxuriously mundane "normality" for the Jewish people—will remain remote from the peculiarities of Israeli reality.

Erratum

A review essay in the Spring 1995 issue of *Orbis* misstated the title of Scott Shane's book *Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union* (Ivan R. Dee, Inc., Publisher, 1994). The editors regret the error.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

La Longue Durée

Having devoted most of this issue to learned discussion of the possible futures of Russia and her neighbors, we were moved to investigate what authors of the recent past ventured to prophesy on the selfsame theme. What follows is an excerpt from "The Soviet Succession Crisis and Its Aftermath," published ten years ago by *Orbis*.[1] An erudite essay, it nonetheless predicted that the years 1988–1995 might be a time of "maximum danger to the West."

O felix culpa!

"Mikhail Gorbachev is, in many respects, very different from all previous Soviet leaders. The youngest leader since Stalin and the best-educated newcomer to the top post since Lenin, his experience differs considerably from that of his predecessors. Barely a teenager at the conclusion of World War II, he is the first Soviet leader whose adult life was not touched by the impact of foreign invasion, and he is also the first leader since 1953 whose career was not furthered in some way by Stalin's purges. . . . Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov, he has not been involved in direct supervision of either the military or the police. And his travels abroad have given him a wider acquaintance with the outside world than that possessed by any leaders since Lenin; he has visited eleven foreign countries, including six non-Communist ones.

"It is, thus, not surprising that Gorbachev's election evoked widespread expectation in the West of a fresh approach to a wide range of issues, both domestic and foreign. But the Western reaction to Gorbachev has focused less upon his background than upon his apparent personal qualities. Commentaries in the Western press have emphasized his lack of the arrogance usually associated with Soviet officials of high rank, his well-spoken manner, and his unassuming demeanor. . . .

"The image projected by Gorbachev will surely be a less important determinant of political outcomes at home than abroad. Nevertheless, an impression of young vigorous leadership in the Kremlin could generate enthusiasm and shake the Soviet populace out of the doldrums so apparent during the waning days of Chernenko's leadership. . . .

"The indications are that Gorbachev will follow Andropov's approach to domestic policy, with the main emphasis upon improving the economy through such means as

[1] R. Judson Mitchell and Teresa Gee, "The Soviet Succession Crisis and Its Aftermath," *Orbis*, Summer 1985, pp. 293–317.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

modernizing industrial technology, rationalization of agricultural production, fighting corruption, and some measure of decentralization of management. . . .

"Gorbachev still has a long way to go in clearing out the dead wood and installing supportive cadres within the party. Further, there may be strains in his relations with the military. The generals could hardly be happy about their apparent downgrading in the maneuvering accompanying the latest succession, nor are they likely to be enthusiastic about an agricultural specialist in the general secretary's post. . . .

"Finally, there is the matter of the massive and stultifying governmental bureaucracy. Any initiatives for reform are likely to encounter fierce resistance from administrators in the state *apparat,* and past experience shows that such resistance is more effective in the execution of policy than in its formation. Moreover, there are built-in systemic limitations to reform. Whatever degree of freedom of action he enjoys, Gorbachev cannot proceed very far in restructuring of the command economy without endangering his own power and that of the forces supporting him. . . .

"Soviet world power in the Gorbachev era is ultimately dependent upon a revitalization of the sluggish economy. A full-fledged attack on this front can hardly be launched before completion of the consolidation of the new leader's power. Gorbachev's authority should peak around 1988, followed by a period of five to seven years of relatively undiminished capacity for inducing change. . . . Thus, in superpower politics, the years from 1988 to 1995 may be a period of maximum danger for the West.

"Soviet hopes for a dramatic recovery in the world 'correlation of forces' will, however, remain wishful thinking unless the new leadership succeeds in reversing the prevailing inertia, bureaucratic muddle, and technological shortcomings within the Soviet Union. The obstacles are formidable. Gorbachev has a mandate for reform but the structure of the Soviet system severely constricts the parameters of permissible change. . . .

"Whatever the extent or initial successes of a reform program, Gorbachev will inevitably confront the central dilemma of the Soviet polity, the basic incompatibility between modernization and authoritarianism. Soviet Communism has aimed to achieve economic modernization while avoiding its natural concomitants, social pluralism and a thrust for political democracy. The condition of the 'mature' socialist system in the USSR demonstrates that suppression of the effects of modernization inevitably inhibits the modernization process itself. For all his impressive qualities, Gorbachev is unlikely to resolve this fundamental 'contradiction of socialism.'"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Auguries

Russia's Habits Die Hard

Economic "fairness" has returned to Moscow. On March 29, the central government suddenly issued a tax directive extending its "excess wage" tax of 38 percent to foreign-representative businesses. The level at which wages supposedly become "excessive" is $25 a month.[1]

Previously, Russian and joint-venture companies were subject to the "excess wage" tax, although observance of tax laws by Russian companies is thought to be spotty. Foreign branch offices had been exempt because they are largely exploratory and rarely profitable.

Under the new "excess wage" directive, expatriate employees are covered as well as Russians, and since expatriates manning foreign-representative offices are typically paid far more than the prevailing wage rate in Russia, the new tax on their salaries is likely to be steep indeed. Analysts have estimated that many foreign-representative businesses could owe hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxes.

The new "excess wage" tax comes on top of a 41 percent tax on wages that companies pay to support "social programs." The "excess wage" tax is also retroactive—to the beginning of *last* year. Payment of the new "excess wage" tax was due less than a month after the retroactive tax was proclaimed.

According to Peter Carow, executive director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Moscow, "A lot of businessmen are just reaching the end of their rope."[2]

To make matters worse, Russia's banks are negotiating with Moscow to keep foreigners from buying companies. A consortium of Russian banks recently proposed lending the government nearly $2 billion in return for the state shares in dozens of companies slated for privatization. "The buying up of the most attractive Russian enterprises by foreign investors for next to nothing is not in the interest of domestic capital," said the bank group's memorandum.[3]

Western investor Richard Jacobs seems inclined to take the consortium at its word: "Russians would rather control their own destiny. And Russian financial institutions have grown sufficiently in stature to do that."[4]

Yet Dmitry Vasiliev, the head of Russia's own Federal Commission on Securities and Capital Markets, opposes the banks' plan, describing its centralization of economic power as "like communism."[5]

[1] *The Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 5, 1995.

[2] *The Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 5, 1995.

[3] *The Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 13, 1995.

[4] Quoted in *The Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 20, 1995.

[5] *Financial Times,* April 22–23, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Call it nationalist or call it socialist, the banks' proposal augurs a trend sure to scare off Western investors. Lehman Brothers International has dropped plans for a $300 million Russia fund. Said a company spokesman: "For a Western investor with no protection of his purchases, no price [for state assets] is good enough. For a Russian bank with protection of its interests, those assets are a great deal."[6]

China's Siberia

Beginning in 1858, tsarist Russia acquired its Pacific Maritime provinces, hoping to flood the Amur Valley with settlers and thus secure its Siberian empire against Chinese intrusion. But today, the Chinese are moving in, entering as traders or tourists and staying on as farmers or cheap labor.[7]

The impulse behind this migration is obvious. China contains 1.2 billion people. The Russian Far East (the area from the western borders of Yakutia and Amur oblast to the Pacific) is a region two-thirds the size of China but contains just 8 million people. Then, too, China's birth-control policies have produced a surplus of Chinese males; some of them head north in search of wives.

Meanwhile, Russian citizens are leaving Russia's eastern regions. By some estimates, about 5 percent of the regions' population has already departed.

The conjuncture of Russian out-migration and Chinese in-migration could, in less than twenty years, create a Chinese majority in areas of the Russian Far East that border China.

Siberia's Seoul

The influx of Chinese into Siberia worries the Russians, particularly since their hopes for Japanese help in developing Siberia are still dimmed by the dispute over the four southernmost islands of the Kurile archipelago. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has said, in effect, that no territorial conflict exists because the islands belong to Russia and that's that.

According to *Forbes:* "The South Koreans have taken full advantage of the opportunity produced by Russia's dislike of its other two close neighbors."[8] Specifically, a Korean consortium is negotiating to develop the natural gas, oil, coal and nonferrous metal resources of Russia's Far East. It "has already spent $20 million on feasibility studies [and] plans to invest $22 billion over ten years to construct a 3,000-mile pipeline, highway, and railroad from Yakutia/Sakha to the Vladivostok region, and then down to South Korea, thus knitting the entire area closer together and providing energy for future development."[9]

Siberia—Korea's *Lebensraum?*

[6] *The Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 20, 1995.

[7] "China 'Invades' Russia," *Foreign Report,* Mar. 2, 1995, pp. 4–6.

[8] Paul Klebnikov, "Russia-on-the-Pacific," *Forbes,* Mar. 27, 1995, p. 89.

[9] Ibid., p. 90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Foreign Policy Research Institute

New and Classic Books by FPRI Staff and Associates

The Kazakhs, 2d ed., by Martha Brill Olcott (Hoover Institution Press, 1995)

Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement, by Adam Garfinkle (St. Martin's/Macmillan, 1995)

Democracy and American Foreign Policy: Reflections on the Legacy of Alexis de Tocqueville, by Robert Strausz-Hupé (Transaction, 1995)

Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, by Robert D. Kaplan (St. Martin's Press, 1993)

Let the Sea Make a Noise . . . A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur, by Walter A. McDougall (Basic Books, 1993)

Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation, edited by George Ginsburgs, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles Smolansky (M.E. Sharpe, 1993)

The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite, by Robert D. Kaplan (Free Press, 1993)

Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government, and Peace, by Harvey Sicherman (Westview Press, 1993)

Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, 2d ed., by Vladimir Tismaneanu (Free Press, 1993)

War, Water, and Negotiation in the Middle East: The Case of the Palestine-Syria Border, 1916–1923, by Adam Garfinkle (Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1994)

The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, by Walter A. McDougall (Basic Books, 1985)

For more information, contact Carl Engelke, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102, or call 215-732-FPRI (732-3774).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

J
A
I
P
R
E
S
S

Research in Biopolitics

Edited by **Albert Somit,** *Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale* and **Steven A. Peterson**, *Department of Political Science, Alfred University*

Volume 3, Human Nature and Politics
In preparation, Spring 1995
ISBN 1-55938-866-8 Approx. $73.25

CONTENTS: Preface, *Joseph Losco and Albert Somit.* Human Nature as the Central Issue in Political Philosophy, *Albert Somit.* Democracy as an Endangered Species: Toward an Evolutionary Perspective, *Albert Somit and Steve Peterson.* Aggression Then and Now, *Robin Fox.* Human Nature and Aggression: Where Do We Go From Here?, *James C. Davies.* Natural Law, Nature and Biology: A Modern Synthesis, *Richard Shelly Hartigan.* Liberalism and the Bifurcated Self: A Life Sciences Critique of Liberal Political Psychology, *Joseph Losco.* Human Nature--One, Two, or None: Feminism and Primatology, *Larry Arnhart.* Politics as a Biological Phenomenon, *Roger D. Masters.* Biological Phenomena, Levels of Analysis, and Reductionism: Masters Model of Human Behavior as a Case Study, *Heinz Eulau and Susan Zlomke.* The Paradigm Shift in the Social Sciences: A Reply to Eulau and Zlomke, *Roger D. Masters.* The Changing Nature of Human Nature, *Robert Blank.* The Evolutionary Origins of Government and Politics, *Gary R. Johnson.*

Also Available:
Volume 1-2 (1991-1994) $73.25 each

FACULTY/PROFESSIONAL discounts are available in the U.S. and Canada at a rate of 40% off the list price when prepaid by personal check or credit card and ordered directly from the publisher.

JAI PRESS INC.
55 Old Post Road # 2 - P.O. Box 1678
Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678
Tel: (203) 661- 7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy Studies in Developing Nations

Edited by **Stuart S. Nagel,** *Department of Political Science, University of Illinois*

Volume 1, Poverty Policy in Developing Countries
In preparation, Fall 1995
ISBN 1-55938-054-3 Approx. $73.25

Edited by **Thomas R. DeGregori** and **Harrell R. Rodgers**, *University of Houston*

CONTENTS: Poverty Policy in Developing Countries, *Thomas R. DeGregori and Harrell R. Rodgers.* PART A. POVERTY: CONCEPT, DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT. A Critique of the World Bank 1990 World Development Report: The Poor as Other, History, *John Mason and Dan Seyler.* Global Development: Is the Gap Widening or Closing?, *N. Kakawani and K. Subbarao.* The Meaning and Measurement of Poverty, *Judith Hayes Ellison and Randal Thompson Dorman.* PART B. POVERTY POLICY: HISTORY, CURRENT CONDITIONS, CONSTRAINTS. Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction: The Implementation Framework for Pakistans Conservation Strategy, *Omar Norman.* Continuing Poverty in the Global Economy: The Impact of Population Growth, *John Adams.* PART C. POVERTY POLICY: RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY. Poverty Policies: The Role of Research, *Pamela R. Johnson and Ann Van Dusen.* Poverty and the Green Revolution, *Nyle Brady.* Health Issues, *D.A. Henderson.* Opportunities in Energy-Photovoltaics, *Bryant Rossiter.* PART D. CONCLUSIONS. Global Development and Poverty Reduction: The Future, *Thomas R. DeGregori and Harrell Rodgers.*

FACULTY/PROFESSIONAL discounts are available in the U.S. and Canada at a rate of 40% off the list price when prepaid by personal check or credit card and ordered directly from the publisher.

JAI PRESS INC.
55 Old Post Road # 2 - P.O. Box 1678
Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678
Tel: (203) 661- 7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792

JAI PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

J
A
I

P
R
E
S
S

Research in Micropolitics

Edited by **Michael X. Delli Carpini,** *Barnard College,* **Leonie Huddy**, *State University of New York at Stony Brook* and **Robert Y. Shapiro**, *Columbia University*

REVIEWS: "This is the first volume of a new annual series, published by JAI Press, devoted to political psychology and political sociology. The thematic focus of this inaugural collection of essays is voting behavior.

On balance, the essays in this volume of Research in Micropolitics contribute to the study of electoral behavior by providing a broad coverage and panoramic view of the electoral literature in the United States, identifying trends in electoral behavior (both methodological and substantive), and offering valuable observations on electoral politics."

— *Contemporary Sociology*

"... its summary and critique of thirty years of existing literature make it worth reading"

— *Contemporary Sociology*

Volume 4, New Directions in Political Psychology
1994, 243 pp. $73.25
ISBN 1-55938-197-3

CONTENTS: Introduction: New Directions in Political Psychology, *Robert Y. Shapiro, Michael X. Delli Carpini, and Leonie Huddy.* PART ONE: METHODOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE RESEARCH. Experimentation in Political Science: Historical Trends and Future Directions, *Kathleen M. McGraw and Valerie Hoekstra.* Pictures in the PC: Computational Modeling and Political Psychology, *Charles S. Taber and Richard Timpone.* The Method is the Message: Focus Groups as a Means of Social, Psychological, and Political Inquiry, *Michael X. Delli Carpini and Bruce Williams.* Survey Research in the Past and Future USSR: Reflections on the Methodology of Mass Opinion Surveys, *James L. Gibson.* PART TWO: MASS PERCEPTION, COGNITION, AND DECISION MAKING. Cognitive Heuristics, Heuristic Processing, and Efficiency in Political Decision Making, *Jeffery Mondak.* The Political Effects of Perceptions of Mass Opinion, *Diana C. Mutz.* The Political Significance of Voters Gender Stereotypes, *Leonie Huddy.* PART THREE: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION. Political Socialization During Adulthood: Clarifying the Political Time of Our Lives, *Virginia Sapiro.* The Politics of the White Collar Working Class: From Structure to Action, *Richard Sobel.*

Also Available:
Volumes 1-3 (1986-1989) $73.25 each

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis (ISSN 0030–4387) is published quarterly by:

JAI Press Inc., 55 Old Post Road - No. 2, P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836–1678.

Editorial Offices: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684. Newsstand distribution is by Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, New Jersey 07110.

Submission of Articles. The editors invite submissions of articles (preferably no more than seven thousand words, reference notes included) bearing upon contemporary international issues important to the United States. Preference will be given to articles including evaluations of different policy options. Authors are encouraged to request manuscript specifications and a style sheet from the editor before beginning to write.

Books and Publications for Review. Materials should be sent to the Book Review Editor, *Orbis,* 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Subscriptions. $40.00 per year for individuals, Canada and Foreign $60.00, Airmail $80.00; $160.00 per year for institutions, Canada and Foreign $180.00, Airmail $200.00. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to JAI Press, Inc., 55 Old Post Road - No. 2, P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836–1678. *Postmaster:* Send address changes to: Subscription Dept., 55 Old Post Road - No. 2, P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836–1678. (Europe and United Kingdom) The Courtyard, 28 High Street, Hampton Hill, Middx TW12 1PD, London, England. All subscriptions must be prepaid and are for the 1995 calendar year only.

Advertising and Permissions. Address all correspondence regarding advertising or permission to photocopy articles to JAI Press Inc.

Microfilm. Beginning with Volume 37, *Orbis* is available on microfiche from JAI Press. Each volume is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. Volumes 1–36 of *Orbis* are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106; call toll free 1-800-521-0600. Volumes 1–36 of *Orbis* are also available on microfiche from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Beginning with Volume 37, back issues are available from JAI Press. Back issues of *Orbis,* Volumes 1–36, are available from Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the editors of *Orbis.* Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Copyright © 1995 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis
A Journal of World Affairs
(ISSN: 0030-4387)

Second Class Postage Paid at Ann Arbor MI and Additional Offices

JAI PRESS INC.
55 Old Post Road No. 2
P.O. Box 1678
Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678
(Address Correction Requested)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED